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This study of the feasibility of free trade between the EU and Ukraine was 
undertaken from September 2004 to January 2005, under contract from the 
European Commission. Extensive consultations were held in Brussels with 
the European Commission, first with the Directorates-General for Trade 
and External Relations, and subsequently with the several other 
directorates-general concerned with sectoral policy aspects of EU–Ukraine 
relations (transport, energy, enterprise, agriculture, information 
technology, heath and safety, economics and finance, competition). 
Consultations were also held in Brussels with UNICE, the European Round 
Table, COPA and steel industry interests. In Kyiv consultations were held 
with Ukraine’s presidential staff, the Ministry of Economy, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice (with special thanks to Olena 
Zerkal), the National Bank of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Agrarian 
Confederation, the European Business Association, steel industry interests, 
the Delegation of the European Commission, several embassies of EU 
member states, the offices of USAID, the World Bank, the IMF, the EBRD 
and the UNDP, along with several policy research centres. 
All the authors worked in an independent capacity. Valeriy 
Pyatnytskiy was appointed Deputy Minister of Economy when the report 
was at an advanced stage of preparation. 
This project is part of the broader work programme of CEPS on 
European Neighbourhood Policy, which is generously supported by the 









Our mandate has been to report on the possible content, feasibility and 
economic implications of Ukraine and the EU undertaking a free trade 
agreement (FTA) to follow on from Ukraine’s accession to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). 
The authors are a group of EU and Ukrainian economists, all of 
whom worked on the project in an independent capacity.1  
The study was commissioned by the European Commission as a step 
in the EU–Ukraine Action Plan jointly agreed with the government of 
Ukraine in December 2004, in the framework of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
2. Context 
The present study is intended to update an earlier study on this subject 
undertaken in 1999. There are indeed major new developments that 
warrant a fresh look at the question:  
•  Ukraine’s economic recovery from the deep recession of the 1990s, 
with fast economic growth over the last five years;  
•  Ukraine’s forthcoming WTO accession; 
•  the EU’s enlargement in 2004 up to Ukraine’s borders;  
                                                      
1 Valeriy Pyatnytskiy participated fully in the larger part of the work of the group 
in an academic capacity, before his appointment as Deputy Minister of Economy in 
November 2005. 2 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
•  the EU’s new European Neighbourhood Policy and Action Plan with 
Ukraine; and  
•  the Orange Revolution in 2004, which marked the will of Ukraine to 
make the break from a phoney to a real democracy. 
At the EU–Ukraine summit of 1 December 2005, EU leaders 
“reconfirmed the goal of promoting deep economic integration between the 
EU and Ukraine and, in order to achieve this, look forward to an early start 
of negotiations of a Free Trade Area once Ukraine has joined the WTO”.2  
3. Methodological  approach 
A starting point for our work was the request to update an earlier study 
undertaken for the Commission on a possible free trade agreement 
(Brenton, 1999). We have approached the task of ‘updating’ in a more 
substantial way than just re-running model calculations quantifying the 
expected impact of free trade with more recent economic data. We took this 
decision because there have been important developments in the analytical 
methods of economists in recent years, reflecting better understanding of 
the processes of both the post-communist transition and contemporary 
European integration. We confirm the earlier conclusions that the simplest 
free trade agreement, merely removing customs tariffs, would have only a 
minor impact on Ukraine’s macroeconomic performance, and even less on 
the EU’s economy. On the other hand, deeper forms of market integration 
can have substantial impact, especially when they link to reforms of 
domestic economic governance in countries (such as Ukraine) where it is 
badly needed. We have thus drawn up two main scenarios for simple and 
deep free trade, and made quantified estimates for both. Whereas simple 
free trade is relatively straightforward to describe, a deep free trade 
agreement (FTA+) requires much more detailed specification of its possible 
contents, to which we therefore devote substantial attention.  
4.  Current economic situation in Ukraine 
Ukraine has succeeded in the last five years to climb out of the deep 
recession of the early years of post-communist transition. But this burst of 
fast growth owed much to a cyclical boom for metallurgical products in 
                                                      
2 See the European Commission, Joint Statement, EU–Ukraine Summit held in Kyiv 
on 1 December 2005, 15222/05 (Presse 337), Brussels, 1.12.2005.  THE PROSPECT OF DEEP FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE| 3 
world markets, which has now come to an end, and to which is now added 
the rise in imported energy prices. Since Ukraine has only a moderate 
natural resource endowment, it has no option other than to become a 
highly open and internationally competitive economy in a diversified range 
of industrial and service sectors (the agricultural sector has a rich 
endowment of land, but will nonetheless be of declining importance in a 
growing economy).  
To this end, Ukraine must establish a favourable business climate 
without delay, cutting out or streamlining a host of complicated, 
unpredictable and often corruptly administered business regulations, and 
so favour both domestic and foreign investment. Also, in the near future 
the government has to unwind the unsustainably populist fiscal policies of 
2004. Yet Ukraine’s capacity to attract strategically important foreign direct 
investments has recently been exemplified in the re-privatisation of its 
largest steel producer (Kryvorizhstal) and investment by an EU bank in one 
of its largest banks (Aval). Integration into European and international 
markets and supply chains, coupled with decisive measures to improve 
domestic economic governance and curb corruption, will have to be at the 
heart of an economic strategy to restore Ukraine to a fast-growth path. 
5.  From WTO accession to an FTA+: A continuum of possibilities 
WTO accession primarily means: 
•  abiding by the principles of non-discrimination and transparency 
among WTO partners; 
•  fixing tariffs, mostly at low levels, with the most-favoured nation 
clause; 
•  excluding quota restrictions; 
•  opening many service sectors to free trade; 
•  adopting rules for customs procedures; and 
•  observing rules for non-tariff barriers, with the principle of non-
discriminatory ‘national treatment’.  
The simplest or minimalist FTA would add to these WTO conditions 
the move to zero tariffs for trade in goods, further liberalisation of services, 
but perhaps with only limited liberalisation in some sectors. 
Deepening the free trade package could mean drawing on the 
following: 4 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
•  extending the zero tariff principle to embrace the free movement of 
all goods, services, capital and (doubtless with longer transition 
periods) labour as well; 
•  for trade in goods, substantial elimination of non-tariff barriers 
through harmonisation or mutual recognition of technical standards 
with those of the EU (or both);  
•  for trade in services, complete sectoral coverage and convergence on 
internal market regulatory rules of the EU or best international 
standards; 
•  stronger commitments in competition policy, corporate governance 
and internal market regulation that are anchored to EU practices, and 
for selective elements of environmental standards; and 
•  adoption of accompanying policies, including technical assistance, 
infrastructure investment, education and training.  
6.  Actual examples from the EU 
The continuum of theoretical possibilities is illustrated by the variety of the 
EU’s existing free trade and association agreements: 
•  The EU’s first free trade agreements were with the European Free 
Trade Area (EFTA), and initially only covered free trade in goods.  
•  The Euro-Mediterranean agreements initially only provided for 
shallow free trade in goods, but extension to free trade in services is 
now being discussed. 
•  The EU-Chile agreement is already more extensive in the coverage of 
service sectors and other provisions.  
•  The EU and Turkey share a customs union for industrial products. 
•  The European Economic Area (EEA), bringing the EU together with 
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, covers all ‘four freedoms’ and 
entails complete compliance with E U  i n t e r n a l  m a r k e t  l a w s  a n d  
standards, and full mutual recognition. This is the extreme model of 
complete inclusion in the EU’s internal market, yet without political 
membership of the EU.  
•  The current EU-Swiss model comprises a large selection of sectoral 
agreements linked to EU internal market norms, but this model is less 
complete than the EEA.  THE PROSPECT OF DEEP FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE| 5 
7.  Economic impacts of simple or deep free trade scenarios 
For making quantitative estimates of the likely impact of free trade, the 
standard modelling (computable general equilibrium) technique is useful, 
but not fully adequate. This is because such models theoretically assume 
that trade barriers are separating otherwise competitive economies, which 
may be not too far from reality for the EU and US as trade partners, but is 
certainly not valid for Ukraine. In addition, the standard models generally 
fail to investigate the dynamic effects of improved institutional 
performance and economic governance or the curbing of corruption, which 
is now the most important deterrent to trade and investment for Ukraine.  
In recent years, however, economists have progressed in analysing 
the impact of removing wider categories of trade barriers, such as 
incompatible technical standards, as well as the dynamics of deeper 
integration, especially between close neighbours where gravitational effects 
through proximity to large markets come into play. The recent experience 
of the enlargement of the EU into Central Europe, coinciding with the post-
communist transition, has spurred research in these fields. There are now 
indications that deep free trade, of the kind discussed here for the EU and 
Ukraine, could have beneficial effects much greater than earlier estimates 
have suggested, including important benefits from both external 
liberalisation and domestic regulatory reforms in the main service sectors. 
Cuts in import tariffs on their own, such as in a simple FTA, will not lead to 
substantial income growth and welfare gains, although there would be 
significant changes in trade structure (which are detailed in chapter 4). Yet 
deeper free trade could deliver welfare gains of the order of 4-7% according 
to comparative static simulations; taking into account dynamic effects, 
welfare gains over time could be twice or three times as large. In addition, 
reductions in the cost of capital could lead to a further 4-5% welfare gain. 
Ukrainian exports to the EU could double, and EU exports to Ukraine 
could also grow very substantially. 
Estimates of the impact of improved institutional quality for countries 
such as Ukraine are very large, with conceivable increases in GDP in the 
range of 20 to 30%. Fully opening the financial and other key service sectors 
such as telecommunications to foreign investment and best international 
practice would constitute a key element of such reforms, and could 
according to some new estimates alone raise the annual growth rate by 
1.5%, compared with economies that have closed and unreformed markets. 
In interpreting these quantitative results it should be noted that they reflect 
different modelling approaches and are therefore not strictly comparable; 6 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
also, the reforms analysed are to some degree overlapping rather than 
strictly additional (the same is true for the estimated welfare effects).  
Overall, a combination of opening the economy and transforming the 
quality of domestic economic governance could substantially raise the 
sustainable growth rate of the Ukrainian economy, possibly even 
approaching double digits for some time. This would mean a substantial 
catch up towards the GDP per capita levels of the new Central European 
member states of the EU. Ukraine has two key assets that could help to 
make this feasible, namely a well-educated human capital base and 
geographical proximity to the EU market – provided that the policy and 
institutional prerequisites are also satisfied. Furthermore, deep free trade 
may also lead to a more equal distribution of population income because 
enhanced competition will cut down monopoly profits. 
The effects on the EU economy will be very minor at the 
macroeconomic level, even insignificant according to standard model 
calculations. But these simulations cannot take into account certain 
dynamic effects that could be of some importance to the EU economy. 
Notably there is the possibility that Ukraine’s inclusion in the European 
supply chain could offer some EU industries, ranging from high-tech 
electronics to low-tech textiles, an opportunity to improve their 
competitiveness  vis-à-vis the fast-growing Asian competitors by 
outsourcing labour- or resource-intensive parts of their production process. 
The example of the huge growth of US-Mexican trade and investment 
under the NAFTA agreement is suggestive here.  
8.  Concepts of feasibility 
Feasibility, a key word in our terms of reference, is a complex concept. It is 
certainly not a static or purely technical matter, and it might be defined as 
having the following aspects in the present context: 
•  administrative capacity to legislate, implement and enforce requisite 
policy steps; 
•  political economy feasibility to undertake the requisite reform 
strategy; 
•  competitive capability of the economy to prosper under open market 
conditions; and 
•  educational capacity of the labour force for an advanced market 
economy. THE PROSPECT OF DEEP FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE| 7 
In general terms, Ukraine’s educational capacity is strong, its 
administrative capacity weak and its competitive capacity, with the 
exception of a few sectors, remains to be created. Political economy 
feasibility is surely a fluid and elastic matter, depending on the broad factor 
of political will, which is the product of political leadership, public 
understanding of the issues and perceptions of sectoral and national 
priorities on the part of different business and civil society interest groups. 
In this area, it is vital that the Ukrainian authorities invest more heavily in 
the normal processes of stakeholder consultation, for example for passing 
WTO-compliant legislation now, followed by that for an FTA. Given 
political will, administrative capacities can be strengthened, reform 
strategies implemented, and new competitive capacities created.    
The broad picture is one of a trade-off, especially for Ukraine, 
between the ease of feasibility versus the scale of the benefits. Simple free 
trade is the most easily feasible, but its impact will be weak. Deep free trade 
is much more demanding in terms of feasibility, but offers the prospect of 
much larger economic advantages of strategic value.  
9.  How far to go in convergence on EU regulatory rules and standards?  
How far or how fast the country should go in the direction of deep policy 
convergence on EU regulatory rules and technical standards requires 
detailed attention, i.e. to define the optimal package and time-path 
specifically for the case of Ukraine on the basis of cost-benefit analysis. 
The recent experience of the new member states has underlined the 
heavy costs in the short run, for both public administrations and the private 
sector, of achieving full compliance with EU economic rules and standards. 
This was in fact achieved only with very substantial financial and technical 
assistance, along with the political incentive of full membership. Ukraine, 
however, is under no pressure to define a deep FTA in terms of complete 
compliance with EU market laws and standards, and so selective 
prioritisation is both possible and desirable. The parties can focus on 
defining the content of an FTA in accordance with objective cost and 
benefit criteria for the two parties.  
10.  A scenario for simple free trade (FTA) 
Free trade in goods. Various precedents would suggest the elimination of 
tariffs asymmetrically over five to ten years. The EU might front-load its 
tariff cuts, possibly eliminating them all on the day of entry into force of the 8 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
agreement, given its much greater competitive strengths. Ukraine would at 
the same time begin to reduce its tariffs. A long transition period, up to 10 
years, has precedents in EU free trade agreements with Mediterranean 
countries. But the disadvantage of a long transition period is that the 
process may lose credibility and fail to energise the private sector, so we 
would suggest about five years. 
WTO rules allow bilateral free trade agreements only on condition 
that substantially all products are included. Agriculture has been the main 
exception in many of the EU’s free trade agreements. Particularly sensitive 
sectors could be handled with extended transition periods and limited 
partial exclusions.  
Free trade in services. Ukraine’s WTO offer already covers almost all 
service sectors, and will be one of the most liberal regimes of all WTO 
members. A few exclusions from the WTO offer, such as for road transport 
and civil aviation (see below), should be brought into the FTA.  
Freedom of capital movements. Some restrictions remain at present for 
short-term capital movements, and these are understandable for a 
transitional period while the Ukrainian financial market is poorly 
developed, and while monetary policy is moving towards a floating 
exchange rate and inflation-targeting regime. Complete freedom for capital 
movements might be achieved by 2008.  
11.  A scenario for deep free trade and the reform of economic 
governance (FTA+)   
Under the current Partnership and Cooperative Agreement with the EU, 
Ukraine has already been progressively approximating many of its external 
trade and internal regulatory policies to EU standards. Although important 
as preliminary investments in legal infrastructure, Ukraine’s performance 
in implementation and enforcement has been lagging far behind. Our 
summary of the priorities for Ukraine would see a scenario with the 
following points, along with those outlined in the simple free trade 
scenario, and are illustrative rather than exhaustive: 
i)  Customs services have to make a double quantum leap, first to 
eliminate corruption, and then to introduce technically advanced 
procedures that would logistically support Ukraine’s entry into the 
European supply chain.  
ii)  For industrial product standards, compliance with EU standards is of 
primary importance, and the EU Commission has proposed an THE PROSPECT OF DEEP FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE| 9 
ambitious plan to Ukraine for achieving a high level of harmonisation 
and mutual recognition by 2011.  
iii)  For agricultural and food products major investment is needed to enable 
compliance with EU sanitary and phytosanitary standards so that 
Ukraine might be able to export a diversified range of products to the 
EU.  
iv)  Ukrainian competition policy is being comprehensively aligned at the 
legislative level on EU practice, but major reinforcement of the 
political independence of the executive authority for controlling 
monopolies and state aid is needed, possibly with some external 
anchorage.  
v)  A government procurement agreement could be negotiated with the EU, 
taking into account whether Ukraine would first negotiate an 
agreement in this domain in the WTO.  
vi)  The financial sector is now being opened for foreign investment, and 
this is the crucial step at this stage towards improved resource 
allocation – by disconnecting the financial system from both 
government and domestic monopolistic power. Nevertheless, there 
should not be a premature attempt at total compliance with EU 
regulatory norms, which would be too costly. 
vii)  The transport sector, especially air and road transport, needs multiple 
initiatives beyond free trade in services, with convergence on EU 
standards and investments in infrastructures. Since the civil aviation 
sector is excluded from the WTO, bilateral negotiations between the 
EU and Ukraine are already beginning in this sector, and should aim 
at full inclusion of Ukraine in the ‘Single European Sky’. 
viii)  The telecommunications sector has also recently been opened for foreign 
investment and competition, and here it is appropriate to converge on 
the EU’s first generation of regulations of 1998 (rather than the more 
recent version, which relies on very advanced national regulatory 
authorities). 
ix)  In the energy sector there are already limited possibilities for 
connections with the EU electricity grid in the south-west region. But 
the bigger question of linkage of the entire Ukraine grid with the EU 
and south-east European grid now becomes conceivable, which 
would require strict compliance with EU standards. The gas crisis of 
January 2006 highlights the inevitable convergence of Ukraine’s 10 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
energy prices on world market levels, and the resulting burden of 
adjustment for its energy-intensive industries.  
x)  In general, an essential requirement for the service sectors is for the 
regulatory authorities to have independence from both political and 
commercial interests, and to acquire state-of-the-art competence, for 
which twinning arrangements with European counterparts would be 
valuable. 
xi)  Ukraine’s corporate governance standards are extremely weak and basic 
laws for joint stock companies, the protection of minority rights and 
for mandatory accounting and audit standards in line with 
European/international standards are still lacking.  
xii)  Regarding environmental standards, full compliance with EU standards 
would be extremely costly if implemented rapidly, although there are 
also the costs of non-action to consider, notably in the area of public 
health. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan 
therefore foresees step-by-step alignment with the environmental 
acquis, with EU financial support. Ukraine’s accession to the Kyoto 
Protocol opens opportunities for accelerating the process in 
cooperation with the EU. 
xiii)  Concerning  labour regulations there are urgent needs in Ukraine to 
improve safety standards, but this requires above all modern re-
equipment in industries such as coal mining. The introduction of 
liability insurance systems would also be helpful. In this area there is 
no need to harmonise with the EU’s often very burdensome 
regulations, such as those for part-time work. Mutual recognition of 
professional qualifications and coordination of social security would 
be natural complements to the other three freedoms. 
xiv)  With regard to the movement of persons, it is already highly positive for 
both parties that Ukraine has scrapped visa restrictions for EU 
citizens. Asymmetry is appropriate here in the interests of both 
parties for the next several years. Visa-free travel would be 
appropriate when Ukraine has achieved a higher level of prosperity 
and border control. Visa facilitation negotiations have now begun for 
Ukrainians travelling to the EU. 
xv)  Ukraine’s human capital is high, especially in the natural sciences, but 
has a huge need for modernisation in the social sciences and 
management studies. With the projected doubling of the EU’s grant 
assistance from €50 to €100 million in the near future, we advocate 
scholarships in higher education as a major priority, with a rapid THE PROSPECT OF DEEP FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE| 11 
build up from the few dozens per year of Ukrainian students in the 
EU as at present, to a thousand by 2008.  
12.  Benchmarks and checkpoints 
The negotiation and implementation of an FTA+ could be subject to a 
number of major benchmarks or checkpoints, for example from the entry 
into force and review after a number of years to moving towards an even 
more advanced relationship. The main strategic requirement, for an FTA+ 
to become strongly beneficial, is for Ukraine to switch to a transparent, 
consistent and largely de-corrupted regime of economic governance, and 
therefore to acquire a reputation for these qualities in the eyes of the 
international business community. Examples of conditional checkpoints 
could include some vital laws for creating conditions for sound economic 
governance that need to be passed, notably the current draft laws for joint 
stock companies, minority shareholder rights and competition policy for 
state aid, which have been rejected by the parliament during the last year, 
but have not been pre-conditions for WTO accession.  
In any event, enforcement of EU-compliant legislation will be 
monitored under the ENP Action Plans, and this could link to the intention 
to make aid under the new European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument 
(ENPI) dependent on performance according to governance criteria. This 
could further link with and reinforce conditionalities set by the 
international financial institutions (IFIs). Indeed, classic trade policies are in 
general not suitable instruments for fine-tuning in relation to wider 
economic policy conditions. On the other hand, where an FTA+ forms part 
of a wider transition strategy and European integration process, there will 
be opportunities for attaching EU and other IFI finance to policy reforms 
that would be crucial for the success of an FTA+.  
13.  From sensitive sectors to a rebranded Ukrainian economy 
We have had a close look at certain sectors that are currently the most 
heavily protected in either or both the EU and Ukraine, and where the most 
lively opposition to free trade might be expected.  
For both parties agriculture is a heavily protected and politically 
sensitive sector. In Ukraine this is because the modernisation of the 
agricultural sector has only recently begun, beyond the essential first step 
of privatisation. For the EU there are already major political difficulties in 12 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
agreeing conditions for opening the WTO’s Doha Round agenda, especially 
for liberalisation of agricultural trade.  
For the EU, steel and textiles have been sensitive industrial sectors for 
several years. In any case, the EU’s quota for steel imports from Ukraine 
will have to be scrapped with Ukraine’s accession to WTO, and an FTA will 
not add to this sector’s challenges. It is already apparent that EU and 
Ukrainian steel producers are beginning to see opportunities for 
complementarity and mutual integration through investments. For textiles 
Ukraine is not at present a major player, but with an FTA+ there would be 
useful opportunities for intra-industry trade in textiles and clothing, with 
the proximity of low labour costs in Ukraine next to the high value-added 
parts of the supply chain in the EU.  
The challenges are more heavily weighted on the Ukrainian side, 
where virtually every sector of the economy, including for example a 
poorly competitive automobile industry, still faces the prospect of deep 
restructuring and renewal. The extent of the poor international 
competitiveness of Ukrainian industry and service sectors makes it 
pointless to try and identify individual branches that might justify special 
protection. This is why a strategy of total commitment to openness and 
steady improvement of the business environment is indispensable. Once 
Ukraine achieves a reputation for such a strategy, which means a ‘re-
branding’ of the Ukrainian economy, there is every reason to expect a 
strong flow of domestic and foreign investment. Already there are signs 
that major industrial sectors, for example electronics manufacturers, are 
seriously considering the option of locating an important part of the 
European supply chain in Ukraine, which could also become a plus for the 
EU’s global competitiveness, in light of the Asian challenge it faces. 
14.  Implications for Ukrainian-Russian trade relations 
There will be many aspects of an EU FTA+ affecting relations between both 
parties and Russia. Both the EU and Ukraine would want an FTA+ to be 
compatible with positive and constructive relations with Russia, as 
illustrated in the following two examples: 
•  There could in principle be possibilities for free trade between all 
three parties. For Ukraine the main objective should be to have free 
trade with both the EU and Russia. Russia also advocates a customs 
union with Ukraine (and Belarus and Kazakhstan); however, this idea 
is being rejected by Ukraine since it would indeed be incompatible 
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•  For the highly complex domain of technical standards for industrial 
and agricultural goods, convergence on a single set of standards is 
desirable. Ukraine is converging on European standards. Here it 
would be helpful if Russia more clearly agreed to also converge on 
European standards in the framework of the (EU–Russia) Common 
European Economic Space. 
15.  What is feasible? What is necessary? 
Unfortunately, as noted earlier, the main policy options come in the form of 
a trade-off between the ease of feasibility and the scale of likely benefits. 
The least ambitious and simplest free trade area, merely eliminating 
tariffs with the exception of agriculture, would be rather easily feasible, but 
of little benefit since the most important barriers to trade and investment in 
Ukraine remaining after WTO accession will be the well-known problems 
of economic governance (lack of transparency in business relations, lack of 
predictability in government policies and pervasive corruption). 
It would clearly not be feasible, on the other hand, to seek within a 
five-year time horizon, full inclusion into the EU’s internal market in the 
manner of Norway in the European Economic Area. The burden of full 
compliance with EU law for the legislature, government agencies and the 
private sector would certainly be excessive for Ukraine over such a short 
period. 
An FTA+ along the lines set out above would fit with the needed 
reform agenda of Ukraine. Its feasibility would certainly be more difficult 
than for simple free trade, and would depend on the capacity of the 
Ukrainian government, parliament, business interests and civil society to 
find together the political will to work towards this end. This condition 
cannot be taken for granted at present, since the current parliament has 
refused to pass a number of laws required even for WTO accession, and 
which would be essential parts of a comprehensive strategy to improve 
economic governance. It remains to be seen therefore what will prove 
feasible with the next parliament following the elections of March 2006.    
The ongoing experiences of the post-communist transition in wider 
Europe point to a model that is not as simple as the idea of a naturally 
continuous process. The picture seems rather to be one of two models 
emerging: the model of countries converging fast on advanced European 
standards of economic governance and democracy with law-abiding 
societies, versus a model of corrupt oligarchic governance, pseudo-14 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
democracy and poor living standards. Regrettably, it seems that the second 
as well as the first of these models is self-sustaining. The Ukraine of the 
Orange Revolution was seen to be trying to break out of one to join the 
other. But the economic forces that sustain the vicious circle of corruption 
and poor living standards are formidable, which is why a strong and deep 
free trade formula, rather than a shallow one, is advisable. 
At this stage the future of the Orange Revolution and Ukraine’s 
European choice hang in the balance, and cannot be considered 
irreversible. A credible reform strategy needs to be anchored in the short 
run to a progression, beginning with the conditions for WTO accession and 
leading on to those for deep free trade, or an FTA+, with the EU. In the 
long run, Ukraine can only become a prosperous and stable democratic 
society with a diversified economy if as a general rule it converges on 
international standards of economic governance and competitiveness. 
Convergence on European standards fits as a strategic anchor both as a 
matter of the political ‘European choice’ and as proxy for general 
international standards. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
SOME PRINCIPLES AND PARADIGMS 
This study concerns the possible content, implications and feasibility of a 
free trade agreement (FTA) between the European Union and Ukraine. The 
EU–Ukraine Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which 
entered into force on 1 March 1998, foresaw the possible establishment of 
an FTA between the two partners. A study of the Tacis programme in 1999 
(referred to below as the ‘1999 study’) examined the issues in depth. The 
present study is intended to update that work3 
The new political context  
Since the 1999 study, there have been no less than five substantial changes 
in the context for the relationship between the EU and Ukraine:  
•  The EU has enlarged to 25 member states, with Poland, Slovakia and 
Hungary all directly bordering Ukraine, and Romania due to follow 
soon. 
•  The EU has developed a new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 
which embraces Ukraine and greatly extends the agenda of EU–
Ukrainian integration measures, including a stake in the internal 
market. Thus the idea of free trade is already overlapping with that of 
deeper integration. 
                                                      
3 See P. Brenton, Study on Evaluating the Economic Feasibility, General Impact and 
Implications of a Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine 
according to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, Executive Summary, CEPS, 
Brussels, 1999.  16 | INTRODUCTION 
•  Over the past five years, Ukraine’s economy has impressively 
resumed economic growth, compensating for the heavy losses of the 
early period of independence. These gains relied heavily on an 
exceptional boom in world metallurgical demand, however, which is 
now over. Therefore new and sustainable sources of economic growth 
are urgently required. 
•  Meanwhile, Ukraine’s negotiations for accession to the WTO have 
been gradually advancing, and the government is attaching the 
highest priority to now bringing them to a rapid conclusion, which 
would satisfy a major prerequisite for opening negotiations for free 
trade with the EU. Yet continuing parliamentary opposition to some 
necessary WTO-enabling laws means that there remains some 
uncertainty over the timing of the country’s accession to the WTO.  
•  In the last year, Ukraine has seen its dramatic Orange Revolution, 
which aimed at making a decisive break in favour of sound 
democratic governance, followed by the announcement of ambitious 
objectives for European integration. Nevertheless subsequent 
developments are a reminder that the objective of democratic stability 
is not achieved overnight.  
At the EU-Ukraine summit of 1 December 2005, EU leaders, 
“reconfirmed the goal of promoting deep economic integration between the 
EU and Ukraine and, in order to achieve this, look forward to an early start 
of negotiations of a Free Trade Area once Ukraine has joined the WTO”.4  
All these developments make the elaboration of a strategy for trade 
liberalisation and economic integration between the EU and Ukraine a 
much more relevant and pressing concern for policy-makers.  
Forms of free trade 
Free trade has traditionally been defined in a simple way, namely the 
removal of tariffs and quotas for trade in goods. For free trade to exist 
b e t w e e n  t h e  E U  a n d  U k r a i n e ,  i t  i s  u n d e r s t o o d  b y  b o t h  p a r t i e s  t h a t  
Ukraine’s accession to the WTO is in any case a prior step. Once this is 
achieved, the further move to the simplest form of free trade with the EU 
would be a rather modest step, since the tariffs bound with WTO accession 
                                                      
4 See the European Commission, Joint Statement, EU–Ukraine Summit held in Kyiv 
on 1 December 2005, 15222/05 (Presse 337), Brussels, 1.12.2005.  THE PROSPECT OF DEEP FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE| 17 
will be relatively low on average, and the rules of the WTO exclude quota 
restrictions as a general rule. More precisely, WTO accession means: 
•  fixing tariffs, mostly at low levels; 
•  excluding quota restrictions; 
•  opening many service sectors for free trade; 
•  conforming with rules for customs procedures; and 
•  conforming to rules for non-tariff barriers, with the principle of non-
discriminatory ‘national treatment’.  
The simplest and shallowest FTA would therefore add to these WTO 
conditions only the move to zero tariffs for trade in goods, but perhaps 
with some limited exclusions such as those applying to agriculture. This 
simplest form of free trade would surely be feasible as it adds rather little 
to the conditions for WTO membership, which is expected in the near 
future in any case. 
Deeper forms of economic integration, which we call ‘deep free 
trade’, or ‘FTA+’, could in principle include the following further elements: 
•  for trade in goods, substantial elimination of non-tariff barriers 
through harmonisation or mutual recognition of regulatory rules and 
technical standards (or both); 
•  for service sectors, complete coverage of and convergence on internal 
market regulatory rules, leading to harmonisation or mutual 
recognition of regulatory standards (or both); 
•  extension to capital and labour, no doubt with various conditions and 
transition periods, for goods and services; 
•  commitments to European models and methods of competition 
policy, corporate governance and internal market regulation; 
•  alignment with European environmental standards in the long run, 
but starting now; and  
•  accompanying policies, including technical assistance, infrastructure 
investment and programmes for education and training.  
How far or how fast the country should go in these directions requires 
detailed attention in order to define the most advisable package and time-
path, and we advocate careful cost-benefit analysis of the options. The deep 
free trade concept covers a continuum of conceivable packages or of 
sequencing of different components, and our report assembles (in chapter 6) 
one view of a plausible package of priorities. While many alternative 18 | INTRODUCTION 
packages are conceivable, we do not encourage ‘shopping’ to simply to pick 
out the easiest elements. As pointed out below, there are important 
synergies to be achieved between the different sectoral items, such that a 
holistic approach is in our judgement advisable. The main variable in fine-
tuning the package should be in sequencing and lengths of transition 
periods for various reforms. 
Concepts of feasibility 
With a view to free trade between Ukraine and the EU, there are several 
concepts of feasibility or capacity to be considered.  
Administrative capacity to legislate and implement the requisite policy steps. 
Ukrainian administrative capacities in the public sector are undoubtedly 
still weak, but in the context of free trade the important distinction is 
between those measures that are pure acts of liberalisation, versus those 
that involve sophisticated regulatory capabilities. The agenda for simple 
free trade will actually reduce burdens on the public administration 
through removing the task of collecting customs duties (although not 
eliminating the need for proper customs controls), reducing or eliminating 
licensing requirements for entry into service sectors and capital 
movements, and – as was done by Ukraine in 2005 – by simply scrapping 
visa requirements for visitors from the EU. On the other hand, the deep free 
trade agenda, with convergence on the EU acquis or best international 
regulatory practice, would require serious institutional reform and 
capacity-building. This first concerns the technical functions of regulatory 
authorities in the executive branch of government, which require a high 
degree of professional knowledge. Second, it concerns the functioning of 
law enforcement and judicial authorities. Third, it requires a correct 
separation of powers between the executive, legislature and judiciary. On 
all these accounts, Ukraine’s ratings, according to international surveys 
undertaken by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), are still weak.  
Political economy feasibility to undertake a reform strategy. So far it has 
not proved politically feasible to obtain parliament’s agreement to 
significant parts of the economic reform agenda needed to create a newly 
diversified and internationally competitive economy. In particular, 
oligarchic interest groups in the parliament, with strong links to the 
executive, have hampered attempts to introduce some basic legislation for 
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governance. Oligarchic business interests have both bought influence in the 
parliament and secured a very high level of direct representation within it. 
That being said, civil society has become forceful in protesting against 
corrupt governance – such was the essence of the Orange Revolution. 
Whether the next political period can produce a power structure that will 
be willing and able to undertake a deep reform agenda is unknown at the 
time of writing.  
Competitive capability of the economy to prosper under open market 
conditions. Ukraine has delayed the structural adjustment of its economy to 
competitive, world market conditions. Ukraine has, however, built up very 
large trade surpluses since 2000, which provide a favourable basis for trade 
liberalisation. These surpluses will now be reduced as a result of 
weakening demand for metallurgical exports and rising prices for energy 
imports. The rise in energy prices towards world market levels, long 
delayed, is now being imposed on Ukraine, which therefore has no option 
but to develop a more energy-efficient and internationally competitive 
economy. This step will require new and rapid growth in many branches of 
the industrial and service sector eco n o m y .  T h a t  i n  t u r n  r e q u i r e s  a  
favourable business climate by international standards, which leads back to 
the case for the deep free trade agenda.  
Educational capacity of the labour force for an advanced market economy. 
All the former communist states of Europe achieved high educational 
standards. International surveys show that for the more easily comparable 
mathematical and scientific disciplines the levels of educational 
achievement in both the EU’s new member states and Ukraine, Russia and 
Belarus actually exceed those of Western European countries. Aptitudes to 
adapt to new technologies are good, as for example in the rapid 
development of a service sector in information technology software. This 
primary prerequisite for deep integration with the EU is therefore satisfied.   
The feasible and the necessary. What is feasible depends in the short run 
on the level of ambition of the project. Over a medium-term time horizon, 
however, the political-will factor is key to making more ambitious projects 
feasible, and notably so for Ukraine since the general educational level 
satisfies a key prerequisite for deep integration with Europe. The simplest 
free trade proposition is clearly the most feasible in the short run, since it 
eases problems of weak administrative capacity and the economy starts 
with a healthy trade surplus. But it is unlikely to produce important 
benefits. By contrast, the political and administrative demands made by a 
deep free trade and reform agenda are much more onerous. Whether this 20 | INTRODUCTION 
heavier political agenda is going to prove feasible in the period ahead is 
uncertain at this stage. The political-will factor is certainly not a static 
matter, resulting as it does from the constant interaction between political 
leaders, the perceptions of public opinion and the influence of business and 
civil society. At this time the need for profound economic reform should 
become all the more obvious by the end of cheap imported energy supplies. 
Moreover when the political situation is manifestly unsettled and unstable, 
as is understandable for a country mid-way through the post-communist 
transition, the need for external anchorage of the reform process is all the 
greater.  
Cost-benefit analysis for the optimal FTA+ package 
The precise choice of the optimal extent and speed of Ukraine’s 
approximation of EU internal market law and practice is a highly complex 
matter. There is a need for operational criteria to define the best way 
forward for the foreseeable future. The criteria should in principle be based 
on analysis of the costs and benefits for Ukraine to converge, to fuller or 
lesser degrees, on the regulations and standards of each chapter of the EU’s 
external and internal market policies (known as the EU acquis 
communautaire).5 
The cost and benefits of adopting given market laws and policies may 
be identified as follows: 
•  Costs 
o  for the public sector in recruiting/retaining skilled personnel in 
government departments and in allocating material resources 
for technical agencies; 
o  for the private sector in changing the technical specifications of 
products to satisfy reach EU standards or to enable service 
sectors to respect regulatory norms; and 
o  for accelerated economic restructuring with the scrapping of 
investment in the previous system and transitional 
unemployment. 
                                                      
5 The term ‘acquis’ is the French expression used very commonly in EU circles as 
shorthand for the ‘acquired’ stock of EU laws, regulations and standards. New 
member states are required to become completely ‘acquis compliant’, and EEA 
members have to become completely compliant with the internal market acquis. THE PROSPECT OF DEEP FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE| 21 
•  Benefits 
o  through obtaining improved EU market access; 
o  through accessing conditional financial incentives offered by the 
EU and IFIs; and  
o  through embedding improved domestic economic governance, 
leading to better economic performance. 
While the main issue on the cost side is the burden of implementing 
regulatory rules and standards, a distinction needs to be made in the cost-
benefit analysis between: 
•  mandatory standards, which must be adopted by the entire sector, as 
is typical for the financial sector; and  
•  voluntary standards, which may be applied by the individual 
enterprise if it so wishes, as is typical for industrial products (Box 1).  
The voluntary standards system is an important part of the market 
economy paradigm, whereas the generalisation of mandatory standards 
(rather than their selective choice in accordance with externalities) is part of 
the centrally-planned economy paradigm, of which the Gosstandards system 
is a relic. 
Box 1. Examples of costs and benefits in some cases of possible EU compliance 
A Ukrainian manufacturer can choose voluntarily to adopt the EU product 
standard and gains access to the EU market. The costs should not be too onerous, 
since companies have the option not to comply. The EU and IFIs may grant 
technical assistance to help set up the testing and conformity assessment agencies. 
The benefits in terms of economic governance are, however,  small.  
The prudential regulations for financial services are mandatory for all banks, 
in line with basic EU and international standards. The costs of compliance may 
initially be heavy, but the benefits in terms of domestic economic governance are 
very important, and investment aid from the IFIs could be significant. Yet for 
Ukrainian banks to have full access to the EU market, obtaining the ‘European 
passport’, the regulatory system would have to be exactly compliant with all EU 
directives, which would be a great additional burden for little benefit at this stage.  
Accounting and auditing standards, in line with EU and international 
practices, are currently voluntary in Ukraine, but could be made mandatory for all 
large companies. The costs of compliance are initially quite high for the private 
sector and there are no direct benefits in terms of market access for trade. But the 
benefits in terms of access to international capital markets, in improved domestic 
governance and in creating a favourable business environment for foreign 
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More generally, the criteria for judging the desirable degree of EU 
compliance include: i) whether it facilitates deeper market integration; ii) 
whether the EU law or standard is in line with best international practice; 
iii) whether it helps the transition of the reform process; and iv) whether it 
can help overcome obstacles to reform from domestic interest groups. These 
are the criteria that are taken into account later in this report, especially 
when looking in some detail at the market-opening and reform agendas for 
the service sectors.  
Synergies from a holistic approach 
While each individual act of adopting EU norms and standards can be 
assessed as single items, this may only be a first step in the assessment, 
since there will often be synergy between multiple actions in a given sector 
(see Box 2).  
Box 2. An example of possible synergies between multiple elements of EU 
compliance 
The prospects for the civil aviation sector in Ukraine might be dramatically 
improved with a ‘freedom of the skies’ agreement with the EU concerning market 
access, but only on the condition that Ukrainian airlines can buy new aircraft 
competitively without import duties (thus free trade in goods and services together). In 
addition, the main airports would need to be upgraded to meet European safety 
standards along with major infrastructural investment following privatisation, 
which could also attract foreign investment (thus further adding regulatory compliance 
and infrastructural investment). The potential synergies culminating from these 
multiple actions would be decisive, while isolated actions would not yield a 
favourable cost-benefit result.  
This point links to an even broader argument concerning the 
construction of a nation’s reputation, image and identity. International 
investors wish to synthesise masses of detailed information in making their 
investment strategies. For this purpose credible anchorage on a robust set of 
rules, with further qualities of predictability for future policy-making are 
vital for the building of a reputation for a favourable business climate. The 
new member states of the EU have evidently been through an extremely 
demanding process of becoming comprehensively compliant with EU rules 
and standards, backed up legal enforcement mechanisms. For Ukraine, 
‘European choice’ is the chosen label, but to give credibility to this image 
there has to be a very substantial commitment to EU standards. This stance 
does not have to represent a total commitment as for accession candidate 
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  states, but there has to be a critical mass. Otherwise, there will be no 
reputational benefit, as was indeed the case during the Kuchma regime. The 
Orange Revolution created the opportunity to construct a new reputation, 
and deep free trade with the EU could be a strategic mechanism for 
achieving it. | 24 
 
 
2.  MACROECONOMIC AND STRUCTURAL 
DEVELOPMENTS IN UKRAINE 
Ukraine has arrived at a crossroads on its way from a Soviet past to a 
European future. While the external environment is becoming less 
favourable, a big leap forward is necessary for creating a market-based 
economy, namely one that would allow for structural change by the entry 
of new enterprises offering new products or more efficient lines of 
production. This advance means using the momentum created by the 
Orange Revolution and combining negotiations about better access to 
external markets with sweeping reforms at home, so as to signal to 
domestic and foreign investors that Ukraine is going to exploit its 
comparative advantage as a low-cost producer bridging European and 
Asian areas.  
2.1  Macroeconomic performance  
It is excellent that the Ukrainian economy has been able to grow rapidly in the last 
few years, recovering from the deep recession of the early years of the post-
communist transition. The macroeconomic situation is now becoming more 
difficult, but assuming that monetary stability is assured, the starting condition for 
the years ahead looks broadly favourable.  
Ukraine experienced a strong recovery in the six years after the 1998 crisis 
(IMF, 2005 and World Bank, 2005a). GDP growth totalled 50% for the 
period 1999–2004. At 12.1% in 2004, Ukraine’s growth rate was the highest 
in Europe, but this recovery came from a low starting base. Ukraine’s 
output contraction in the 1990s was more pronounced than in most other 
transition countries and the country’s GDP has not yet reached the level it 
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than half that of Russia or Romania and not even 10% of that in the EU-15 
(although at purchasing power parity, this disparity is considerably less). 
The acceleration in economic growth has initially been driven by 
exports. Rapid growth in China has boosted Ukraine’s steel exports, while 
continued growth in Russia has benefited Ukraine’s machinery exports. 
Additionally, the cheap exchange-rate policy since the 1998 crisis has 
improved competitiveness considerably. Consequently, annual export 
growth has averaged 25% since the end of 2002, yielding a sizable current 
account surplus (10.5% of GDP in 2004) and foreign reserve accumulation. 
These favourable external conditions have helped to fuel an investment 
and construction boom, with domestic demand playing an increasingly 
important role. The trend was also supported by the surge in credit to the 
private sector and rising disposable incomes. Until 2004, economic growth 
allowed for a significant improvement in the fiscal position, which led to a 
greatly reduced debt-to-GDP ratio (from 61% of GDP in 1999 to less than 
27% of GDP in 2004). The economy has also experienced significant growth 
in the real demand for money owing to increased confidence and rising 
incomes. The macroeconomic stability achieved by Ukraine in 2004 was 
remarkable in absolute but also in relative terms, when comparing 
Ukraine’s inflation rates, budget balance and public debt with EU-accession 
candidate states (see further below) and the standards set by the euro area 
(Vinhas de Souza et al., 2005). 
Now, however, Ukraine’s macroeconomic environment is 
deteriorating fast, with much slower growth, and rising inflation and 
budget deficits (World Bank, 2005a and ICPS, 2005a). Since the elections of 
late 2004, real growth has slowed while inflation pressures have mounted. 
In the period January-August 2005, GDP growth decelerated to 2.8% 
compared with a year earlier. Cutbacks in public investment together with 
continuing uncertainty about policy interventions caused a substantial fall 
in investment demand. The contribution of net exports also declined, partly 
because of the appreciation of the Ukrainian hryvnya in April. Meanwhile, 
consumption growth, fuelled by fiscal stimulus, has remained strong. 
Industrial production decelerated to 3.5% in January-August 2005. A 
considerable part of the slowdown can be attributed to the metals (–3.2% in 
January-July) and oil refining (–8.6%) sectors. Metal production declined as 
a result of the reversal of the growth of world metal prices, reduced import 
demand in China and tensions associated with the re-privatisation. The oil 
refinery sector suffered from the demand decline associated with the 
surging prices and the earlier government’s attempts to control prices and 
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in 2005, as compared with 20% in 2004. Investment uncertainty resulted in 
a 7.7% decline in construction during January-August 2005. By contrast, the 
food industry grew at 14% in 2005, reflecting households’ real income 
growth. 
Rising inflationary pressures reflect increasingly tight capacity 
constraints, large terms-of-trade gains, massive hikes in public wages and 
pensions and rigidity in the supply response to higher demand in some 
food markets (e.g. meat). At the same time, the impact and persistence of 
these shocks on inflation has been enhanced by a monetary policy 
framework that tends to transmit exchange-rate market pressures directly 
into changes in monetary conditions. As a result, annual CPI inflation has 
been on an upward trend since early 2003 and reached 14.9% in the period 
between August 2004 and 2005. 
In the macroeconomic framework, the most pressing issue is the 
exchange rate targeting policy.6 In an environment of strong external 
surpluses and a virtually stable exchange rate there are increasing 
inflationary pressures, albeit after a period of rather limited inflationary 
effects stemming from a re-monetisation and reduction of ‘barter’ 
payments (Vinhas de Souza et al., 2005). The appreciation of the hryvnya in 
early 2005 may be interpreted as a step towards a more flexible exchange-
rate system, a step supported by the international financial institutions, and 
the authorities have announced their intention to move to an inflation-
targeting system. Indeed, an over-long continuation of the current 
exchange-rate peg may become unsustainable and feed speculative 
pressures (van Aarle et al., 2004). It is therefore advisable that Ukraine 
gradually moves towards more exchange rate flexibility in order to gain 
greater control over monetary aggregates and so avoid the build up of 
financial vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, whereas there is broad agreement 
                                                      
6 In 2000, a free-floating exchange-rate regime was introduced, but de facto the 
hryvnya has been kept at an almost constant rate with respect to the US dollar by 
means of foreign-exchange market interventions. Since 2000, the trade and current 
accounts have shown surpluses, leading to an increase in the money supply, as 
often the monetary authorities refrained from sterilising these inflows. The main 
reason behind the lack of effective sterilisation was the lack of sterilisation 
instruments and the ineffectiveness of the National Bank of Ukraine rates as a 
monetary policy tool (Bilan, 2004). Also, owing to the success of the stabilisation 
policy, the demand for financial assets increased. This led to high growth rates of 
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on the need for such a change, there is much less agreement on the best 
alternatives (see Yushchenko, 2000) given the practical difficulties that 
remain in implementing monetary policy in Ukraine (as in other CIS 
countries – see Esanov et al., 2004). To mention two of the difficulties, the 
monetary transmission mechanism is still unstable (see Bilan, 2004, 
Golodniuk, 2004 and Leheyda, 2004) and there is a potential –and growing 
– ‘fear of floating’ problem, when one looks at the level of the dollarisation 
of liabilities in the financial system (IMF, 2005). Money supply or interest 
rate rules coupled with a floating exchange rate are difficult to implement 
in Ukraine, because there are neither the stable structural relationships nor 
the deep financial markets needed to support such monetary rules. The 
problem also applies to other transition countries such as China (Diehl & 
Schweickert, 2005), 
Assuming that macroeconomic stability remains a high priority, and 
driven by the early Yushchenko reforms and favourable external 
conditions, the starting point for the years ahead is still broadly favourable. 
The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) developed a solid reputation through 
its smooth introduction of a new currency in the mid-1990s and remains 
one of the country’s more respected and better-led institutions (EIU, 2005). 
Good starting conditions together with the reputation of the central bank 
should allow Ukraine’s politicians to concentrate on badly needed 
institutional reforms. 
2.2  Institutional reforms for structural change  
While the metallurgical boom has driven the recent rapid economic growth, the 
necessary diversification away from traditional sectors has been delayed by vested 
interests and inadequate modernisation of the legal, regulatory and institutional 
framework. Institutional reform now has to be the first priority for structural 
change.  
The year 2000, when Viktor Yushchenko was Prime Minister, represented a 
milestone from an historical perspective since it marked the start of 
Ukraine’s economic recovery (World Bank, 2004a). Yet the strong growth 
since 2000 has reflected low marginal costs for expanding production in 
many areas owing to excess capacity after the free fall in output in the 
1990s. Under these conditions, growth in domestic demand impacted more 
on output than prices. Yet marginal costs are now increasing as capacity 28 | MACROECONOMIC AND STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENTS IN UKRAINE 
constraints become more binding, which makes fixed capital investment, 
along with a more efficient allocation of existing resources, increasingly 
important as a determinant of future growth potential.7 Although 
investment levels in Ukraine appear adequate to support economic growth 
in general, it is not clear if they will be sufficient to support a sustained 
period of rapid growth over the medium term. 
Restructuring in Ukraine has been delayed by vested bureaucratic 
and economic interests eager to preserve elements of the centrally planned 
system and by the lack of consensus among political and business leaders 
over the desirability of market reforms (EIU, 2005). The recent very rapid 
recovery in growth relied heavily on low value-added (or even value-
subtracting) manufacturing sectors, particularly metallurgy (see Tables 2.1 
and 2.2). This led to concerns about the longer-term sustainability of the 
recovery, which was not the result of far-reaching reforms or large-scale 
investment of the sort needed to reorient the manufacturing sector towards 
higher value-added output and developed markets. These concerns eased 
somewhat when in the last few years the ongoing recovery in 
manufacturing became less driven by traditional industries, and suggested 
a somewhat broader and more sustainable basis for growth. During this 
period, higher value-added sectors (including the engineering sector, food 
and light industries) became increasingly important contributors to growth. 
Since 2003, machine-building, a relatively high value-added sub-sector, has 
emerged as the fastest-growing component of the manufacturing sector. 
The rapid expansion in machine-building is the result of strong Russian 
demand for railway carriages and locomotives, and a surge in demand 
among Ukrainian consumers for low-budget, domestically assembled 
automobiles.  
Nonetheless, the metal sector still plays a crucial role. In 2003-04, it 
returned to strong double-digit growth, having recovered from a sharp 
production slump in the first months of 2002 (because of weak world prices 
and proliferating trade restrictions). The sector’s recovery reflected 
improved prices and the successful re-orientation of exports to newer 
                                                      
7 The energy and utility sectors deserve special attention as energy demand 
continues to increase while the infrastructure deteriorates. In addition to robbing 
the energy sector of needed investment resources, low energy prices and 
continuing problems in payment discipline encourage wastefulness and distort the 
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markets in the Middle East and Asia. But with about 75-80% of Ukraine’s 
metal production still oriented towards foreign rather than domestic 
consumers, the sector’s vulnerability remains an issue. So too does the 
growing domestic shortage of scrap metals and coke, two key inputs in 
steel production. Controversial government measures – including a duty 
on scrap exports – have failed to dissuade Ukrainian scrap exporters from 
taking advantage of the higher prices available elsewhere. As a result, 
Ukraine’s success in diversifying away from traditional sectors has been 
gradual at best. Privatisation and foreign investment have proceeded more 
slowly in Ukraine than in former communist countries in Central Europe, 
such as Poland and Hungary. 
Table 2.1 Gross value-added by sector, 2002-07 (% of real change) 
    2002  2003  2004 2005 2006 2007 
% of 
GDP 
      Est.  Forecast Forecast Forecast  in 
2003 
Agriculture, hunting 
and forestry  
2.0  –11.0  19.5 3.0 1.0 3.0  12.7 
Extraction  2.4  5.4  4.2 5.0 3.0 3.0  4.0 
Processing  9.5  17.4  14.7 3.0 7.0 7.0  23.4 
Utilities (power, gas 
and water)  
1.7  4.5  –1.0 3.0 3.0 1.0  3.6 
Construction  –2.6  28.2  18.4 –3.0  8.0 10.0  5.0 
Wholesale/retail 
trade  
7.8  21.5  17.8  –1.0 5.0 6.0  14.6 
Transport  7.4  11.1  10.3 7.0 7.5 8.0  13.2 
Education      –0.5  10.4  6.7 5.0 6.0 7.0  4.7 
Healthcare and 
social security  
4.6  9.0  5.5 5.0 6.0 6.0  3.2 
Other types of 
economic activity  
–  8.3  8.1 8.0 7.0 6.4  15.9 
Net tax on products  0.5  2.9  12.6  6.0  5.0  5.0  – 
GDP    5.2  9.6  12.1 4.0 5.5 6.0 – 
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Table 2.2 Industrial output (2002-07) 
  2002    2003    2004    2005 2006 2007 




















Total industrial output   171,206.7  7.0   220,605.1   15.8   326,543.9   12.5   5.0   6.5   6.0  
Extraction   19,822.0   2.3   21,900.4   5.5   26,881.6   4.1   3.0   3.0   3.0  
Fuel extraction   13,026.5   –0.8   13,778.7   3.6   15,014.3   1.9   1.0   1.0   1.0  
Non-fuel extraction   6,795.5   7.7   8,121.7   9.1   11,106.3   7.6   6.0   6.0   6.0  
Processing industry   126,186.0   8.9   171,592.6   18.2   253,706.3   14.6   6.0   7.0   7.0  
Food industry and processing of farm output  30,883.6   8.4   38,409.0   20.0   49,150.7   12.4   10.0   8.0   8.0  
Textiles/apparel   2,216.9   0.4   2,498.1   4.0   3,434.0   13.6   4.0   7.0   7.0  
Timber production and wood products   1,002.4   23.4   1,499.4   23.6   1,931.8   25.5   20.0   10.0   10.0  
Pulp & paper, printing and publishing   3,327.6   8.4   4,294.7   25.7   6,261.5   25.9   10.0   15.0   10.0  
Coke production and petroleum refining  9,837.3   25.5   16,896.9   8.7   27,831.4   3.4   –8.0   4.0   2.0  
Chemicals and petrochemicals   10,789.4   6.5   14,523.1   16.8   21,204.9   14.4   10.0   6.0   5.0  
Other non-metal mineral products   5,378.7   5.3   6,797.3   17.9   9,149.1   19.3   12.0   15.0   25.0  
Metallurgy and metal processing   39,031.0   3.9   53,650.9   14.3   86,674.2   12.0   2.0   0.0   –2.0  
Machine building   21,309.4   11.3   30,091.4   35.8   43,782.0   28.0   9.0   14.0   15.0  
Utilities (electricity, gas and water)   25,198.7   1.1   27,112.1 4.7    45,955.9   –1.1   3.0   3.0   1.0  
Note:  Arc = annual real change. 
Source: ICPS (2005a). THE PROSPECT OF DEEP FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE| 31 
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The fundamental challenge will be to modernise the legal, regulatory 
and institutional framework required for a functioning market economy. 
Sustained progress in building market-based institutions is a sine qua non 
condition for EU enlargement and neighbourhood policies. Ukraine is 
characterised by widespread state ownership, an oligarchic business 
structure (a big part of the economy is controlled by a few industrial clans), 
inefficient bureaucracy and endemic corruption. The importance of the 
private sector has risen (to 65% of GDP and 45% of fixed assets), but the 
composition of the private sector is strongly skewed towards heavy 
industry, while the service sectors and SMEs remain underdeveloped 
(ICPS, 2004b). Hence, a strong move towards the implementation of 
market–based institutional reforms should have been a natural first priority 
for the new government when it came to power in January 2005. Yet the 
political arena became fully occupied by counterproductive discussions, 
which led to a standstill in the essential reform process (Åslund, 2005). The 
government’s interventions in the energy and food sectors, the surge in 
government expenditures and the re-privatisation drive brought 
investment and reconstruction to a painful halt. The exceedingly high tax 
burden harms business and investment, while rising costs neither stimulate 
enterprises nor calm the surging inflation.  
The recent update of the Blue Ribbon report (BRC, 2005) for Ukraine 
points exactly at the institutional deficits as a bottleneck for structural 
changes.8 The report foresees that years will pass before the full positive 
impact of these changes could be felt, and the steps needed to achieve them 
will arouse fierce conflicts of interests. But credible signals that the 
government has adopted a reform course can be expected to improve 
public confidence. With trade negotiations already on the agenda, tax 
policy, privatisation, competition policy and better financial intermediation 
                                                      
8 The report proposes five priorities for reform. The first area of priority includes 
political reform, administrative reform, reform of relations between the central 
state and local governments and judicial reform. Social reforms are a second 
priority area. A third priority area consists of further tax reform and the 
development of the financial sector. The fourth priority targets respect for private 
property—something that has been discredited by the current relations between 
the state and private business in post-Soviet Ukraine. The fifth priority area is 
Ukraine’s international integration, which is vital for the country’s economic 
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are the reform areas where the government could take immediate steps that 
help structural change.9 In the absence of reforms in these areas, the 
country will have a low investment rating, which discourages foreign 
capital inflow, while domestic capital flees offshore.  
Institutional reform should be the first priority for structural change. 
The main obstructions on the way from a Soviet past to a European future 
are domestic. Without a clear signal to the public and to the business sector 
of a big leap forward in building reliable, market–based institutions, which 
allow restructuring by the market entry of new enterprises with new 
products, there is clearly a risk that Ukraine may not use the momentum 
created by favourable macroeconomic conditions and the spirit of the 
Orange Revolution, and get stuck on its way to a modern market economy. 
2.3  Patterns of trade and foreign investment 
Ukraine’s trade has roughly doubled over the last decade in US$ value terms, with 
a major diversification of exports away from the initially dominant Russian 
market. Exports to Asian markets have grown hugely, while the volume of exports 
going to the EU-25 plus south-east Europe is now double that for Russia. The new 
trade structure sees Ukraine having to export to the EU and Asia in order to pay 
for its oil and gas imports from Russia.  
Largely as a result of booming metal exports, Ukraine’s level of trade 
openness has increased considerably (imports and exports are equivalent to 
90% of GDP), and is now comparable to other countries in the region. In the 
medium term, however, the sustainability of the export trend remains 
uncertain and the export sector faces severe shortcomings (World Bank, 
2004a): Ukraine’s export elasticity on foreign incomes has been low, 
                                                      
9 An effort should be made to simplify and unify the code, while reducing overall 
taxation. Another task is to make sure that refunds of value-added tax (VAT) for 
exporters actually work, so that they are not being punished with an unlawful levy 
of no less than 20%. Also, the number of taxes as well as the tax burden should be 
reduced from the current high level of 39% of GDP to a more moderate rate of 25–
30% of GDP. The state also continues to control the most capital-intensive 
enterprises: two-thirds of the capital assets of the real sector remain in state owner-
ship, especially in the energy and transport industries, telecommunications, public 
utilities and military-industrial sectors. Coupled with a completion of 
privatisation, a more robust and consistent competition policy should be 
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Ukrainian exports remain highly concentrated (as shown in slow changes 
in Ukraine’s diversification indicators) and, finally, Ukrainian exporters 
face far more problems at home than abroad.  
Nevertheless, the regional structure of trade is changing 
continuously. After the enlargement in May 2004, the EU became the 
largest trade partner of Ukraine. Trade with the EU-25 is estimated to 
account for approximately one-third of merchandise exports and imports in 
2004, with total trade turnover at almost €15 billion. In spite of this fact, it is 
still substantially below the share from the eight new EU member states 
from Eastern Europe several years prior to their EU accession. For example, 
the share of Ukraine’s exports to the EU-15 (20% in 2003) is three times 
lower than that of Poland. The role of Russia—although it is still the largest 
single-country trade partner for Ukraine—has been substantially declining. 
The most significant area of that decline is registered for Ukraine’s exports 
to Russia, which dropped by more than half as a share in Ukraine’s total 
exports, from 36% in 1996 to 16% in 2004 (see Tables 2.3 and 2.4). Export 
flows were redirected towards both the EU-25 and the rest of the world, in 
particular Asia. As for imports, the decrease in trade with Russia was far 
less significant, primarily because of its importance as a source of energy 
products for Ukraine. The structure of Ukraine’s trade with the EU-25 and 
with Russia differs quite significantly (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2). In the most 
simplified terms, trade flows in Ukraine include westward movement of 
raw materials and semi–processed goods, and eastwards the opposite 
movement of final products, primarily investment goods. These features 
characterise both Ukrainian–EU and Ukrainian–Russian trade relations 
(Vinhas de Souza et al., 2005).10 
                                                      
10 Ukraine’s competitive position in world trade on the basis of revealed 
comparative advantage index shows that Ukraine has a comparative advantage in 
metals, agro–food products (including vegetable and animal oils and fats) and 
inedible crude materials. Also Ukraine had, but lost, comparative advantage in 
chemical products. Exports of these products face more trade restrictions in the 
case of the EU market (anti–dumping cases against metal and chemical products, 
limitations of the GSP scheme, etc.), than in the case of the Russian market. Free 
trade agreements and similar trade regulations inherited from the past and still 
partially functioning make the Russian market relatively more open than the EU 
market.  34 | UKRAINE’S TRADE POLICIES 
Table 2.3 Ukraine’s changing trade structure for exports from 1996 to 2004  








EU-15    3,196  6,432   22.2 19.7 
CEECs-10* 1,123  3,349    7.8  10.2 
SEECs**  849 1,820   5.9 5.6 
EU + CEECs + SEECs  5,168  11,600    35.9  35.5 
Russia    5,572  5,886   38.7 16.0 
Rest of the World  3,626  15,177    25.2  46.5 
Total   14,400  32,666    100.0  100.0 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Directions of Trade. 
Table 2.4 Ukraine’s changing trade structure for imports (from 1996 to 2004) 
 Imports from:  1996 
($ million)  
2004 





EU-15 2,710  6,439    15.4  22.2 
CEEC-10* 1,091  2,506    6.2  8.6 
SEECs** 563  606    3.2  2.1 
EU + CEECs +SEECs  4,364  9,551    24.8  32.9 
Russia   8,819  12,127    50.1  41.8 
Rest of the World  4,418  7,316    25.1  25.2 
Total   17,603  28,996    100.0  100.0 
 * The 10 Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC-10) comprise the new EU member 
states of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, 
Czech Republic and Cyprus. 
** The south-eastern European countries (SEECs) comprise Bulgaria, Romania, 
Bosnia/Herzegovina, Macedonia, Albania, Croatia, Yugoslavia and Turkey. 
Source:  International Monetary Fund, Directions of Trade. THE PROSPECT OF DEEP FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE| 35 
















































































































Source: Vinhas de Souza et al. (2005). 



















































































































Source: Vinhas de Souza et al. (2005). 36 | UKRAINE’S TRADE POLICIES 
Ukraine’s dependence on Russia’s fuels is partly a consequence of 
natural resource endowments, but partly also a heritage of the former 
Soviet Union, which meant an extremely inefficient structure of energy 
consumption. Ukraine is the most energy-consuming economy in the 
region. The introduction of energy-saving technologies, as well as the 
diversification of energy suppliers and types of energy used is expected to 
reduce Ukraine’s dependence upon Russia. In terms of exports, the EU‘s 
market seems potentially much more attractive, being the largest 
neighbouring market both in terms of population and GDP. But it is also 
more demanding, and increasing export share in this market will mean 
meeting very high demand standards; however, it would also facilitate 
entering other world markets with quality products. 
Another indicator of regional integration is capital movements 
between the regions concerned and, in particular, flows of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Despite all the benefits FDI can bring to a transition 
economy, Ukraine has failed to attract a significant amount of capital from 
abroad. As for the origin of current foreign investors present in Ukraine, 
the EU is by far the largest, with more than one-third of total FDI inflow 
(for just the EU-15, so the figure for the EU-25 would be higher).11 It is 
followed by the US, a set of so-called ‘offshore zones’ (Cyprus, an EU-25 
member and the Virgin Islands, a British dependency) and CIS countries – 
mainly Russia (see Figure 2.3). All together, these four groups account for 
three-quarters of the total FDI stock.  
FDI originating from different regions goes into different industries. 
As shown in Table 2.5, Russian capital is concentrated in the fuel and 
energy sector. Russian oil companies have acquired almost all Ukrainian oil 
refineries, which in the era of the former Soviet Union were constructed 
specifically for processing Russian oil. EU investors are mostly companies 
in the food, chemical and machine-building industries. The wholesale and 
retail trade sector has also received a significant portion of the funds 
coming from the EU. Hence, capital from the more advanced economies of 
the EU can bring benefits that are more relevant for the long-term growth 
                                                      
11 The figure of FDI flow from the EU-25 is not reported, since the enlarged EU 
includes one very large off-shore zone, Cyprus, which accounts for a substantial 
portion of FDI into Ukraine. It is difficult to identify the true origin of capital 
coming from offshore zones. Potentially, investors of all countries (including 
Ukrainian) may use these regions for tax-optimisation schemes. THE PROSPECT OF DEEP FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE| 37 
and development of the Ukrainian economy. But without a big leap 
forward in terms of the institutional reforms outlined above, Ukraine is 
likely to miss its chance to exploit a comparative advantage as a low-wage 
location with access to both the EU and the CIS markets. On its own, a 
simple free trade regime with either EU or CIS will not do the trick. The 
experience of the new EU member states showed that domestic reforms 
linked to European integration led to an increase in FDI inflows on a scale 
sufficient to boost economic growth. Trade policy, to be discussed below, 
has to be seen as a catalyst for internal reforms and an element in an 
aggressive strategy to increase domestic investment and FDI inflows. 
 










Other CIS countries 
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Russia 
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Table 2.5 Sectoral distribution of FDI from the EU-15 and Russia (2003) 
EU-15 Russia 
  ($ million) (%) ($ million) (%)
All sectors  2,383.4 100 377.7 100
Agriculture 61.6 2.6 5.9 1.6
Industry 1,340.2 56.2 159.4 42.2
Mining 32.7 1.4 1.1 0.3
Manufacturing 1,297.0 54.4 158.3 41.9
Food industry  581.0 24.4 10.6 2.8
Light industry  55.0 2.3 0.1 0.0
Wood–processing 45.2 1.9 0.5 0.1
Publishing 73.0 3.1 0.8 0.2
Coke and refined oil products  10.2 0.4 103.7 27.5
Chemical industry  141.1 5.9 0.6 0.2
Other non-metallic mineral products  109.4 4.6 2.3 0.6
Metallurgy and metal processing  46.0 1.9 20.0 5.3
Machine-building 205.0 8.6 8.5 2.3
Other 29.5 1.2 11.1 2.9
Production and distribution of 
electricity, gas and water supply  10.1 0.4 0.0 0.0
Construction 50.3 2.1 14.7 3.9
Wholesale & retail trade  373.3 15.7 26.9 7.1
Hotels and restaurants  24.9 1.0 6.3 1.7
Transport and telecommunications  174.9 7.3 39.4 10.4
Finance 186.1 7.8 28.5 7.5
Real estate  108.1 4.5 17.3 4.6
Education 1.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
Healthcare 5.2 0.2 77.9 20.6
Other community, social and 
personal services  57.6 2.4 1.4 0.4
Source: Vinhas de Souza et al. (2005). 
2.4  Ukraine and comparator countries  
Relative to comparator countries, such as Turkey, Romania and some other EU 
candidate and new member states, Ukraine’s fiscal and external balances and 
indebtedness situation is relatively favourable, and provides a sound basis for the 
reform of domestic economic governance and institutions.  THE PROSPECT OF DEEP FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE| 39 
When trying to gauge the effects of economic integration between Ukraine 
and the EU, it is important to appreciate the fact that Ukraine is different 
from other countries that are either part of the enlargement process or the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). With 600,000 km2, the country is 
slightly bigger than France and its 48 million inhabitants are equivalent to 
two-thirds of the total population that entered the EU during the 2004 
enlargement. Economically, the characteristics of Ukraine are somewhat of 
a mixture between Poland (the largest of the recent accession countries, 
with substantial heavy industry), Romania (a large and poor accession 
candidate with a significant agricultural sector) and Turkey (a large 
country of geo-strategic importance on the European fringe). Despite these 
similarities, Ukraine is unique in the combination of its features: its large 
size, its low income level, the depth of the structural adjustment challenges 
ahead, the size of its steel and heavy industry, as well as its huge and 
potentially highly competitive agricultural sector.  
A precondition for Ukraine’s progress is to secure the macroeconomic 
stability achieved so far. As regards inflation, Ukraine figures in the last 
position with Romania and Turkey (Vinhas de Souza et al., 2005). But 
Ukraine’s performance with respect to fiscal data was much better. The 
fiscal deficit in 2004 was even lower than the EU’s 3% (Maastricht) 
criterion. Together with the Baltic countries, Bulgaria, Romania and 
Slovenia, Ukraine outperforms the euro area in this regard. Turkey appears 
again at the end of the scale, with a fiscal deficit more than double that of 
Poland, the new member state with the highest fiscal deficit. A similar 
picture appears with respect to public debt, where Ukraine is again in the 
group with the best performance, whereas Turkey has the highest public 
debt. All in all, the macro picture on the basis of inflation and fiscal data 
reveals that Ukraine still needs to undergo some additional nominal 
convergence. This is only in absolute terms, however, as in relative terms 
Ukraine performs quite well when compared with the new member states. 
Turkey is the only country in the sample that fails to meet any of the three 
criteria discussed here. Hence, according to the Maastricht criteria, Ukraine 
is considerably closer to Brussels than Turkey. 
A more critical matter of concern may be the external position. Table 
2.6 shows some indicators on the external position comparing the five non–
member countries with the new member states in this respect. Ukraine 
shows the lowest external debt and short-term debt ratios of all, whereas 
some new member states (such as Estonia and Latvia) and candidate 
countries (such as Bulgaria, Croatia and Turkey) have heavily exposed 40 | UKRAINE’S TRADE POLICIES 
external debt burdens. A similarly favourable position for Ukraine is seen 
with respect to the current account deficits adjusted for FDI inflows.  
Table 2.6 The changing structure of Ukraine’s trade (1996-2002) 
* In percent of total exports/imports in the case of regional exports/imports; in percent of regional 
exports/imports otherwise. 
Sources: Vinhas de Souza et al. (2005), World Bank (2005a) and authors’ calculations. 
 
Hence, the still favourable macroeconomic setting could provide the 
basis for a big advance in terms of institutional reforms. The fact that this is 
so badly needed is seen in the World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI), 
which demonstrate the challenges (see Figure 2.4). In a sample of European 
countries, Ukraine together with Moldova, perform worst. In contrast to 
  EU-25  Russia 
  1996  2002  1996  2002 
  $ million   (%)*  $ million   (%)*  $ million   (%)*  $ million   (%)* 
  Exports 
Regional exports  2,793.8  19.4  4,449.9  30.9  5,170.0  35.9  2,462.6  17.1 
  Exports by the Level of Procession 
Raw materials  810.2  29.0  890.0  20.0  206.8  4.0  73.9  3.0 
Semi-processed 
   products 
894.0  32.0  1,379.5  31.0  2,326.5  45.0  763.4  31.0 
Final goods  922.0  33.0  2,002.5  45.0  2,688.4  52.0  1,625.3  66.0 
  Exports by the factor intensity 
Capital intensive  
   goods 
1,005.8  36.0  1,513.0  34.0  2,843.5  55.0  1,354.4  55.0 
Labour  intensive 
    goods 
335.3  12.0  801.0  18.0  361.9  7.0  295.5  12.0 
Raw material  
   intensive goods 
1,201.3  43.0  1,780.0  40.0  1,499.3  29.0  615.6  25.0 
  Imports 
Regional imports  3,802.2  21.6  5,316.1  30.2  7,815.7  44.4  6196.3  35.2 
  Imports by the level of procession 
Raw materials  418.2  11.0  152.1  4.0  2,509.5  66.0  2,509.5  66.0 
Semi-processed  
   products 
646.4  17.0  874.5  23.0  380.2  10.0  418.2  11.0 
Final goods  2,623.6  69.0  2,623.6  69.0  950.6  25.0  874.5  23.0 
  Imports by the factor intensity 
Capital intensive 
   goods 
1,749.0  46.0  2,205.3  58.0  836.5  22.0  912.5  24.0 
Labour intensive  
   goods 
798.5  21.0  950.6  25.0  152.1  4.0  190.1  5.0 
Raw material  
   intensive goods 
836.5  22.0  342.2  9.0  2,737.6  72.0  2,623.6  69.0 THE PROSPECT OF DEEP FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE| 41 
naïve expectations about the transition process, not all countries’ 
institutions have improved over the years. By far the largest progress has 
been made by Bulgaria and Croatia. In fact, Croatia shows positive 
developments in all indicators. In the case of Turkey, there is a strong 
deterioration in the indicators for regulatory quality and control of 
corruption and no progress with respect to government effectiveness or the 
rule of law. In Ukraine the poor quality of almost all institutions had even 
been deteriorating further before the Orange Revolution. The Kuchma 
heritage was clearly disastrous. Up to that point, the transition process had 
not translated into better institutions, whereas the case of the Baltic states 
and now that of Croatia, illustrates how EU integration may help to focus 
the reform process of accession countries (Schweickert, 2004 and 
Hammermann & Schweickert, 2005). 


















-1,0 -0,5 0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 –0.5 –1.0
 
Notes:  EU-15 comprises the EU member states before 2004; EU–South refers to 
Portugal, Spain, Greece; EU–Baltic refers to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; EU–
Central refers to Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, 
Slovenia; NMS–Central refers to the non-EU member states Bulgaria, 
Romania; NMS–Balkans comprises the non-EU member states of former 
Yugoslavia; NMS–Black Sea refers to Ukraine, Moldova and Turkey. 
Sources: Kaufmann et al. (2005) and authors’ calculations. 42 | UKRAINE’S TRADE POLICIES 
Based on the indicators analysed in this chapter, the macroeconomic 
situation is still favourable. The fiscal and external debt figures in particular 
are better than in comparator countries. On the negative side, there is a 
considerable backlog with respect to the development of institutional 
capacities and a potential for macroeconomic instability owing to monetary 
expansion, rising inflation rates and real exchange-rate instability. As a 
consequence, the process of structural adjustment in Ukraine remains at an 
early stage. Like much of the former Soviet bloc, independent Ukraine 
inherited an economy based on heavy industry and reliant on technology 
that had largely been superseded in the West. Ukraine’s main challenge is 
to diversify away from many of the industries that depended heavily on 
government subsidies and to develop a viable production and export 
structure on the basis of a comparative advantage as a low-wage producer 
located between European and CIS markets. This leads to the conclusions 
that Ukraine urgently needs to develop market-based institutions that 
foster structural change. Together with sustained macroeconomic stability, 
this is a precondition for establishing stable trade relations with its 
neighbours and for exploiting potential benefits from an FTA with the EU. THE PROSPECT OF DEEP FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE| 43 
Table 2.7. Major macroeconomic indicators for Ukraine by indicator and year 
(1998-2007) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007   
         est. forecast   
Economic activity             
GDP, UAH billions   102.6 130.4 170.1 204.2 225.8 267.3 344.8 412.1 486.5 542.6
Real GDP, apc*   –1.9 –0.2 5.9 9.2 5.2 9.6 12.1 4.0 5.5 6.0
Real industrial output, 
apc  
–1.0 4.0 13.2 14.2 7.0 15.8 12.5 5.0 6.5 6.0
Real agricultural output, 
apc  
–9.8 –5.7 7.6 10.2 1.2 –11.0 19.9 3.0 1.0 3.0
Gross investment, % 
GDP  
20.8 17.5 19.8 21.8 20.2 22.0 19.1 19.4 18.9 19.6
Real gross fixed  
investment, apc   2.6 0.1 12.4 6.2 3.4 15.8 10.2 –2.0 7.0 9.0
Real total consumption, 
apc  
–0.1 –3.7 2.0 9.3 5.0 12.8 12.1 13.1 7.6 7.8
Net FDI, $ millions(a)   747 489 594 769 688 1,411 1,711 1,700 2,000 2,500
Real disposable 
household  
 income, apc(b)   –5.8 1.2 11.1 10.0 18.0 9.1 16.5 19.5 6.0 6.5
Real retail trade, apc   –6.6 –7.1 8.1 13.7 15.0 20.5 20.0 17.0 13.0 10.0
Prices  
Consumer price index, 
apc  
20.0 19.2 25.8 6.1 –0.6 8.2 12.3 13.5 11.5 7.0
Producer price index, 
apc  
35.3 15.7 20.8 0.9 5.7 11.1 24.1 11.0 6.0 6.0
Labour market  
Population, millions   50.1 49.7 49.3 48.4 48.0 47.6 47.3 47.1 46.9 46.7
Average monthly real 
wages, apc*  
–3.9 –8.9 –0.9 19.3 18.2 15.2 23.8 15.0 8.0 7.0
Unemployment rate, % 
(ILO  methodology)  
— 11.9 11.7 11.1 10.1 9.1 8.6 8.2 8.0 7.844 | UKRAINE’S TRADE POLICIES 
Table 2.7, continued 
Foreign economic 
activity  
Exports of goods & 
services, apc  
–13.4 –7.3 18.0 8.0 10.7 24.0 37.2 13.0 7.0 8.0
Imports of goods & 
services, apc  
–14.0 –19.1 17.8 14.1 5.0 28.7 26.0 20.0 13.0 15.0
Current account 
balance, % GDP  
–3.1 3.0 4.0 3.7 7.7 5.8 10.5 6.0 2.8 –0.3
Budget  
Revenues, % GDP 
 (consolidated) (c)  
27.3 24.7 26.2 26.9 27.4 28.5 26.5 30.0 29.0 29.0
Balance, % GDP(c)   –2.7 –2.4 –0.8 –0.3 0.7 –0.2 –3.2 –3.0 –2.0 –1.0
Financial indicators  
Monetary base, apc   22 39 39 37 34 30 34 39 23 15
М3, apc   25 41 45 42 42 47 32 38 30 22
NBU gold/forex 
reserves,  
$ millions    793 1,094 1,475 3,089 4,417 6,937 9,252 14,475 16,176 17,146
Official exchange rate, 
UAH/$ (average 
annual)  
2.45 4.13 5.44 5.37 5.33 5.33 5.32 5.11 5.04 5.09
Loan interest, % pa 
(average annual) (d)  
55 53 40 32 25 18 17.5 15.9 13.3 9.0
* Apc = annual percentage change.  
(a) according to the NBU.  
(b) starting in 2002, indicator of aggregate disposable household income.  
(c) calculation using IMF methodology. 
(d) commercial bank loans, UAH.  
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Table 2.8. External balances in the new member states, accession countries 





























35.5 21.8 6.2 –4.6 4.6 –0.0 36.8 –0.2
Estonia 80.3 36.6 13.5 –14.5 5.5 –9.0 34.8 0.9
Hungary 57.2 14.2 24.5 –9.1 2.3 –6.8 27.6 3.8
Lithuania 46.0 29.9 14.4 –8.5 3.0 –5.5 53.3 –0.9
Latria 74.4 112.5 14.8 –10.9 3.8 –7.1 34.4 –0.4
Poland 41.7 20.0 16.0 –1.4 1.7 0.2 36.8 –2.1
Slovenia 45.5 0.8 14.7 –0.3 –0.5 –0.8 44.6 0.0
Slovakia 46.1 20.5 8.0 –3.6 3.9 0.3 52.4 9.0
NMS–8 53.3 32.0 14.0 –6.6 3.0 –3.6 40.1 1.3
Bulgaria 61.9 23.1 12.4 –7.0 9.7 2.7 60.0 3.0
Romania 35.5 6.0 14.4 –6.0 5.5 –0.4 71.5 2.2
Turkey 51.1 32.0 36.9 –3.6 0.7 –3.0 24.7 –0.1
AC–3 32.5 9.7 8.9 –4.3 5.1 0.8 43.8 1.7
Croatia 78.9 3.3 20.4 –5.3 2.4 –2.9 37.5 –0.4
Ukraine 27.3 1.2 12.9 10.2 2.3 12.5 38.7 –7.5
NAC–2 53.1 2.3 16.7 2.4 2.3 4.8 38.1 –4.0
 




3.  UKRAINE’S TRADE POLICIES 
This chapter reviews recent developments in Ukraine’s trade-related 
policies and outlines the government’s options. Ukraine’s negotiations on 
WTO accession are currently the focal point of reforms in trade-related 
policies. Although important in its own right, WTO accession will also help 
to resolve some current bilateral trade-policy issues, such as by ending EU 
quotas on steel imports from Ukraine. Also reviewed is progress to date in 
Ukraine’s institutional approximation to EU law (acquis communautaire) in 
key areas as defined by the EU–Ukraine Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA). Finally we discuss how far Ukraine’s integration with 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) can go without prejudicing 
an EU–Ukraine FTA. 
3.1  WTO accession process 
Ukraine’s average tariff rate for WTO accession is likely to be a little under 5% for 
industrial goods and about 11% for agricultural produce. Ukraine’s offer for 
service sector liberalisation is very bold and goes beyond what many existing WTO 
members have done. Yet there are still problems in getting some WTO-compliant 
legislation adopted by the parliament. 
WTO accession is a precondition for free trade between the EU and 
Ukraine. But even by the standards of WTO accession negotiations, 
Ukraine’s accession process has been protracted since it first applied for 
membership in 1993. At least one meeting has been held by Ukraine’s 
accession working party each year since 1995. An offer on market access for 
imports of services was first submitted in 1997 and an offer on goods in 
1999. A first draft of the working party’s report (which normally signals 
that all substantial disagreements have been essentially resolved) is dated 
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meeting planned for 29 September 2005 was postponed. Still, if 
parliamentary support can be ensured for the required legislative changes, 
it is entirely possible for Ukraine to accede to the WTO in 2006.  
Ukraine’s negotiations on market access for goods and services are 
almost complete, following extensive bilateral and multilateral talks. But 
substantial issues remain to be resolved, mostly with Australia and the US. 
On the Australian side, concerns include agricultural subsidies to be 
retained by Ukraine as well as the proposed tariff rate quota for sugar 
(Australia wants Ukraine to double the tariff-free quota). American 
concerns focus on the implementation in national legislation and effective 
enforcement of WTO rules on the protection of intellectual property rights, 
as well as on market access in audio-visual services. On the US side, 
complex congressional procedures are currently being activated to 
permanently waive the application of the Jackson–Vanik amendment to 
Ukraine, which is a precondition for Ukraine to enjoy the full benefits of 
WTO membership in its trade relations with the US.  
In bilateral and multilateral negotiations, practically all import tariff 
lines for goods have been agreed. Although detailed information about 
Ukraine’s recent comprehensive tariff offer consolidating the results of 
these negotiations is formally restricted, its key features are widely known. 
Import tariffs (most-favoured nation or MFN rates) on agricultural 
products will decline from an average of 15% at present to about 11% at the 
end of the implementation period around 2010. The average MFN tariff on 
industrial goods will remain roughly constant at just below 5% as bound 
rates are reduced slightly during the implementation period but still 
remain marginally higher on average than the current applied rates. These 
conclusions apply broadly to both weighted and unweighted average 
tariffs. The view that no large cut in the average tariff is likely to be 
required reflects the fact that import tariffs in Ukraine have already been 
fairly modest in recent years.12  
In 2004, Ukraine submitted a services offer that will bind fairly liberal 
rules for market access across a wide range of service sectors. There will be 
no limitations on i) cross-border supply, ii) consumption abroad, or iii) 
commercial presence for 139 out of 155 service (sub)sectors (see Box 3.1).  
                                                      
12 See World Bank, Ukraine Trade Policy Study, Report No. 29684, Washington, D.C. 
(2004a) for a comprehensive review of the Ukrainian trade regime since the early 
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Box 3.1. Ukrainian offer to the WTO in services  
Sectors covered by the standard formula with no limitations on cross-border 
supply, consumption abroad or commercial presence: 
•  Professional services – legal, advisory, accounting, taxation, etc. 
•  Computer and related services – data processing, software and repair 
services 
•  Research and development services in natural and social sciences 
•  Real estate services 
•  Rental & leasing services  
•  Other business services – advertising, consulting, personnel, etc. 
•  Telecommunications services – telephone, mobile, e-mail, leased circuits, 
etc. 
•  Construction services for buildings & engineering works 
•  Distribution services – wholesale, retail, franchising, agencies 
•  Environmental services 
•  Banking & financial services 
•  Tourism and travel-related services 
•  Recreational, cultural & sporting services  
•  Transport services – maritime, inland waterway, railway & fuel pipelines  
Sectors with limitations are: 
•  Health & related services 
•  Agricultural land – ownership only by Ukrainian citizens 
•  Notarial services – only performed by Ukrainian citizens 
•  Auditing services – a foreign auditor’s conclusions must be confirmed by a 
Ukrainian auditor 
•  Medical & dental services – professional qualifications will be assessed 
according to Ukrainian law 
•  Postal services – the licensing system for mail & packages applies 
universally to service providers 
•  Education, schools & other academic institutions– only Ukrainian citizens 
can head educational institutions 
•  Insurance services – licensing required for branches (but not subsidiaries) 
•  Hospital services – professional qualifications are assessed according to 
Ukrainian law 
•  News agencies – foreign investment is limited to 30% 
•  Audio-visual sector 
•  Road transport 
Source: Government of Ukraine. 
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Ukraine does not commit itself with respect to restrictions on the 
movement of natural persons except for senior employees (who may stay 
i n  U k r a i n e  f o r  u p  t o  f i v e  y e a r s )  a n d  a widely defined group of service 
providers who may stay in Ukraine for up to 180 days in any calendar year. 
This offer has been accepted by the members of Ukraine’s accession 
working party, with only minor issues still to be settled, and is 
outstandingly liberal by the standards of many WTO member states; 
further many of the limitations (as in Box 3.1) concern regulatory issues 
that do not restrict market access. 
Implementation in national legislation. Although negotiations with 
trading partners have almost been completed, there is a considerable 
amount of legislation that still needs to be passed by parliament for 
Ukraine to become WTO-compliant. The government has made repeated 
efforts since the summer of 2005 to push through large packages of the 
required measures. Parliamentary opposition has remained a problem, 
however, with alliances of various interest groups ranging from 
communists with ideological objections to oligarchs with specific business 
interests. 
Changes in national legislation are needed not only to implement the 
results of market access negotiations for goods and services. In addition, 
Ukraine needs to implement the WTO Single Undertaking, i.e. all binding 
WTO rules that affect a wide range of trade-related policies. For example, 
with respect to trade in goods, these include the national treatment of 
imported goods in terms of domestic taxes or standards for customs 
valuation of imports. With respect to the protection of trade-related 
intellectual property rights, the WTO Single Undertaking includes 
minimum standards of protection for various categories of intellectual 
property rights as well as rules on effective enforcement.  
The government has recently adopted a series of necessary but 
politically difficult changes in government regulations, including some 
related to investment incentives and the price regulations for alcoholic 
drinks. The parliament has implemented required changes in customs 
tariffs following Ukraine’s recent tariff offer, removed restrictions on the 
imports of used cars, liberalised financial and audit services, and reduced 
export restrictions on ferrous metal scrap and some agricultural products. 
Apart from several outstanding legislative changes of a fairly technical 
nature (sanitary and phytosanitary standards, technical barriers to trade), 
delays in adopting the draft laws necessary for WTO accession persist in 
sensitive sectors such agriculture (export restrictions on hides and skins 50 | UKRAINE’S TRADE POLICIES 
and the lowering of barriers to sugar imports) and metallurgy (reductions 
in – but no abolition of – export duties on metal scrap). With the March 
2006 parliamentary elections looming as well as persistent pressure from 
the big metallurgical lobbies, it is unclear whether essential legislative 
changes can be made before the elections. 
3.2  Trade relations with the EU 
Under the existing trade policy regime the EU grants tariff preferences to Ukraine, 
as to many partner states under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), but 
also has made considerable use of the anti-dumping defensive instrument. The EU 
recognised Ukraine’s market economy status in December 2005. WTO accession 
will make an important difference to EU–Ukrainian trade relations, since the EU’s 
steel import quota will have to be scrapped and the scope for anti-dumping actions 
will be more strictly constrained.  
Ukraine’s bilateral relations with the EU are based mainly on the PCA, 
which was signed in 1994 and entered into force in 1998 for an initial 10-
year period. A future EU–Ukraine FTA would presumably become part of 
a new agreement that might replace the PCA after 2008. Other significant 
bilateral agreements relate to trade in textiles and clothing (now fully 
liberalised), trade in steel products and cooperation in the field of 
controlled nuclear fusion. 
EU imports from Ukraine have benefited from the Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP) since 1993. Currently, imports can be divided 
into three categories, each accounting for approximately one-third of 
import value: goods imported tariff-free under the GSP (non-sensitive 
products), goods imported under GSP preferential tariff rates (sensitive 
products) and goods imported at MFN tariff levels. It has been estimated 
that GSP preferences reduce EU import tariffs on Ukraine’s exports by up 
to 2 percentage points from a hypothetical average of about 4% under MFN 
rates. It is noteworthy that GSP treatment is not granted to many of 
Ukraine’s most important export commodities, such as iron and steel, 
fertilisers, fishery products, grain, seeds, fruit or plants (for more details, 
see World Bank, 2004a, pp. 73-86). Overall, however, average tariffs on EU 
imports from Ukraine are already quite low; an EU–Ukraine FTA will lead 
to little additional market access for Ukraine through tariff reductions. 
Many Ukrainian exports to the EU as well as to other countries have 
been subject to anti-dumping duties in recent years. According to the WTO, 
Ukraine ranked 13th in the world as a target of anti-dumping measures 
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imposed by various trading partners (a share of anti-dumping measures 
about ten times greater than Ukraine’s share of world trade). Of these, eight 
originated in the EU-25 (typically in the range of 25-50%) and affected a 
group of metallurgical and chemical products. As these product groups 
comprise roughly half of Ukraine’s total exports (to all destinations), it is 
highly likely that anti-dumping duties had a major impact on Ukrainian 
exports to the EU.  
The large number of successful anti-dumping procedures against 
Ukrainian exports is partly explained by the fact that during that period 
Ukraine had not yet been accorded market economy status by the EU. As a 
result, Ukrainian exporters found it more difficult to disprove allegations of 
dumping by EU special interest groups. Issues that prevented Ukraine’s 
graduation to market economy status (MES) included deficiencies in 
bankruptcy legislation and state intervention in price-setting mechanisms. 
These concerns should diminish as Ukraine addresses the implementation 
of relevant WTO rules (such as Art. XVII of GATT 1994 on state trading 
enterprises) in its national legislation upon acceding to the WTO. While 
concerns about soft budget constraints in Ukraine should certainly not be 
minimised, it is noteworthy that Russia was granted MES by the EU as 
early as 2002. The state of the systemic transition is broadly similar in 
Russia and Ukraine. The EU finally granted Ukraine MES in December 
2005.  
Ukrainian (as well as Russian and Kazakh) exports of many steel 
products to the EU are still limited by a quota system that will expire 
automatically when Ukraine accedes to the WTO. Thus WTO accession will 
remove a market access barrier that would otherwise have to be dealt with 
by an EU–Ukraine FTA. 
3.3  Approximation to EU law 
Ukraine has been making considerable efforts to bring its market legislation in line 
with EU standards and laws in line with commitments made in the PCA, even 
during the politically inhospitable environment of the Kuchma administration. The 
results so far have only been partial.  
Among many other provisions, the EU–Ukraine PCA sets out the objective 
of approximating Ukrainian economic laws to the EU’s regulations and 
norms. Art. 51 states that: 
an important condition for strengthening the economic links between 
Ukraine and the Community is the approximation of Ukraine’s 
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endeavour to ensure that its legislation will be gradually made 
compatible with that of the Community.13 
Art. 51 goes on to specify 16 domains for approximation.  Since 1996, 
considerable legislative work has been done in these areas, coordinated by 
the Ministry of Justice and supported by EU technical assistance. In a recent 
stocktaking exercise for all 16 domains, the EU-financed Ukrainian-
European Policy and Legal Advice Centre (UEPLAC) used the following 
definitions to broadly characterise the degree of approximation to EU 
norms of every key legal instrument in each of the 16 domains. The results 
of this stocktaking exercise are summarised in Table 3.1, although it must 
be stressed that it only gives an impression of a highly complex field. Out 
of a total of 234 legal instruments analysed, 26 are described as fully 
approximated; approximation is considered advanced in 62 instruments 
and underway in 113; 33 legal instruments are held not to be approximated. 
Among the 16 domains, approximation of legal instruments in the broad 
field of service sector regulation seems especially, while the least progress 
has been made in areas under the heading of economic governance. 
Nevertheless, significant legislative efforts have been made in all domains. 
The Ministry of Justice is currently (mid-November 2005) completing 
its own review of legal approximation in the 16 domains; while their report 
is not yet available, we have received impressions of their views from 
interviews and a short paper prepared by the ministry (see Box 3.2). The 
overall picture is similar to that painted by the UEPLAC review, although 
again this can only be taken as a broad brush view. While identifying 
outstanding issues in each domain, the ministry notes that there has been a 
continuing harmonisation process that could be substantially completed by 
the time the PCA expires in 2008. The ministry rightly stresses that this 
scorecard relates to the legal texts and does not assess the effectiveness of 
enforcement. Still, it seems a significant achievement that these legal 
reforms were largely developed during the Kuchma administration in a 
less than favourable environment for EU–Ukrainian institutional 
integration.  
                                                      
13 See Council and Commission Decisions No. 98/149/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 26 
January 1998 on the conclusion of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and 
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Table 3.1 Approximation levels of Ukrainian legislation in relation to the EU 
acquis in the 16 domains of Art. 51 of the PCA – Assessments as of 
2004 












Trade and product regulation        
1. Customs   –  1  4  – 
2. Technical standards  –  –  11  3 
3. Food safety  8  3  24  2 
4. Indirect taxation   –  4  4  – 
        
Service sector regulation        
5. Banking  2  2  2  – 
6. Financial markets, insurance   –  1  14  – 
7. Transport  4  10  13  – 
8. Nuclear energy sector  3  3  -  – 
        
Economic governance        
9.  Competition & bankruptcy  1  10  -  1 
10. Public procurement   –  5  -  1 
11. Intellectual property rights  5  9  -  6 
12. Taxation  –  1  1  4 
13.  Civil  code  –  – 6 – 
14. Consumer protection  –  –  9  4 
15. Labour protection  2  7  9  10 
16. Environment  1  6  16  2 
        
Totals  26  62 113 33 
Notes:  Approximated = the given legal instrument is very similar to the respective EU 
legislation. 
Approximation advanced = the main elements of the examined legal instrument are 
present in the domestic legal system and it has been developed along a similar line to 
that of the EU. 
Approximation underway = first steps towards implementing the given legal 
instrument have been taken, or there is a comprehensive legal draft in progress or in 
front of the government or parliament. 
Not approximated = this area of law is at such an early stage of development that a 
particular legal instrument is missing from Ukraine’s legal system. 
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Box 3.2. Evaluation of Ukraine’s approximation to EU law  
Trade and product issues 
Customs: There is substantial compliance with the EU and the WTO, but 
implementation is still lagging for customs evaluation and rules of origin. 
Amendments to the customs code are still needed in 2006. 
Product standards: So far, 16 technical regulations and 2000 out of 5000 specific 
standards have been adopted in compliance with EU and international standards.  
Food standards: Current statutory acts are not totally compliant with the EU or 
the WTO. A draft law has been submitted, but implementation will be difficult.  
Indirect taxation: VAT compensation (for exporters?) is still a flagrant issue of 
non-compliance. 
Service sector regulation 
Banking: This area is largely compliant with the EU; the area is open, but some 
procedures are unduly complex.  
Financial services: Adaptation of laws is ongoing; it is anticipated that this area 
will become EU-compliant. 
Insurance: This field is largely open and compliant. 
Transport: This area still needs essential privatisation and reforms. There is a 
Ministry of Transport plan for 2005-07. 
Energy: Ukraine has joined and ratified the European Energy Charter. Wholesale 
markets for electricity, oil and gas still need further liberalisation and reform. 
Economic governance issues 
Competition: Most competition law is compliant with the EU. Implementation 
and procedural issues remain, for which a new law in 2006 is planned.  
Public procurement: This area is only partly compliant, with new a programme for 
2005-10 aiming at EU compliance.  
Bankruptcy law: Several problems remain, notably provisions concerning 
companies with state participations.  
Intellectual property: Substantial work needs to be done towards EU compliance, 
but draft laws are still to be passed.  
Company law: There is partial compliance with more draft laws planned for 2006. 
Company law and accounting: Work towards EU compliance is ongoing, with 
revisions of laws planned for 2006. 
Consumer protection: This area is only partly EU compliant; revisions of the 
related laws are ongoing. 
Environment: Development of environmental law is ongoing but patchy.  
Labour law: Current laws do not meet EU standards and new ones are needed. 
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What seems appropriate is a two-pronged strategy with an active and a 
passive component: active acquis convergence would be pursued in priority 
areas, where the acquis either makes a significant contribution to domestic 
economic development or to deeper cross-border integration. Economic 
development will be promoted by those parts of the acquis that are in line 
with international best practices, are suited for Ukraine’s state of 
development, are relatively easy to implement (cost-benefit analysis) and 
address pressing reform needs. This report argues that priority areas for 
acquis convergence include product standards, competition policy and the 
backbone areas of telecommunications, transport, energy and financial 
services. Passive acquis convergence would be pursued in all non-priority 
policy areas, by screening all new pieces of legislation on their acquis 
compatibility. In other words, new legislation would be modified but not 
initiated out of the desire to comply with the acquis. The Ministry of Justice 
has a department in charge of legal approximation to the EU and could 
fulfil that function.  
Ukraine’s key challenge regarding acquis compliance is not the 
adoption of new legislation, but its effective enforcement. In many policy areas, 
the country has relatively modern laws, but they are not sufficiently 
implemented or complied with. In the EU internal market, however, 
enforcement is the key. To make progress on this front, Ukraine will have 
to address a number of structural problems: its weak government 
institutions, a highly deficient judicial system, poorly developed regulatory 
authorities, pervasive corruption and the strong grip of the oligarchs with 
their shady business practices on large parts of the economy. Unless these 
problems are solved, Ukraine will not be able to make real progress on 
acquis compliance.  
3.4  Ukraine–Russia/CIS/Common Economic Space 
Ukraine’s participation in the Single Economic Space (SES) with Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan raises issues of compatibility with an FTA+ with the EU. Free 
trade with both the SES and EU are entirely possible, but customs union would 
not be.  
Since trade among the former Soviet republics collapsed in the early 1990s, 
Ukraine has participated in various CIS-wide and bilateral agreements that 
have sought to revive the traditional trade linkages among them. Many of 
these agreements, especially multilateral ones such as the CIS Economic 
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have suffered from very weak implementation and have remained virtually 
irrelevant. Nevertheless, working bilateral agreements are in place with key 
CIS trading partners that effectively establish bilateral free trade areas, 
albeit with some exemptions for sensitive products. For example, the 1993 
free trade agreement with Russia covers all goods except sugar, tobacco 
goods, certain spirits, chocolate and candies, while the Ukrainian–Russian 
steel trade is regulated by special quotas on Ukraine’s steel exports to 
Russia.  
In 2003, Ukraine was invited to join an ambitious effort at deeper 
integration (the SES project) with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. These 
three countries are already linked by a customs union; their systemic 
transformation has advanced to a broadly similar degree (at least as 
regards Russia and Kazakhstan); and many policy-makers probably share 
similar protectionist preferences with respect to the design of trade-related 
policies. With only four member countries (compared with the CIS’s 
twelve) and with Russia clearly playing a leading role, this new effort at 
integration is potentially more promising than previous ones at the CIS 
level. The objectives stated by the SES are ambitious, with the creation of a 
customs union without exceptions or limitations, involving a unified policy 
on tariff and non-tariff regulations, unified rules for competition, the use of 
subsidies and other forms of state support and without contingent 
protection affecting intra-union trade. Further steps would involve the 
harmonisation of macroeconomic policies and network regulation. 
Ukrainian participation in the SES project was rendered politically 
feasible by the explicit understanding that these ambitious objectives are to 
be implemented gradually, with each country independently determining 
the speed of its integration (the so-called ‘multilevel’ and ‘multi-speed 
integration’). Eventually, however, a single commission in which each 
member state will have a voting weight proportional to its economic size 
would govern all policies; clearly, decisions by this commission would be 
dominated by Russia.  
Ukraine’s participation in an effective SES customs union along these 
lines would be incompatible with an EU–Ukrainian FTA because Ukraine 
would have to give up its sovereignty over certain trade-related policies to 
a supranational SES decision-making body. Technically, the EU could 
conclude an FTA with the SES customs union. But at best it will take a long 
time for this body to develop a sufficiently robust institutional structure to 
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Therefore, Ukraine faces a crucial choice: either to integrate more 
closely with the EU through a deep FTA while seeking to maintain and 
extend the existing free trade agreements with CIS countries (for example, 
by reducing the list of goods exempted from free trade); or it could opt for 
deeper SES integration with its envisaged customs union and institutional 
provisions. In the latter case improvements in EU–Ukrainian trade relations 
might be limited to what would come with WTO accession, such as an end 
to the quota system for steel products and the granting of market-economy 
status, which would make it more difficult to impose anti-dumping tariffs 
on Ukrainian exports to the EU. It is notable, however, that Ukraine’s 
political declarations since the Orange Revolution have excluded Ukraine’s 
accession to the customs union of the SES.  
Interestingly, Ukraine’s bilateral free trade agreements with some CIS 
member countries contain provisions on the conduct of WTO accession 
negotiations. There was an early understanding among many CIS countries 
that they would closely coordinate their negotiating strategies and aim at 
joining the WTO at the same time. This coordinated approach made sense 
because many difficult issues – such as state trading enterprises, the legal 
implementation and enforcement of intellectual property rights, etc. – 
applied similarly to most CIS countries. In practice, this coordinated 
approach translated into Russia taking the lead in negotiations while 
governments that were so inclined (including Belarus, Kazakhstan and for 
some time Ukraine) would follow closely – on the understanding that, 
should Russia accede first, it would then use its newly gained influence to 
accelerate the other countries’ accession process. If Ukraine makes 
integration with the EU the clear priority, these provisions would lose 
relevance.  
There would still be many aspects of an FTA+ where the choices 
made will necessarily affect relations between both parties and Russia. It is 
entirely possible for there to be free trade between all three parties. Yet in 
the absence of this condition there should be no customs union between 
any of the parties. 
For the highly complex domain of technical standards for industrial 
and agricultural goods it is desirable that there be convergence on a single 
set of standards. Ukraine is converging on EU standards. Here it would be 
helpful if Russia also converged on EU standards in the framework of the 
(EU–Russia) Common European Economic Space, and there are signs that 
Russian practice is tending to move in this direction. Nevertheless, 
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markets in conformity with their respective standards where these are 
different, so there is no necessary conflict of norms.  
In the electricity sector, grid connections require technical 
compatibility. Ukraine now has a small regional grid connection with its 
EU neighbours, known as the ‘Burshtyn Island’, while the rest of the 
Ukrainian grid is connected to the Russian grid. If Ukraine joined the 
south-east European grid, as has begun to be discussed, it would mean 
alignment with EU standards. That step would have implications for the 
present Ukrainian–Russian grid connection, unless there is also progress in 





4.  ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SIMPLE OR 
DEEP FREE TRADE SCENARIOS
∗ 
This chapter reviews and updates the findings of the 1999 feasibility study 
on the likely economic effects of an EU–Ukraine FTA. Given the limited 
time available for preparing this report, it has not been possible to 
undertake a fresh, detailed empirical analysis of all possible effects on trade 
and production patterns, income growth and distribution, and social 
welfare. Yet by updating the earlier analyses as well as drawing on recent 
literature, it is possible to discuss rough orders of magnitude of the main 
effects.  
The first section of this chapter (section 4.1) reviews the changing 
geographical and commodity composition of Ukraine’s international trade 
since 1997.14 Section 4.2 reports the simulation results from an updated and 
somewhat extended version of the computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model that was employed in the earlier study. These findings provide 
insights into the direction and possible order of magnitude of trade and 
sectoral output effects of trade integration. But comparative-static CGE 
models cannot capture the medium- to long-term welfare gains and income 
growth that would result from an improving investment climate as a result 
of Ukraine approximating key economic institutions to the EU model in the 
                                                      
∗ The authors thank Alexander Freese, Alexandra Horst and Ece Turgay for their 
research assistance in this chapter. 
14 Annex 4, section 3 provides additional detail on recent trends in several 
indicators that were used in the 1999 study to gauge possible trade creation and 
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context of a deep EU–Ukraine FTA. Section 4.3 draws on recent related 
literature to provide a sense of the orders of magnitude of such effects.  
4.1  Gravity models and Ukrainian trade trends 
The evolution of the geographical composition and sectoral pattern of Ukraine’s 
international trade since 1997 confirms the conclusion of the earlier study 
(Brenton, 1999) that the EU and Ukraine are natural trading partners.  
The lingering impact of Soviet-style central planning on the international 
trade patterns of Ukraine has diminished since 1997. The Soviet economy 
had been fairly insulated from the rest of the world – even from the 
member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. As a 
result, during the first half of the 1990s, the share of Commonwealth of 
Independent State (CIS) countries in Ukraine’s international trade was far 
larger than one would expect on the basis of their geographical location 
and economic size (GDP per head and population). Also, the commodity 
composition of exports differed from traditional (CIS) markets where final 
goods played a significant role in line with the structure of output in 
Ukraine, and the EU and other industrialised countries where exports 
consisted more of commodities and intermediate goods. 
With respect to the geographical composition of trade, the 1999 study 
(Brenton, 1999, ch. 3) used a gravity model of bilateral trade flows to 
predict a substantial growth of the EU’s share in Ukraine’s exports. The 
gravity model describes bilateral flows as increasing in the economic 
weight of the two countries, measured by per capita income and total 
population, and decreasing in their distance, which may be reflected in 
geographical distance as well as other factors that either facilitate or 
impede transactions across the border (e.g. common language or currency, 
a free trade agreement and adjacency). While the EU-15 accounted for 
about one-third of Ukrainian non-fuel imports and less than one-fifth of 
exports, its potential share, based on a ‘normal’ trade pattern estimated 
with a gravity model, was thought to be closer to one-half of both non-fuel 
imports and exports (Brenton, 1999, ch. 3, Fig. 3). 
Figure 4.1 demonstrates that Ukrainian exports have indeed evolved 
towards a more ‘normal’ geographical composition while growing rapidly 
since 1997. Whereas exports to Russia and other CIS countries almost 
doubled from $4.6 billion to $8.6 billion in 2004, exports to the EU-25 
countries tripled to $9.8 billion. Exports to the rest of the world, chiefly to 
developing countries in Asia, the Middle East and the Western hemisphere, 
more than doubled from $6.5 billion to $14.3 billion. Preliminary data for THE PROSPECT OF DEEP FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE| 61 
2005 suggest, however, that exports to Russia continued their strong 
growth from 2004, whereas exports to the EU were stagnant. If confirmed 
by annual data, this new trend would suggest that many Ukrainian firms 
are able to take advantage of strong demand growth in Russia, fuelled by 
high world market prices for energy. Clearly, many Ukrainian firms are 
still more familiar with the Russian market than with Western Europe; at 
the same time, a shared history and language may give them an edge over 
their competitors in the Russian market.  
Figure 4.1. Ukraine: Exports by major destinations, 1997-2004
(US$ billion)






































Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics. 
A less clear picture emerges for Ukraine’s imports (Figure 4.2), 
possibly in part because the sharp energy price increases in recent years 
inflated the value of Ukrainian imports from Russia (predominantly 
energy) relative to imports from the EU. Total imports declined sharply 
between 1997 and 1999 owing to the regional economic crisis. From 1999 to 
2003, import growth was particularly strong for the EU-25 ($7.7 billion in 
2003 versus $5.0 billion in 1997) and the rest of the world ($6.9 billion 
versus $3.6 billion); imports from Russia and other CIS countries grew less 
rapidly. In 2004, however, imports from CIS countries jumped to $15.2 
billion from $9.6 billion in 2003, probably in large part because of increases 
in energy prices. 
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Figure 4.2. Ukraine: Imports by major countries of origin, 1997-2004
(US$ billion)
















































Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics. 
The gravity model does not permit us to predict how long the 
reorientation of Ukraine’s trade patterns towards a more ‘normal’ pattern 
with a substantially larger share of the EU in Ukraine’s exports and imports 
will take. In the short run, the relative weight of trading partners fluctuates 
along with exchange rates and world market prices for key commodities; 
trade patterns are partly driven by path dependencies (such as existing 
pipelines for natural gas transport); and in any case, coefficient estimates 
and hence the ‘normal’ trade pattern assumed for Ukraine obviously 
depend on the database that is used to estimate the gravity model. 
Nevertheless, the model as well as the strong growth of trade with the EU 
since 1997 suggests that the EU and Ukraine are natural trading partners, 
based on geographical proximity and the EU’s large GDP. Therefore, any 
trade diversion that may be caused by an EU–Ukraine FTA is unlikely to be 
large and will probably be compensated for by efficiency gains from trade 
creation.  
On the other hand, Russia and other CIS countries are currently as 
important to Ukraine as export markets as the EU – and even more   
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important as sources of imports. Therefore, it would be desirable for 
Ukraine to maintain and further develop the free trade agreements that 
cover Ukraine’s trade with the CIS countries. To the extent that deeper 
integration involves the harmonisation of institutions, such as in 
standardisation and certification, it would be desirable for Ukraine’s CIS 
trading partners to also persuade their institutions to approximate to EU 
norms, rather than maintain idiosyncratic rules.  
Neither the commodity composition of Ukraine’s exports and 
imports, nor the EU-25 trade share in individual product categories, have 
changed much in the course of the rapid growth of international trade since 
2001 (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). 
On the export side, where the EU-25 accounted for 30% overall in 
2001 as well as 2004, its shares are still relatively high for many raw and 
semi-processed commodities, such as mineral products (47% in 2004), hides 
and skins (61%), and wood and wood products (71%). By contrast, EU-25 
shares for many processed commodities and final goods are much lower, 
with machinery at 31% and base metals and articles thereof at 21%. For the 
latter, exports to the EU are restricted by a quota regime that will 
automatically expire when Ukraine accedes to the WTO.  
Since the remaining exports go mostly to Russia and other CIS 
countries, these figures document the difficulties that Ukrainian producers 
of final goods still face in meeting the demands of the relatively 
sophisticated EU markets for differentiated goods (see section 2.3 for a 
more detailed discussion). There are encouraging counter-examples, 
however. Textile and clothing exports are destined largely to the EU (76% 
in 2004), probably reflecting production networks with EU firms where 
Ukrainian firms perform labour-intensive operations outsourced from 
Western Europe (see section 4.3 for a more thorough discussion of the role 
of such networks). Similarly, exports of instruments (HS Section XVIII), 
another labour-intensive sector, have grown sharply, with 46% of all 
exports going to the EU. These examples suggest that Ukraine’s 
international trade patterns are indeed becoming more ‘normal’ – not only 
with respect to the overall direction of trade, but also in the sense that 
Ukrainian exporters are overcoming the Soviet legacy of insulation from 
the world market and are learning to successfully serve relatively 
sophisticated markets such as the EU.  64 | ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SIMPLE OR DEEP FREE TRADE SCENARIOS 
Table 4.1 Ukraine’s exports to the EU vs. the rest of the world by commodity (2001 
and 2004) 
HS section  Total exports 
Of which 
exports to EU-25 
       Of which  ($ million)  (%) 
       HS chapter  2001  2004  2001  2004 
I  Animals & animal products  454  648  16.5  3.9 
II Vegetable  products  693  1,136  48.9  28.4 
III  Animal or vegetable fats  225  546  19.8  38.1 
IV Prepared  foodstuffs  451 1,141  13.1  13.9 
V Mineral  products  1,750  4,324  57.4  51.8 
27  Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc  1,186  3,387  51.6  47.2 
VI Chemical  products 1,478  2,782  30.1  29.7 
28 
Inorganic chemicals, precious metal  
   compounds, etc.  550 786  19.5  20.4 
29 Organic  chemicals  203  500  58.0  47.3 
VII  Plastics & rubber  256  439  18.1  30.3 
VIII  Hides & skins  130  207  81.8  60.8 
IX  Wood & wood products  230  516  81.7  70.8 
X  Wood pulp products  287  393  17.4  10.2 
XI  Textiles & textile articles  614  883  74.2  81.5 
62 
Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or 
   crocheted  420 554  80.6  75.7 
XII Footwear,  headgear  85  122  69.5  58.3 
XIII  Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos  141  281  19.5  39.2 
XV  Base metals & articles thereof  6,720  13,048  18.6  20.7 
72 Iron  and  steel  4,977  10,766  13.8  17.7 
73  Articles of iron or steel  649  1,448  13.6  32.2 
XVI  Machinery & mechanical appliances  1,714  3,032  34.1  31.3 
84  Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, etc  1,249  1,803  33.4  24.2 
85 Electrical,  electronic  equipment 466  1,229  36.0  41.8 
XVII Transportation  equipment  549  2,035  18.3  10.8 
XVIII  Instruments - measuring, musical  77  592  25.4  60.9 
XIX  Arms & ammunition  93  171  47.2  56.9 
XX Miscellaneous  11  0  99.2  66.9 
XXI  Works of art  305  370  10.1  26.8 
   Total  16,265  32,666  30.4  29.9 
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Table 4.2 Ukraine’s imports from the EU vs. the rest of the world, by commodity 
(2001 and 2004) 
HS section  Total imports 
Of which 
imports to EU 25 
       Of which  ($ million)  (%) 
       HS chapter  2001  2004  2001  2004 
I  Animals & animal products  183  315  26.5  35.3 
II Vegetable  products  266  439  43.0  24.1 
III  Animal or vegetable fats  86  149  50.4  44.3 
IV Prepared  foodstuffs  590 1,005 28.9  35.2 
V Mineral  products  6,725  10,845  3.1  4.2 
VI Chemical  products 1,127  2,248  59.7  59.0 
29 Organic  chemicals  186  340  41.7  39.2 
30 Pharmaceutical  products  343  745  69.2  67.3 
38 Miscellaneous  chemical  products  192  313  69.3  72.8 
VII  Plastics & rubber  697  1,407  49.7  50.0 
39  Plastics and articles thereof  463  1,071  61.9  57.3 
VIII  Hides & skins  66  73  71.3  75.4 
IX  Wood & wood products  73  156  73.7  75.8 
X  Wood pulp products  538  785  54.0  60.3 
XI  Textiles & textile articles  647  992  61.1  63.4 
52 Cotton  96  171  47.5  52.4 
54 Manmade  filaments  105  115  58.6  69.7 
55  Manmade staple fibres  129  175  63.3  62.7 
XII Footwear,  headgear  44  43  30.3  42.2 
XIII  Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos  185  391  57.9  50.3 
XV  Base metals & articles thereof  821  1,753  39.2  31.2 
XVI  Machinery & mechanical appliances  2,378  4,741  50.6  56.5 
84  Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, etc.  1,661  3,214  46.8  54.3 
85 Electrical,  electronic  equipment 717  1,526  59.4  61.0 
XVII Transportation  equipment  746  2,494  44.0  41.8 
87  Vehicles other than railway, tramway  637  2,247  46.3  43.9 
XVIII  Instruments – measuring, musical  260  560  46.0  45.7 
XIX  Arms & ammunition  114  242  70.2  54.2 
XX Miscellaneous  1  1  20.4  16.6 
XXI  Works of art  228  356  39.4  49.4 
   Total  15,775  28,997  29.5  32.6 
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4.2  CGE model simulations 
Cuts in import tariffs on their own, such as in a simple FTA, will not lead to 
substantial income growth and welfare gains. But deeper free trade could deliver 
welfare gains of the order of 4-7% in comparative static simulations. If dynamic 
effects are also taken into account, the orders of magnitude could over time be twice 
or three times as large. Additional estimates on the effects of reductions in the cost 
of capital could amount to further welfare gains of 4-5%. If this deeper free trade 
were limited to Ukraine, there would be a potential for trade diversion from other 
CIS countries. Therefore, a comprehensive approach for trade liberalisation and 
institutional harmonisation covering the whole region would be desirable. 
The 1999 feasibility study used a small comparative-static CGE model to 
estimate the production and trade effects of an EU–Ukraine FTA. We have 
reviewed and updated this model with more recent data, while leaving its 
basic structure unchanged owing to time constraints. Our model predicts 
trade flows and output changes for six regions: Ukraine, the EU-15, the 
2004 Central and Eastern European accession countries (CEECs), south-
eastern European countries including Turkey (SEECs), Russia and the rest 
of the world (ROW). Its sectoral focus is on trade in goods because 
available data for trade in services are at best fragmentary, especially in 
terms of disaggregation by trading partners. Thus we separately identify 
the following sectors: agriculture, minerals, food products, light 
manufacturing, heavy manufacturing, textiles, metals and services, and 
other activities. It would be desirable to distinguish between plant and 
animal products within agriculture, but this was precluded by lack of data.  
The model is based on data drawn from the Global Trade Analysis 
Project (GTAP) database complemented by Ukrainian national sources. 
While the GTAP data are available only for 2001, information on Ukraine 
has been adjusted to reflect the rapid growth of Ukraine’s GDP and 
international trade since then. We assess the sensitivity of our simulation 
results by employing two alternative sets of assumptions about elasticities 
of substitution between factors of production and elasticities of 
transformation across outputs; these ‘low’ and ‘high’ elasticity cases 
correspond approximately to ‘short-term’ and ‘long-term’ effects. In the 
low (high) elasticity case, the elasticity of substitution is 2 (4) between the 
same class of goods from different countries and 1.25 (1.25) between 
different classes of goods. The elasticity of transformation in production is 
2 (4). A detailed description of the model and fuller discussion of the 
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Data on import tariffs are from the GTAP database for 2001, 
complemented with national data for Ukraine. In an extension of the 1999 
model, we use a gravity model of bilateral trade flows to estimate the 
implicit non-tariff trade barriers among the regions of our model. 
Regression estimates are obtained for each sector from GTAP trade data for 
2001. Technically, these estimates are based on the coefficients of dummy 
variables for relevant country groupings in the gravity regressions (for 
example, to indicate that a given bilateral trade relationship involves trade 
among EU-15 countries, or between an EU-15 country and an accession 
country, or between an EU-15 country and the rest of the world). The 
resulting estimates of the ad valorem equivalents of implied trade barriers 
are large, roughly ranging from 20% for textiles to 40% for food products, 
over and above the formal and informal barriers still encountered by trade 
flows between EU countries.  
We develop three highly stylised scenarios involving progressive 
degrees of trade liberalisation and institutional approximation. Scenario (i) 
represents the eastern enlargement of the EU plus Malta and Cyprus as 
well as the future accession of south-eastern Europe (especially Romania 
and Bulgaria). This scenario involves eliminating the estimated non-tariff 
barriers between the EU-15, CEECs and SEECs. This scenario is included in 
part to assess the possible disruption to Ukraine’s trade with the CEEC and 
SEEC regions because of their accession to the EU. Scenario (ii) adds a 
simple FTA with the EU-15, the CEECs, the SEECs and Ukraine, with 
import tariffs fully abolished, but EU versus non-EU non-tariff barriers still 
in place. Scenario (iii) represents the move from a simple to a deep FTA, 
eliminating non-tariff barriers between Ukraine and the extended EU-25 
with the aid of considerable institutional and regulatory convergence.  
In interpreting the simulation results from this small comparative-
static model, it is important to be clear about its limitations. For this 
particular exercise, the stocks of all factors of production are assumed 
constant and fully employed. Reductions in trade barriers will lead to an 
elimination of waste (non-tariff barriers are represented by a cost per unit 
of output), as well as to a more efficient allocation of factors of production 
across sectors and additional trade; but increases in output for one sector 
inevitably involve decreases in output elsewhere in the economy. Thus the 
model does not account for the added investment and income growth that 
would result from the efficiency gains arising from trade liberalisation and 
institutional approximation. Still, some rough indications are given below 
of the possible size of the dynamic effects, which would be additional to the 
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Table 4.3 summarises the changes in Ukraine’s international trade 
and sectoral structure of output owing to progressive trade liberalisation in 
line with our scenarios. Considering trade flows by trading partner first, 
the eastern enlargement scenario (i) causes trade between the EU-15 and 
Ukraine to decline slightly.  
Table 4.3 CGE simulation results - Trade by partner country and sector (percent 
change) 
  Scenario (i) 
EU eastern enlargement 
(change) 
Scenario (ii) 
EU-Ukraine simple FTA 
(change relative 
to eastern enlargement) 
Scenario (iii) 
EU-Ukraine deep FTA 
(change relative 
to simple FTA) 
   Short term  Long term  Short term  Long term  Short term  Long term 
Exports of Ukraine          
EU-15  0.0 -0.7 19.8 64.8 15.8 58.0 
CEECs  2.4 27.3 23.8 94.1 11.8 37.2 
SEECs  3.1 26.4 21.9 76.8  6.7 34.9 
Russia  -4.4 -10.4  0.2  -0.2 -10.7 -15.5 
Rest of world  0.4  -0.2  0.2  0.0  -8.0  -11.5 
Imports of Ukraine          
EU-15 -4.8  -11.7  5.9  11.4  18.3  53.6 
CEECs  22.2 86.3  8.4 15.9 15.3 32.9 
SEECs  17.0 82.5  8.3 15.5  3.6 28.8 
Russia -5.2  -13.7  -4.8  -10.8  0.2  -7.0 
Rest of world  -4.7  -12.5  -3.0  -6.7  -1.9  -13.6 
Exports by sector          
Agriculture 2.0  4.8  5.2  11.7  5.1  31.2 
Minerals -3.1  -7.7  1.3  1.5  -24.8  -37.1 
Food processing  1.2  3.5  14.0  35.2  7.5  15.2 
Light manufacturing  -5.4  -10.4  14.4  34.6  6.2  21.9 
Heavy manufacturing  -1.3  3.6  4.0  10.1  7.5  13.2 
Textiles 4.5  8.5  5.6 13.8  9.0  8.8 
Metals  -0.5 -1.3 79.4  495.5 10.6 63.5 
Other activities  3.9  3.7  1.4  1.8  16.2  75.2 
Imports by sector          
Agriculture  4.3 18.0 10.8 35.2  9.8 34.5 
Minerals -0.2  3.9  0.7  5.5  -12.7  -20.7 
Food processing  0.8  1.7  -4.4  -15.2  7.4  12.7 
Light manufacturing  -1.1  -1.7  -1.4  -5.4  2.7  6.4 
Heavy manufacturing  -5.0  -4.8  -7.3  -8.3  9.1  15.2 
Textiles 1.9  3.2  1.0 2.9  12.8  19.1 
Metals  -1.2 0.8 4.9 7.8 0.9 2.3 
Other activities  -1.1  -2.9  -2.9  -5.5  11.4  42.4 
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Table 4.4 CGE simulation results - Trade with the EU-15 and CEECs (percent change) 
  
Scenario (i) 
EU eastern enlargement 
(change) 
Scenario (ii) 
EU-Ukraine simple FTA 
(change relative 
to eastern enlargement) 
Scenario (iii) 
EU-Ukraine deep FTA 
(change relative 
to simple FTA) 
   Short term  Long term  Short term  Long term  Short term  Long term 
Exports to EU-15          
Agriculture 0.7  -1.4  22.1  49.6  56.8  103.4 
Minerals 0.0  -3.6  3.6  7.4  21.4  142.7 
Food processing  1.3  0.8  40.8  98.5  54.2  18.1 
Light manufacturing  0.7  -9.1  28.1  65.4  41.5  18.1 
Heavy manufacturing  -4.1  -3.4  10.2  22.4  13.8  9.1 
Textiles 1.4  0.0  11.0 25.1 20.2  3.0 
Metals -1.0  -4.1  314.4  1,714.9  402.0  76.1 
Other  activities  5.9 8.3 1.4 1.8  48.0  194.3 
Imports from EU-15          
Agriculture -3.9  -9.7  1.7  36.6  24.1  48.7 
Minerals -5.3  -13.9  30.8  2.9  9.0  -2.7 
Food processing  -2.8  -7.5  16.2  64.7  8.8  6.7 
Light manufacturing  -2.0  -18.8  4.0  25.6  7.8  -5.4 
Heavy manufacturing  -10.0  -18.6  1.9  7.4  9.0  -6.9 
Textiles -0.6  -3.4 10.7  4.5 10.4  8.7 
Metals -4.6  -17.9  -0.2  20.8  18.7  18.5 
Other  activities  0.1 1.1 5.9 0.1  35.1  140.3 
Exports to CEECs          
Agriculture  2.0 38.8 24.0 48.5 25.8  184.4 
Minerals 6.7  40.0  6.3  7.1  17.7  242.2 
Food processing  -7.0  9.5  40.1  97.1  8.3  27.8 
Light manufacturing  -37.7  -31.8  27.7  65.3  9.1  -11.8 
Heavy  manufacturing  20.4 62.1 10.2 22.3  7.6 83.5 
Textiles 14.2  40.3  11.1 25.0  6.5 45.1 
Metals 22.9  111.4  307.0  1,460.8  21.1  238.3 
Other activities  -21.2  -55.5  0.9  1.6  38.5  21.4 
Imports from CEECs          
Agriculture 33.9  131.9  11.2  21.9  24.0  282.1 
Minerals 23.8  86.0  0.0  -0.5  8.6  109.0 
Food  processing  24.4 83.3 32.0 68.5  8.6  112.2 
Light  manufacturing  -11.3 57.8 22.2 41.1  7.8 83.7 
Heavy  manufacturing  21.7 62.8  7.0 13.8  9.1 87.3 
Textiles 16.7  53.7  11.1 24.1 11.4 74.6 
Metals 44.7  198.1  8.6  12.4  18.3  307.4 
Other activities  -16.3  -54.6  5.9  13.3  35.0  8.6 
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But this effect is compensated for by a substantial increase in trade 
between Ukraine and the new (recent and future) EU members, as they 
adopt the more liberal import regime of the EU. In scenario (ii), with 
import tariffs eliminated on trade with the enlarged EU, the earlier 
reductions in trade with the EU-15 are more than reversed while trade with 
the CEECs/SEECs continues to grow. In scenario (iii), putting trade 
between Ukraine and the enlarged EU on a more equal footing with intra-
EU trade, Ukraine’s trade with the EU-15/CEECs/SEECs grows very 
substantially. In all three scenarios, some trade is diverted away from 
Russia and the rest of the world as a result of lower trade barriers between 
Ukraine and Western Europe.  
Because of the high level of sectoral aggregation and highly stylised 
representation of the production side in this small CGE model, it is 
especially important to view the sectoral change generated by the 
simulations as an indication of the mechanisms at work, rather than as a 
forecast. With this caveat, under both a simple and a deep FTA (scenarios 
(ii) and (iii)), Ukraine’s total exports rise across nearly all sectors (except 
agriculture under a deep FTA). Metallurgical exports increase 
disproportionately, largely as a result of the elimination of the EU import 
quota, which is subsumed under the simple FTA scenario (although 
technically it will occur whenever Ukraine accedes to the WTO; see also 
annex 2). 
For Ukraine’s trade with the EU-15 and the CEECs the model predicts 
large increases in both Ukrainian exports and imports in agriculture and 
food processing (see Table 4.4 above). This result suggests that additional 
export opportunities for Western European producers will appear 
alongside higher competitive pressure from Ukrainian exports not only 
across, but also within broadly defined sectors. The impact of the lifting of 
the EU quota regime on Ukrainian metallurgical exports (subsumed under 
the simple FTA scenario) is also prominent. In reality, however, the surge 
in exports will probably be dampened by the ongoing price increases for 
imports of energy materials from Russia (e.g. the price increases decided 
early in January 2006). As a result the external competitiveness of the 
Ukrainian iron and steel industry will suffer. This sector is more energy-
intensive than its worldwide competitors, with more than 40% of output 
still from open-hearth furnaces. On the other hand a wide range of sectors 
that are less energy-intensive stand to gain, especially if the energy price 
increases also result in some compensatory depreciation of the Ukrainian 
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Our model also generates estimates of the comparative-static income 
and welfare effects for Ukraine from progressive trade liberalisation and 
institutional approximation. For the ‘eastern enlargement’ scenario (i), 
welfare gains are up to 3%, similar in size to the gains for the CEECs and 
SEECs themselves. For a simple FTA (scenario (ii)), the gains are negligible 
whereas for a deep FTA (scenario (iii)), they are 4-7% on top of the gains 
through eastern enlargement (see annex 4 for details).  
Broadly, these estimates are in line with the findings of other recent 
papers on the impact of trade liberalisation in CIS countries. For example, 
using a single-country model to study the impact of Ukraine’s WTO 
accession, Pavel et al. (2004) arrive at welfare gains of around 4%, largely 
through the elimination of subsidies rather than cuts in import tariffs. 
Recent studies of the CEEC accession states (Le Jour et al., 2001 and 
Edwards, 2005) show that the effects of harmonisation and mutual 
recognition agreements are potentially far more significant for trade and 
for economic welfare in particular than tariff and quota removal alone. 
From related literature it is also known that when additional investment 
resulting from higher efficiency is taken into account, such comparative-
static effects translate into full dynamic effects that may be two to three 
times as large.15  
The following calculation explores how a deep EU–Ukraine FTA 
would affect investment in Ukraine more specifically, namely by reducing 
the cost of capital in at least three ways. First, the cost of capital goods will 
be reduced by cheaper imports. As a rough guide, our simulations suggest 
that the price of capital goods (compared with average output prices for 
Ukrainian industry) could fall by up to 3%. Second, institutional 
approximation to the EU to rebrand Ukraine as a more reliable place in 
which to do business will reduce risk premia for investors. A conservative 
estimate puts the consequent reduction in the cost of capital (measured as 
the annual rental cost) at 10%. Further, increased competition in the 
                                                      
15 Annex 4 also discusses several other welfare-improving effects of trade 
liberalisation and institutional integration that are difficult to estimate but are 
widely acknowledged by recent empirical research to be quantitatively important. 
These include: increased competition and lower monopolistic price mark-ups 
(which are important in Ukraine where many markets are highly monopolised); 
reduced corruption (though lower monopoly rents); and productivity gains 
through firm-selection effects because exporting firms would grow faster than 
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banking sector could reduce the cost of capital by 5%. Altogether, the price 
of capital could fall by up to 17%. 
Cheaper capital affects welfare via a complex route. First, the stock of 
capital employed will rise by between 15 and 30%, depending on elasticity 
assumptions (short-term versus long-term). GDP will rise by between 4% 
(short-term) and 9% (high elasticity), compared with our basic CGE 
simulations with fixed capital. This will increase wages in Ukraine by up to 
10%. Still, it is plausible that most of the extra capital will be in the form of 
foreign direct investment (FDI); hence, there will be an offsetting outflow of 
interest, profits and dividends. Nevertheless, cheaper capital goods mean 
lower costs for existing Ukrainian firms, while a lower risk premium 
reduces welfare losses through uncertainty for all. Lower profit margins in 
financial intermediation, however, imply lower profits for Ukrainian banks. 
Taking all these effects into account, the lower cost of capital raises welfare 
in Ukraine by between 4 and 5%, in addition to the trade gains identified in 
our comparative static simulations. Thus the overall welfare gain from a 
deep EU–Ukraine FTA would be estimated as well above 10%.  
4.3  Impact of institutional reforms and approximation 
Estimates of the impact of improved institutional quality for countries such as 
Ukraine are very large, with conceivable increases in GDP in the range of 20 to 
30%. Fully opening the financial and other important service sectors to foreign 
investment and best international practice would constitute a key element of such 
reforms. 
While the comparative-static CGE model gives a useful indication of 
prospective structural change in international trade and production owing 
to an EU–Ukraine FTA, the model does not adequately account for how a 
lasting improvement in the quality of institutions in Ukraine through deep 
integration with the EU would lead to additional investment and GDP 
growth. This section reviews recent literature on medium- to long-term 
growth effects of regional integration schemes and institutional reforms 
and applies the findings to a deep EU–Ukraine FTA. Two strands of 
literature are considered: i) case studies based on the experiences of recent 
major regional integration projects, such as NAFTA and the EU’s southern 
enlargement; and ii) econometric studies that relate improvements in the 
quality of institutions to GDP growth. 
Piazolo (2001, ch. D) reviews case studies of the growth effects of 
regional integration between rich and poor countries. It is often argued that 
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poor-country governments may enhance their credibility, improve the 
investment climate and accelerate GDP growth. Regional integration with 
institutional approximation to the rich partner is a strong signal of the 
commitment to reform, renders arbitrary policy changes more difficult and 
costly and thereby strengthens the incentives for the government to stay 
the course. The influence of different national interest groups is reduced, 
further enhancing the credibility of reforms.  
The history of NAFTA shows these mechanisms at work. Fernandez-
Arias & Spiegel (1998) argue that the primary impact of NAFTA does not 
lie in the further reduction of already low tariffs between the partners, but 
in a fundamental change in the attractiveness of Mexico as a location for 
investment. They extend the traditional analysis of customs unions to allow 
for international capital movements and show how a trade accord may 
improve the ability of the less developed partner to attract capital. Beyond 
this, it has been argued from a political economy perspective that the 
existence of NAFTA indirectly helped Mexico to overcome the peso crisis 
of December 2004 because, without NAFTA, the US government would not 
have mobilised the large financial resources needed by the Mexican 
government to avoid default. In this respect, regional integration provided 
‘insurance’ cover to Mexico, reducing planning uncertainties for the 
economic agents. The NAFTA experience is particularly relevant to a deep 
EU–Ukraine FTA, which would fall short, in terms of the strength of 
commitments and extent of financial support, of full EU membership; 
nevertheless, it is notable that NAFTA has been an effective mechanism for 
enhancing economic reforms in Mexico.  
The example of Mexico and NAFTA also showcases one key channel 
through which improvements in the investment climate lead to higher 
investment and income growth. A large proportion of output growth in 
Mexico comes from trade and production networks between US and 
Mexican plants. While the outsourcing of low-skilled, labour-intensive 
activities from the US was the primary driving force, more complex 
patterns of interaction are emerging. In this respect, Mexico’s experience 
mirrors that of many other developing and transition economies where 
manufactured exports have expanded rapidly. Typically, a wide variety of 
trade and production networks involving local and importing-country 
firms have evolved (see for example Luecke & Szalavetz, 1999). In these 
networks, importers perform functions that are initially beyond the 
capacity of local firms, e.g. marketing in the export market, product design, 
quality control, finance or logistics. Local firms are free to focus on 
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lies. Over time, learning by doing as well as by more formal transfers of 
technological and managerial know-how allow many local firms to move 
into higher value-added activities and become more independent of their 
importing-country partners.  
Although such trade and production networks may involve different 
ownership patterns, including FDI, they do invariably require importing-
country firms to make a substantial investment – in terms of effort, time 
and money – in the relationship with the local firm. Therefore, a good 
investment climate and business environment is a precondition for 
successful network formation (and by implication, expansion of 
manufactured exports) even when no FDI is involved. It is in this context 
that regional integration, such as through a deep EU–Ukraine FTA, has a 
crucial role to play.  
This is especially true in Ukraine where trade and production 
networks are only beginning to evolve. Ukrainian clothing producers and 
similar low-skill, labour-intensive industries have benefited from some 
outsourcing by Western European firms. A problematic business 
environment makes it difficult, however, especially for small and medium-
sized firms to attract the kind of involvement and support from foreign 
firms that would enable them to expand sophisticated manufactured 
exports. A recent case study on the potential for electronics manufacturing 
in Ukraine (ICPS, 2005b) finds that many fundamental conditions are good, 
especially regarding the availability and wage levels of skilled workers. But 
for Ukrainian firms to be able to integrate into international production 
networks, efficient customs procedures and high-quality producer services 
– especially in transport and logistics – would be required. A deep EU–
Ukraine FTA, by improving the quality of market-enabling and market-
supporting institutions in Ukraine, could significantly help to overcome the 
obstacles that are still holding back the participation of Ukrainian firms in 
trade and production networks.  
While case studies on the effects of regional integration schemes such 
as NAFTA are instructive, they normally cannot quantitatively disentangle 
the ‘net’ effect of a regional integration agreement from other determinants 
of income growth such as domestic reforms. Econometric studies of the 
growth effects of institutional change seek to overcome this difficulty; they 
tend to be based on cross-section country data and follow one of two basic 
conceptual approaches: (i) they assume that the quality of institutions is a 
parameter in a macroeconomic production function and estimate the 
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growth regressions that explain GDP growth over the period of observation 
as a function of initial per-capital income, investment ratios in human and 
physical capital, and various additional variables – including institutional 
quality – that may be viewed as influencing the efficiency parameter of the 
production function that underlies the growth model. 
Of the studies that directly estimate the output elasticity of 
institutional quality, the estimates by Piazolo (2001, ch. D) may be the most 
directly applicable to EU–Ukrainian institutional approximation. Piazolo 
uses the transition indicators of the European Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) (published annually in the EBRD Transition Report) 
to measure the extent to which reforms in the EBRD sample of transition 
economies during the 1990s have created institutions of the same quality as 
the EU’s. The EBRD transition indicators cover major areas of systemic 
reform (corporate governance, markets and international trade, the 
financial sector and legal infrastructure) and range from 1 (indicating little 
or no reform in the particular area) to 4+ (institutional quality equivalent to 
the acquis communautaire). The average score for Ukraine in 2005 was less 
than 3; it seems reasonable to assume that an ambitious, deep FTA with the 
EU could bring the average score to around 4 during a reasonable 
implementation period.  
Piazolo’s estimates suggest that an improvement in institutional 
quality by one-third, as measured by the EBRD index, would increase the 
level of GDP by at least one tenth purely through the greater efficiency of 
resource use (conceptually similar to the comparative-static effect that we 
estimate with our CGE model; see section 5.2). The total increase in GDP, 
allowing for additional investment over time, could be in the 20 to 30% 
range. Clearly, even though these numbers (and similar results in the 
literature) are based on solid econometric work, they are not ‘exact’ 
estimates but indications of the likely order of magnitude of possible 
income effects of effective institutional approximation between Ukraine 
and the EU. At the same time, these numbers do provide a more realistic 
sense of the potential benefits of a deep EU–Ukraine FTA than the small 
comparative static efficiency effects generated by our CGE model, 
notwithstanding other important insights that may be gained from the CGE 
model. (These estimates are similar in magnitude and partly overlap 
conceptually with the indication given in the preceding section that full 
dynamic effects may multiply comparative-static results by a factor of two 
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Several econometric studies have recently been undertaken on the 
impact of services liberalisation on GDP growth (for a summary of the 
literature, see Lücke & Spinanger 2004). These are of particular relevance to 
a deep EU–Ukraine FTA as it would cover significant areas of service sector 
regulations. With respect to financial services, François & Schuknecht 
(2000) find that financial sector openness (i.e. the presence of foreign banks 
in the domestic market, not necessarily involving capital account 
liberalisation) is strongly and positively associated with competition in the 
sector; furthermore, competition is strongly associated with economic 
growth, on top of the separate effect of financial sector development on 
growth. In other words, a highly competitive and highly developed 
financial sector is associated with a higher GDP growth rate than a less 
competitive and similarly developed sector.  
Overall, the annual GDP growth rates of countries that had fully 
opened their financial services industries were 1.3 to 1.6 percentage points 
higher than for countries with the ‘most closed’ type of financial services 
regime. Similarly, Mattoo, Rathindran & Subramanian (2001) find from 
cross-country growth regressions that countries with fully open 
telecommunications and financial services sectors annually grew up to 1.5 
percentage points faster than other countries. These are huge growth effects 
from services liberalisation; for example, with a 1.5 percentage point 
difference in annual growth rates between two countries, after 20 years 
GDP is 35% higher in the richer country. As cross-country growth 
regressions may be interpreted as indicative of long-term growth effects 
allowing for higher investment, a 20-year time horizon would appear quite 
appropriate for a ‘back-of-the-envelope’ calculation along these lines. The 
regression results suggest that for Ukraine, comprehensive services 
liberalisation, institutional reform and approximation to the EU through a 
deep FTA with the EU have potentially large benefits.16 
                                                      
16 This conclusion is further supported b y  r e c e n t  r e s e a r c h  o n  s o u t h e r n  
Mediterranean neighbourhood partner states (Egypt and Tunisia) that suggests 
very substantial gains from service sector liberalisation (Müller-Jentsch, 2004). 
Similarly, a literature survey by the OECD concludes that the gains from future 
services liberalisation will be at least as large as that for goods, as service sectors 
remain considerably more protected in many developing and transition economies 




5.  A SCENARIO FOR SIMPLE FREE TRADE 
In this chapter we review the basic ingredients of a simple free trade 
scenario for goods, services and capital.  
5.1  Free trade in goods 
A plausible scenario would be for tariffs to be eliminated asymmetrically, to be 
front-loaded for the EU and for Ukraine over a period of years, probably close to 
five. A period of 10 years would be too long for the needs of Ukraine’s reform 
agenda. Remaining export duties would be scrapped. Any exceptional treatment for 
agriculture should be simple, such as eliminating tariffs soon for some 
commodities, but with extended periods for others.  
There are many precedents for free trade agreements made by the EU, with 
some recurrent patterns seen in the Europe Agreements and the 
Mediterranean Association Agreements.  
Tariffs. Given that quantitative restrictions will have been eliminated 
with WTO accession, the main variable would be the elimination of tariffs, 
with a number of negotiation variables with respect to transition periods 
and possible exclusions.  
For Poland, for example, tariff dismantling was asymmetric in its 
Europe Agreement, with the EU eliminating its tariffs over a period of up 
to five years after entry into force of the agreement, and with Poland doing 
so over up to ten years. Quantitative restrictions were mostly abolished on 
entry into force, while export duties by Poland were eliminated over five 
years.  
The Mediterranean agreements have also seen asymmetric tariff 
dismantling, immediately on entry into force on the EU side, but 
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Quantitative restrictions were eliminated upon entry into force, but 
exclusions remained for some agricultural products.  
The EU–Chile agreement of 2002 saw commodities grouped into 
categories, with tariffs to be eliminated at varying speeds – some upon 
entry into force and others over three, four, seven and ten years. 
With Ukraine the EU would presumably front-load its tariff cuts, at 
least to a considerable degree. It might possibly eliminate them on the day 
of entry into force of the agreement, given its much greater competitive 
strengths. Ukraine also would begin to reduce its tariffs upon entry into 
force, which would be close to the time when the transitional period ends 
for the most part under Ukraine’s WTO offer. The tariff reduction schedule 
would normally be in a straight line of equal steps. A long transition 
period, up to 10 years, could be considered and has precedents in EU free 
trade agreements as mentioned above. The disadvantage of long transition 
periods, however, is that the process may lose credibility and fail to 
energise the private sector, so we would suggest about five years. More 
generally, a long transition period could be out of step with the political 
urgency for Ukraine to push the economy onto a new growth track.  
Export duties. Ukraine’s WTO offer sees the reduction but not the 
complete elimination of certain export duties, such as those for scrap metal, 
sunflower products and animal hides. For free trade with the EU these 
remaining export duties would be on the agenda for elimination.  
Agriculture. This sector has been the main exception in the past to the 
general rule of eliminating tariffs in the EU’s free trade agreements, as is 
also the case with Ukraine’s free trade agreement with Russia. The 
pressures for at least partial exclusion of agriculture from tariff-free trade 
will be no less on both sides than in the past. On the EU side the current 
pressures on agricultural policy in the Doha Round context are very 
intense. On the Ukrainian side the sector has only recently been privatised 
and a huge agenda of modernisation lies ahead. In these circumstances the 
parties might identify certain commodity groups that could be liberalised 
first, with a schedule of tariff reductions leading to their elimination, for 
which the best candidates might be cereals, horticulture and vegetables. 
The EU has a policy for some agricultural commodities of a flexible on/off 
regime, i.e. switching between restrictive versus free conditions for imports 
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durum wheat and high-quality common wheat have been tariff-free17 
(while low- and medium-quality common wheat remains subject to a tariff 
quota regime). This market signal indicates that conditions for free trade in 
this important sector are relatively favourable and effectively a partial free 
trade regime prevails at present. For Ukraine, in the context of a possible 
FTA+, this tariff-free regime could be made permanent. For other products 
there could be extended tariff reduction schedules, for example up to 10 
years, starting from the level of WTO tariff bindings. 
5.2  Free trade in services 
Ukraine’s WTO offer for services already goes a long way towards free trade in 
services. Some exclusions could be brought into the present scenario, but the main 
ones, such as those in the transport sector, raise deeper issues of regulatory reform 
and possible convergence on the EU internal market acquis (see also chapter 6).  
As reported above, Ukraine’s offer to the WTO is one of the most liberal 
and comprehensive compared with the bound commitments of existing 
WTO member states. It already comes close to free trade in services. For 
example, Ukraine’s services offer to the WTO is closer to free trade than the 
services content of the EU’s FTA with Chile, which is itself more open than 
the EU’s FTAs with its Mediterranean partner states. 
Thus, there is a limited agenda for possibly completing sectoral 
coverage for omissions in Ukraine’s WTO offer. The potential areas here 
include road and rail transport where Ukraine proposes not to make 
binding commitments. The case of civil aviation is generally excluded from 
WTO competence and would be subject to a bilateral agreement with the 
EU. There are restrictions on news agencies in the WTO offer, which may 
be reconsidered in an FTA context, while restrictions in the field of audio-
visual services relating to cultural patrimony are not so different to the 
EU’s own position in the WTO. 
The main agenda for the service sectors falls beyond a narrow 
definition of free trade and more into deeper issues of domestic regulatory 
reform, where links to EU internal market laws may be appropriate to 
varying degrees. We return to these issues in chapter 6, section 6.2.  
                                                      
17 See Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1865/2005 of 16 November 2005 fixing the 
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5.3  Free movement of capital 
One scenario could involve complete liberalisation with regard to all remaining 
restrictions on capital movements, rights of establishment and related current 
payments by 2008, thus allowing time for current developments in monetary and 
exchange-rate policy to mature.  
The European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan already recalls the 
commitment in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) to 
ensure free movement of direct investments, to guarantee their protection 
and to hold consultations on the general goal of liberalisation. The PCA 
also assures the liberalisation of current payments, including payments 
related to direct investments, such as profits and repatriation. 
Foreign direct investment has been largely liberalised as a matter of 
political strategy, as illustrated by the recent major cases of the re-
privatisation of the steel firm Kryvorizhstal (bought by Mittal Steel) and the 
purchase of a major bank, Aval (by Raiffeisen International).  
The key remaining restrictions on capital movements relate to 
government bonds with more than one year to maturity. The objective of a 
free trade agreement would be total liberalisation of capital movements, 
rights of establishment and related current payments. The timing of such 
moves will, however, be related to concerns about assuring macroeconomic 
and financial stability. In the current Ukrainian context this links to the 
sequencing of the move towards a flexible, floating exchange rate and 
inflation-targeting by monetary policy. These monetary policy reforms are 
ongoing and are expected to be completed in 2006 or 2007. It is generally 
appreciated that controls over short-term capital movements may need to 
be retained with fixed or semi-fixed exchange rate regimes, so as to avert 
de-stabilising, speculative capital movements. In view of the monetary 
reform timetable it might be plausible to set the year 2008 as a target for 
completing liberalisation of capital movements.  
The current licensing system for foreign investments would then 
switch to just an information-reporting requirement. Current licensing and 
other regulatory requirements for foreign investment are considered by the 
business community to be unduly complicated and unpredictable in their 




6.  FROM DEEPER FREE TRADE TO 
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 
In this chapter we extend the agenda to the possible content of a deep free 
trade agreement, with priority given to policy sectors that can have an 
important bearing on Ukraine’s economic performance. Although the list of 
priority sectors discussed here is already very substantial, it should be 
considered as more illustrative than exhaustive, and a future negotiation 
process would doubtless raise issues that are not covered in this study. The 
Commission’s Strategy Paper on the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) of 2004 (European Commission, 2004) points the way towards 
progressive inclusion in the EU’s internal market in the following terms:  
The implementation of the ENP itself brings with it the perspective of 
moving beyond cooperation to a significant degree of integration 
…including through a stake for partner countries in the EU’s Internal 
Market. 
6.1  Goods sector 
6.1.1 Customs procedures 
The EU–Ukrainian land borders should see ambitious plans for high-tech, fast and 
secure passage of goods and persons, with elimination of the crass corruption that 
still plagues Ukraine’s frontier posts.   
Currently, the EU shares 778 km of its external border with Ukraine. The 
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Hungary (137 km).18 In 2007-08, when Romania is expected to join the EU, 
the length of the common border will increase by 614 km. Such a long 
border creates significant potential for deeper integration through people-
to-people contacts, cross-border investments and trade. But it also gives 
rise to substantial border problems such as smuggling and human 
trafficking. The EU should assist Ukraine in resolving these problems 
through technical assistance to the Ukrainian border guard and through 
financial assistance for modern border-related equipment. In return it 
should demand comprehensive customs reforms and a streamlining of 
border-related controls from Ukraine. 
WTO accession will mean that Ukraine has to comply with requisite 
standards for the customs code, valuation, etc. This will not necessarily 
mean rapid and efficient customs services, however. In working groups 
with neighbouring states the European Commission has developed 
guidelines for best practices at border-crossing points, and made proposals 
for ‘a simple and paperless environment for customs and trade’ in the 
context of the integrated management of external borders. These proposals 
involve complex programmes for modernising and computerising trading 
practices, leading for example to electronic declarations made before 
departure and paperless procedures, with x-ray checking of goods at the 
border-crossing points. Such measures are looking ahead to the ideal future 
situation, which will involve compatible processes of technological 
development on both sides of the frontier.  
For the immediate future there are some more basic priorities to sort 
out, as manifest in the huge and chronic delays for road traffic at Ukraine’s 
frontiers with the EU. Corruption is a major part of the problem and there 
would be little point proceeding with ambitious plans for free trade 
without thorough reform. It is still the case that the traveller who wants to 
pass the frontier without undue delay has to pay bribes, as the article 
quoted in Box 6.1 vividly illustrates. T h i s  a r t i c l e  g o e s  o n  t o  d e s c r i b e  
crossings of Romanian and Bulgarian borders during the same journey, 
which were unproblematic, although the situation there was similar to that 
described for Ukraine only a few years earlier. These cases show that 
reform in this area is not at all intractable. 
                                                      
18 These figures are from State Border Guard Services of Ukraine. The Ukrainian-
Moldovan border is 1,222 km. THE PROSPECT OF DEEP FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE| 83 
Box. 6.1 Corruption on Ukraine’s borders – excerpt from an International Herald 
Tribune article by N. Kurlish 
I sat at a Ukrainian border station, trying to cross into Moldova. “Present? 
Present?” the border guard asked, holding up my CD player. I smiled and told the 
guard that I did not understand. He smiled back, gave the player a whack with his 
billy stick. Then we were inexplicably told we couldn’t leave the country. In 
retrospect I might as well have given it to him. It could have saved me 30 hours of 
desperate searching for a station where the border police would let us pass without 
demanding a bribe higher than we were willing to pay. The asking price at the next 
stop was $200, a lot more than I paid for the CD player.  
  Entering Ukraine was as challenging as leaving. After a four hour wait in a 
line of cars that hadn’t moved, my companion and I finally realized that we had to 
bribe drivers camped out ahead to get to the border station. There the agents tried 
to impound our car.  
Source:  N. Kulish, “Driving the Scenic Route to EU Membership”, International Herald 
Tribune, 4 October 2005. One of the authors of the present study had a similar 
experience at the Ukraine–Slovak frontier in July 2005. 
 
Measures taken by the new government in February 2005 made some 
improvements to reduce corruption (changes in staffing), with an increased 
risk of punishment. But it is reported that this translated quite quickly into 
rises in the price of bribes.  
Eminently suitable for the FTA+ process, there should be decisive 
elimination of corruption of Ukraine’s land border crossings with the EU. 
There are not that many important border crossings with Poland, Slovakia 
or Hungary, which employ a limited number of persons. Two of these 
crossings, between Poland and Ukraine, have initiated an interesting 
cooperative programme, where the two sets of services work together on 
one side of the border in close proximity to each other – at Zosin-Ustilug 
(near Zamosc), and at Kroscienko-Smolnica in the Bieszczady mountains, 
in south-eastern Poland. The Polish and Ukrainian officials check 
passengers and cars/trucks separately, but in sight of each other and this is 
reportedly helping to cut the corruption.  
The EU can surely help over the medium term to build, equip and 
train staff for modern facilities at the border. But first there should be a real 
act of political will by Ukraine to install in its border services a regime of 
zero tolerance of corruption. The EU and Ukraine could arrange for six-
monthly audits of progress towards eliminating corruption at this level.  84 | FROM DEEPER FREE TRADE TO DOMESTIC ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 
Under FTA+ the EU–Ukraine border traffic might well come to 
resemble that now observed across the US–Mexican frontier, where the 
NAFTA has resulted in a huge expansion of bilateral trade, largely related 
to direct US investments in Mexico. The quality of the border crossings is 
also attributable to the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) programme under a 
bilateral Border Accord Initiative between the US and Mexico. When 
drivers approach a FAST lane, wireless information is transmitted to an 
inspection booth, displaying a digital image of the driver, biographical 
information, as well as cargo and carrier information. A gamma–ray 
imaging system displays the truck’s interior on a screen, capable of 
detecting false compartments or cargoes not matching the associated 
declaration. This technology allows designated agents to instantly identify 
low-risk vehicles and drivers, and to expedite traffic through border 
crossings.19 In 2003, a $4 million contract provided the necessary equipment 
for 99 FAST lanes at 22 border crossings.20  
6.1.2 Customs union 
A customs union is not a necessary next stage in the trade integration process, and 
even the European Economic Area (EEA) does not have this. Further, a customs 
union is inadvisable for an EU–Ukraine FTA+, until and unless EU–Russian free 
trade develops as well. 
The example of the Turkish–EU customs union comes to mind as a 
comparator here. The advantage of a customs union is that it removes the 
need for complicated rules-of-origin norms and procedures governing 
inputs from third countries in goods traded between the two principal 
parties. Eliminating these complications is certainly helpful for deepening 
trade integration. But the disadvantage would be that it would impose on 
Ukraine all of the EU’s trade policies with third parties, notably those 
including Russia and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent 
                                                      
19 See the FAST Reference Guide; Enhancing the Security and Safety of Trans-Border 
Shipments, US Department of Homeland Security, US Customs and Border 
Protection, Washington, D.C., 2005. 
20 See the news release by TransCore, “TransCore’s RFID Technology Selected for 
Extending U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection’s Free and Secure Trade 
Programme to 22 Northern and Southern Border Crossings”, TransCore, 
Harrisburg, PA, 5 December 2003 (retrieved from http://www.transcore.com 
/news/news031205.htm, 10.10.2005). THE PROSPECT OF DEEP FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE| 85 
States (CIS) with which Ukraine currently has a free trade agreement. This 
would pose multiple problems – administrative, economic and political. 
The customs union option thus looks implausible until and unless the EU 
and Russia forms a free trade area together, which is a more remote 
prospect as of today compared with the case of Ukraine.  
A customs union is often regarded as a natural, textbook next step in 
the progression from free trade to deeper forms of market integration. But 
this should not be considered an instinctive logic. It is notable that the EEA 
s t a t e s  ( N o r w a y ,  e t c . ) ,  i n  b e c o m i n g  t o t a l l y  c o m p l i a n t  w i t h  E U  i n t e r n a l  
market law, have nonetheless not entered into a customs union with the 
EU. There is already much of great importance and value for Ukraine to do 
in convergence on EU internal market norms without needing to enter into 
a customs union relationship.  
6.1.3 Product standards for manufactured goods 
For the Ukrainian economy it is a strategic necessity for its industrial goods to 
become compliant with EU technical standards. A comprehensive plan for doing so 
over the period 2005-10 is being prepared by the EU Commission and Ukraine.  
The alignment of Ukraine with EU technical standards for industrial goods 
has been the policy objective of the Ukrainian government for some years. 
Ukraine has been making progress in this area, so far adopting 1,500 out of 
8,000 EU standards. Yet progress is still slow, as illustrated by the mixed 
performance recently reported (Table 6.1).  
Table 6.1 Ukrainian performance summary for some main EU technical norms 
Technical norm  Performance 
Safety of toys  Major part ok 
Low voltage Directive  Partly ok 
Electro-magnetic compatibility  Major part ok 
Household refrigeration equipment  Major part ok 
Simple pressure vessels  Not ok 
Pressure equipment  Not ok 
Lifts Differences 
Hot water boilers  Fully OK 
Domestic gas appliances  Nearly OK 
Non-automatic weighing instruments  Differences 
Source: Based on a report of the Tacis project on Standards, Technical 
Regulations and Conformity Assessment undertaken by Afnor-
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The European Commission through the Tacis programme and the 
World Bank through its Programmatic Adjustment Loans have both been 
active with technical assistance and policy advice. For example, it is already 
a positive step that the State Committee for Technical Regulations has been 
given the authority to adopt standards, cutting out the need to pass 
through the Council of Ministers as before. 
The ENP Action Plan contains guidelines for continuing alignment 
with EU standards, with supporting measures to strengthen institutional 
capacity on standardisation, the international accreditation of Ukrainian 
agencies, conformity assessment and market surveillance. Partial or full 
membership of leading standards bodies such as the European Committee 
for Standardisation, the European Committee for Electrotechnical 
Standardisation and the International Standardisation Organisation (ISO) is 
pending.  
The way has very recently been opened for a decisive strategy to 
assure mutual recognition of products conforming to EU standards. In 
September 2005 the Commission presented a plan to Ukraine to work 
towards an Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of 
Industrial Products (ACAA). The plan would be modelled on experience of 
the EU with accession candidate and Mediterranean partner states. A 
multi-stage process is proposed, from 2005 to 2011, starting with 
identification of priority sectors, and ending in 2001 with entry into force of 
the ACAA, meaning that at that time binding mutual recognition (i.e. 
Ukrainian products will enter the EU bearing the CE mark to show 
conformity with EU standards, whose validity would have been certified 
by Ukrainian conformity bodies and thus without needing further testing 
o n  t h e  E U  s i d e  a n d  v i c e  v e r s a  f o r  E U  e x p o r t s  t o  U k r a i n e ) .  T h e  A C A A  
would embrace both the so-called ‘old’ and ‘new’ approaches of the EU, i.e. 
products subject to detailed harmonised standards that Ukraine will 
replicate or the simpler norms of the new approach that relies more heavily 
on mutual recognition. The five-year plan is necessary since achieving full 
mutual recognition requires the full ‘quality infrastructure’, running the 
whole chain from transposition of standards into Ukrainian law to the 
creation or reform of the bodies required to implement the legislation and 
certify conformity.   
To minimise adjustment costs and permit rapid transition to the new 
system, maximum reliance should be made on voluntary compliance with 
EU standards: EU norms should be simply translated into Ukrainian ones 
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Producers can choose to adopt these standards where they are seriously 
interested in export markets. Ukraine should not convert EU/international 
standards, which are for voluntary adoption by enterprises, into mandatory 
ones. Ukraine would thus be switching from the mandatory method under 
the old Gosstandards of the USSR to a mainly voluntary compliance method. 
Ukrainian companies could opt to continue to produce for CIS markets 
according to the old USSR Gosstandards i f  t h e y  w i s h .  I t  i s  n o t a b l e  t h a t  
Ukraine is also leading work in the CIS to switch to European and 
international standards, which is excellent. This work takes place in the 
EurAsia Council for Standardisation, Metrology and Certification, whose 
2005-07 work programme is based on 29 EU directives.  
The preparation and negotiation of a legally binding ACAA with 
wide coverage of industrial goods would thus be the strategic move in the 
field of technical standards. The time horizon proposed of 2005-11 is 
realistic in view of the extent of the in-depth reforms that will be required 
in the private and public sectors. However this could fit well alongside a 
plausible time horizon for the FTA and notably the phasing out of tariffs. 
These two lines of action should be mutually reinforcing, with Ukrainian 
industry encouraged to adopt EU standards with the prospect of tariff-free 
trade.     
6.1.4 Agricultural and food safety standards 
Recognition of standards for processed foods is going to be a long and costly 
process. The most plausible policy may be to focus on particular market niches and 
to make product- and enterprise-specific investments in production and testing 
facilities. 
The prospects for removing non-tariff barriers between the EU and Ukraine 
in this second domain of technical standards, for the agriculture and food 
sectors, are far more difficult than for industrial goods. Discussions 
between the Commission and Ukrainian authorities since the adoption of 
the ENP Action Plan have not yet begun. This is not atypical and is even 
reflected in EU–US trade relations, where mutual recognition for 
agricultural and food products has not been possible (as exemplified in the 
hormone beef and other controversies associated with genetically modified 
food). The EU enjoys mutual recognition only with Canada and New 
Zealand, in addition to intra-EU and EEA trade. Moreover, the climate of 
political sensitivity around these issues has  con tinu ed to g row in recent 
years, in the wake of ‘mad cow’ BSE episodes through to the present 
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The field of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures covers rules 
of trade in animals and animal products, animal welfare, trade in plants 
and plant products, and food safety. Three categories of products may be 
distinguished: 
•  cereals, which are basically free of technical standards or non-tariff 
barriers; 
•  meat products, for which trade is very heavily controlled; and  
•  other processed foods, which are also subject to technical standards. 
 
The standard SPS agreement in the WTO sets out the basic rules for 
the application of SPS measures — in other words food safety and animal 
and plant health regulations. The agreement recognises that governments 
have the right to take SPS measures but that these should be applied only 
to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. All 
WTO members must base their SPS measures on international standards, 
guidelines and recommendations where they exist. The three international 
standard-setting bodies recognised by the WTO for this purpose are Codex 
Alimentarius, the OIE (World Organisation for Animal Health) and the 
IPPC (International Plant Protection Convention). Nevertheless, members 
may maintain or introduce measures that result in higher standards, but 
only if they are scientifically based. The agreement includes provisions on 
control, inspection and approval procedures. The main pillars of the SPS 
agreement are that SPS standards must comply with the principle of 
proportionality, non-discriminatory, be the least trade-disruptive and be 
based on international standards or on science. It also contains provisions 
on transparency, equivalence, regionalisation, special and differential 
treatment, and technical assistance. 
At present Ukraine is only able to export cereals and a few other 
products such as nuts and honey to the EU, since it does not at present 
meet EU standards for meat products or other processed foods. The EU 
exports growing quantities of processed foods to Ukraine, but often finds 
Ukrainian standards – which are not yet bound under the WTO – difficult 
to meet, since sometimes they are set at a more demanding level than in the 
EU and implemented in a non-transparent and unpredictable manner.  
The EU has adopted general principles for food safety – the General 
Food Law (Regulation No. 178/2002), and the Official Food and Feed 
Control Law (Regulation No. 882/2004) that entered into force 1 January 
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instructive that Poland, for example, only reached compliance with EU 
standards for the majority of its abattoirs after over a decade of 
preparations, even with substantial financial aid from the Sapard 
programme. To be able to export animal products to the EU it is necessary 
that the exporting country has a competent authority that guarantees that 
the hygiene and public health requirements are met and that a monitoring 
system is in place to verify compliance with the maximum permitted level 
of residues, pesticides and contaminants. Imports are only authorised from 
approved establishments (e.g. slaughterhouses, cold stores and processing 
plants). An inspection visit by the competent EU authority is necessary to 
confirm compliance. 
The costs of compliance are much less in this case compared with the 
demands made for mutual recognition, where the whole of the sector has to 
be compliant with EU standards (as with Norway in the EEA, for example). 
The total costs of EU agricultural compliance in the new member states 
such as Poland and Lithuania have been estimated to be 2-2.5% of GDP 
annually, of which the EU Sapard programme paid 75%. Lithuania alone 
received €205 million from Sapard in the period 2000-06 and Poland has 
received €172 million annually.  
Therefore, the major step of reaching mutual recognition of 
conformity standards between the EU and Ukraine can only be a distant 
and costly prospect, and is less plausible as an objective for early agreement 
than for industrial standards. The most plausible priority would seem to be 
to secure conformity agreements for specific establishments and products 
in the foreseeable future.  
6.2  Backbone service sectors 
6.2.1 Financial services 
Ukraine’s financial services industry remains bank-dominated and is not yet suited 
for compliance with those parts of the EU acquis that are designed for the most 
advanced financial markets. The most powerful driver for deeper EU–Ukraine 
integration in this sector will be the greater involvement of EU banks and other 
financial services companies through foreign direct investment (FDI). 
A dynamic financial sector is important for both the general process of 
economic development and for deeper regional integration. In that respect, 
Ukraine has a lot of catching up to do: all of the country’s banks together 
have net assets of less than €20 billion – which is equivalent to a small EU 
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financial services industry barely exists. One positive implication of these 
weaknesses, however, is the significant growth potential in the sector, 
which makes it attractive for foreign investors. 
Throughout Central and Eastern Europe, EU banks have driven the 
process of sector development and in several countries foreign bank 
ownership has passed the 80% mark. A handful of EU banks have 
established cross-border networks that cover the entire region. They not 
only bring capital, know-how and greater competition to the sector, but as 
they are supervised by their home regulator, they are also a vehicle to 
import better regulation and corporate governance. This aspect would be 
particularly beneficial for Ukraine, where most major banks are owned by 
oligarchs. 
In recent months, EU banks have started to move into Ukraine. In 
August 2005, Austria’s Raiffeisen International bought Aval Bank 
(Ukraine’s second largest). This purchase brought the share of foreign 
ownership in the sector to over 20%. In December 2005, BNP Paribas 
acquired a majority share in Ukrsibbank (Ukraine’s fourth largest bank) 
and there were rumours that a sale of Ukrsotsbank (the third largest) to 
foreign investors was also imminent. All three banks were owned by major 
financial–industrial groups (FIGs) and one positive side effect of foreign 
entry is their exit from the sector. 
Ukraine’s GATS proposals in the sector are rather comprehensive and 
there are few additional market-opening measures that could be included 
in a regional FTA. Moreover, this is one of the sectors where the adoption 
of EU legislation would not be appropriate for Ukraine. The main reason is 
that this part of the acquis is highly complex and geared towards 
sophisticated financial markets, which Ukraine does not yet have. Ukraine 
should thus not pursue active convergence, but rather ensure that new 
financial sector legislation is acquis-compatible (passive compliance). 
Instead, deeper integration efforts should focus on facilitating cross-
border consolidation at the company level (i.e. banks, insurance and 
financial services companies). One measure would be the sale of the two 
remaining state-owned banks to foreign investors through competitive 
tenders. Another would be the adoption and strict enforcement of the law 
on banks and banking. This would make related-party lending more 
difficult and exert pressure on the FIGs to separate their banking and non-
banking activities (and thus possibly to sell further banking operations).  
As far as sector regulation is concerned, banks are supervised by the 
National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) and financial markets by the State THE PROSPECT OF DEEP FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE| 91 
Securities and Stock Market Commission (SSSMC). The NBU is a healthy 
institution, but the SSSMC requires considerable capacity-building. The 
IMF and the World Bank continue to provide significant technical 
assistance in the sector and the Commission could complement that work 
through twinning arrangements between the SSSMC and the NBU with 
financial market regulators in recent accession countries. These actions 
ought to be taken in close cooperation with other donors in the sector. 
6.2.2 Transport 
The strategic priorities for EU–Ukrainian cooperation in this sector are the 
transition towards a common civil aviation area, transport facilitation along pan-
European transport corridors and a streamlining of customs and other border-
related controls. 
Improving the efficiency of transport and logistical flows will act as a 
catalyst for deeper EU–Ukrainian integration. Even though an adequate 
transport infrastructure is an important precondition, what ultimately 
matters is the speed, reliability and cost of transport services. Such qualities 
will require comprehensive institutional and regulatory reforms in all 
modes (air, road, rail and maritime). Many of these policy issues are not 
adequately addressed under the GATS framework and need to be tackled 
through unilateral reforms and EU–Ukrainian cooperation.  
In air transport, the European Commission has proposed a strategy to 
fully integrate the ENP countries into the EU single aviation market 
(‘common aviation area’) by 2010. Negotiations with the countries of the 
Western Balkans have already begun. In September 2005 the Commission 
also requested a mandate to negotiate a common civil aviation area with 
Ukraine. This request followed the liberalisation of some of the bilateral 
agreements between Ukraine and individual member states and the 
signature of a ‘horizontal agreement’ in December 2005.  
In order to enter into a common civil aviation area, Ukraine would 
have to adopt the full body of EU law in the sector. That includes a 
liberalisation of market access, routes and prices as well as the introduction 
of competition in ground handling, regulations on airport charges, rules on 
slot allocation and compliance with safety and security standards. In air 
traffic management, EU–Ukrainian cooperation became institutionalised, 
when Ukraine became a member of Eurocontrol in 2004, but it would be 
deepened through full integration into the Single European Sky. 
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to facilitate the certification of Ukraine’s aircraft and aviation industry 
production.  
An important and complementary domestic reform in air transport 
would be the privatisation and expansion of Kyiv Boryspil International 
airport and possibly of some of secondary airports. At least the separation 
of airports from airline ownership should be assured. As in other parts of 
the transport sector, state-ownership remains the main obstacle to greater 
services trade through a commercial presence (mode 3) and privatisation 
would change that. Prior to full market liberalisation, the government 
should also try to sell its stake in the country’s two main airlines to 
investors who can ensure fleet expansion and their integration into airline 
alliances. 
In land transport (road and rail), the main focus of EU–Ukrainian 
cooperation should be to facilitate logistical flows along the three pan-
European corridors that extend into Ukraine (the dual road and rail 
corridors III, V and IX). Along corridors III and V, the European Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is already funding infrastructural 
work along the roads as well as track improvements for the rail sections. As 
part of that assistance, it also provides technical assistance and institutional 
capacity-building to the national railway company and to the institution in 
charge of road maintenance. 
Further investments along the pan-European corridors crossing 
Ukraine will be needed in the future. Since many of the frictions and 
bottlenecks along those corridors are policy-induced, however, it will be 
important to combine the upgrading of the infrastructure with sector 
reforms and capacity-building measures. Further infrastructure funding 
from the Commission and the European Investment Bank (EIB) should 
therefore include technical assistance components and be explicitly linked 
to policy conditionalities (i.e. transport facilitation measures along those 
corridors by the government).  
The third transport sector priority for EU–Ukrainian cooperation 
concerns border-related controls. As previously noted, customs checks 
particularly remain time-consuming, non-transparent and prone to 
corruption. Reforms to address these problems are not only needed to 
speed up cross-border logistics, but also to fight border-related crime such 
as smuggling and human trafficking. The EU should provide greater 
assistance in this regard, but it should demand tangible reforms by Ukraine 
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Further measures that would improve the efficiency of transport 
flows between both sides include the removal of frictions at modal 
interfaces (including the rail-gauge change at the border), measures to 
increase containerisation rates, port reforms (especially those linked to 
corridors), Ukraine’s accession to the Interbus agreement and a 
liberalisation of cross-border road freight. 
6.2.3 Telecom and IT-enabled services 
Ukraine should fully transpose the telecom acquis by adopting missing pieces of 
regulation, but the main challenge will be its enforcement through a competent 
regulatory authority. The other key item on the reform agenda is the privatisation 
of UkrTelecom. This step will open up the fixed-wire segment to foreign investment 
and bring in the funding needed for infrastructure modernisation.  
Like other backbone services, telecommunications are a crucial connector 
between economies. Ukraine’s outdated infrastructure and the limited 
competition in fixed-wire services, however, make it difficult for the sector 
to fulfil that function. The main priorities for deeper EU–Ukrainian 
integration in telecoms are thus domestic policy reforms that address those 
problems. Ukraine has made comprehensive GATS proposals in telecom 
services and as far as formal market opening is concerned, there is little 
more that could be inscribed into a regional free trade area. 
Instead, Ukraine could commit itself to full adoption of the EU acquis 
in this sector. Given the relatively early stage of Ukraine’s reform process, 
the country should not refer to the current telecom acquis (the 2002 package 
of legislation), but to the previous 1998 package. The latter is more detailed, 
but otherwise fully compatible with the current EU policy framework. 
Ukraine’s basic telecom law is largely in line with EU requirements, but 
some key implementing regulations still need to be adopted (especially on 
fixed-wire interconnection).  
One way in which the Commission could support the process of 
acquis convergence in Ukraine’s telecom sector would be to use the same 
assistance instruments as for the non-EU countries of south-eastern Europe. 
For those countries, the Commission (i) prepares a detailed regulatory 
report once a year to monitor reform progress, (ii) it maintains an 
institutionalised policy dialogue (a working group meets twice a year) and 
(iii) it provides selected technical assistance by EU telecom experts through 
field trips. Extending those instruments to Ukraine could be done relatively 
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Nevertheless, the biggest obstacles for acquis compliance, however, 
will be the enforcement of those rules. In this area Ukraine will need to 
significantly strengthen its nascent regulator, the National 
Communications Regulatory Commission. The World Bank is already 
providing some technical assistance, but the EU could provide 
complementary support through a twinning arrangement with a successful 
regulatory authority from one of the new Central and Eastern European 
member states. 
So far, there is no major FDI by EU companies in the sector and the 
scope for greater trade in telecom services through mode 3 (commercial 
presence) seems considerable. The best way to promote this will be through 
a successful privatisation of the state-owned operator UkrTelecom. It will 
be critical that this major transaction is conducted in a transparent fashion 
(to permit major EU companies to compete on a level playing field) and 
that important sector reforms are launched beforehand (to reduce 
regulatory risk for investors). A privatisation of UkrTelecom will also 
mobilise the large-scale investments needed to upgrade the fixed network. 
The market segment that has experienced the most rapid growth in 
recent years is mobile telephony. The two main providers, Kyivstar and 
Ukraine Mobile Communications control 95% of the market, but at least 
one of the smaller mobile operators under the brand name of Life:) is 
catching up fast. Even though there is no direct involvement by EU 
investors, two mobile operators have major shareholders from countries 
that are deeply integrated with the EU Single Market: Norway’s Telenor 
holds a majority stake in Kyivstar and half of Life:) is owned by a Turkish 
investor.  
The modernisation of Ukraine’s telecom sector will also create the 
basis for future trade in IT-enabled services – one of the fastest-growing 
segments of international services trade. As a neighbouring country with a 
well-educated workforce, Ukraine has significant potential to benefit from 
the tendency of European firms to outsource back-office functions to low-
wage countries – just as its manufacturing sector can benefit from 
outsourcing in EU production chains. 
6.2.4 Energy 
There is significant scope for greater trade in all parts of the energy sector and the 
inclusion of Ukraine in the Energy Treaty (signed on October 2005) concluded by 
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integration with EU energy markets, however, will entail far-reaching domestic 
reforms in Ukraine. 
Since the EU energy regulations were explicitly designed with the dual 
objective of cross-border integration and domestic market reform in mind, 
its adoption by Ukraine would also facilitate the much-needed sector 
reforms at the national level (e.g. unbundling and regulation of 
monopolistic activities). Two important measures to create a level playing 
field would be tariff-rebalancing (Ukraine’s energy prices remain far below 
world market prices) and convergence towards EU environmental 
standards, including pollution and nuclear safety. 
Acquis compliance, however, is as much about legislative 
approximation as it is about effective enforcement. Even more than in the 
other network industries, natural monopolies and anti-competitive 
behaviour are severe problems across the energy sector. Yet Ukraine’s 
National Energy Regulatory Committee (NERC) is still far too weak to 
counter such tendencies. Hence, regulatory capacity-building will be a 
critical flanking measure for deeper market integration. The Commission 
should consider preparing a high-quality twinning arrangement between 
the NERC and an EU regulator, in close coordination with existing donor 
activities. 
With over 80% of Russia’s gas exports and a substantial proportion of 
its oil exports to Europe transiting Ukraine, pipeline issues are another 
important area for the bilateral energy partnership. Ukraine has already 
signed up to the Energy Charter Treaty, but further collaboration regarding 
pipeline investments and management are needed. For the EU, the main 
concerns in this context are security of supply and the question of who 
controls the pipelines, whereas Ukraine’s prime interests are the lucrative 
transit fees and a desire to reduce its dependency on Russian energy 
imports. 
Following the economic decline after independence, Ukraine 
currently uses only about half of its generation capacity domestically and 
has significant potential for electricity exports. Some of that potential is 
used for exports to Russia, but power trade with western neighbours is 
precluded by a lack of interconnection between the former CIS and the 
continental European grids. Such physical linkages would require 
substantial investments in infrastructure linkages and in measures required 
to make the two systems technically compatible. Both sides should explore 
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The inclusion of Ukraine into the European grid would also require 
institutional cooperation on system management and the coordination of 
transfers among transmission system operators. The full integration into 
the single electricity market would also involve cooperation among sector 
regulators and far-reaching domestic reforms in line with the electricity 
acquis (e.g. vertical and horizontal unbundling and open network access). 
Since the acquis in this sector is in line with international best practice, 
its transposition would promote the very reforms needed to render the 
sector more efficient. In particular, Ukraine should reconsider its decision 
to vertically integrate the remaining state-owned assets into the United 
Energy Company of Ukraine and it should re-launch its privatisation 
efforts in generation and distribution. Moreover, it should move from a 
single-buyer model to third-party access and considerably strengthen the 
autonomy and institutional capacity of the energy regulator. 
Other energy sector policy issues that need to be addressed for the 
sake of both domestic sector efficiency and deeper regional integration are 
the restructuring and privatisation of the vertically integrated gas company 
Naftogaz, the introduction of greater competition in downstream oil 
activities (refineries and petrol stations), a more effective exploitation of 
domestic oil and gas resources, the restructuring and downsizing of 
Ukraine’s large coal industry, and trading arrangements for hot air credits 
under the Kyoto Protocol. 
In October 2005, the EU and the south-eastern European countries 
(SEECs) signed a comprehensive Energy Treaty, which provides a roadmap 
for the integration of the region into the EU energy market within a 
decade.21 All signatories commit themselves to full adoption of the energy 
acquis, including competition and environmental rules. Ukraine’s inclusion 
in that process (it currently only has observer status) would establish a 
clear framework for EU–Ukrainian energy cooperation. Given the fact that 
the energy sector is only partially covered by the multilateral GATS 
framework, there would be considerable value added in such a regional 
approach.  
                                                      
21 The signatories of the Energy Treaty are the EU and the countries of former 
Yugoslavia (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo) as well 
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6.2.5 Tourism and other service sectors 
Other key service sectors are seriously underdeveloped and the reform of de facto 
market entry obstructions are an imperative part of the domestic governance 
agenda. 
Other key service sectors to which foreign investment can make major 
contributions include retail distribution and tourism. The entry of 
European supermarket chains into Ukraine has only recently begun. 
Ukraine has considerable potential for international tourism, notably in the 
capital city Kyiv and in the Crimean and the Carpathian regions. Yet it is 
conspicuous that the major, internationally branded hotel chains are still 
almost completely absent, even in Kyiv (see Box 9.2). The reasons for this 
are de facto obstructions to market entry, owing to a maze of red tape, 
corruption and well-organised vested interests surrounding land rights and 
the securing of regulatory licenses. 
Box 6.2 The mystery of the missing five-star hotels 
A striking feature about Ukraine’s largest city Kyiv is the complete lack of 
international-standard four- and five-star hotels – with one exception: the SAS 
Radisson, which opened in August 2005. Any capital city of comparable size (2.6 
million inhabitants) would have at least half a dozen major hotels run by global 
hotel chains. The lack of such hotels is not only a major constraint for tourism and 
business travel, but it also implies a loss of hundreds of millions of foreign 
investment to the country. Research into this mysterious lack of international-
standard hotels reveals some of the fundamental barriers to FDI and trade in 
services that also constitute major constraints for Ukraine’s economic 
development. 
During the past 15 years, about 10 global players in the hotel business – 
including Hyatt, Hilton and Marriot – have tried to enter the Kyiv market, but 
w e r e  k e p t  o u t  b y  a  m a z e  o f  r e d  t a p e ,  c o r r u p t i o n  a n d  w e l l - o r g a n i s e d  v e s t e d  
interests in the hotel and real estate development industries. The main hotels in 
Kyiv belong to influential members of the local business elite and some aspects of 
the city administration are not known to be centres of integrity. The first set of 
problems that international hotel groups encounter pertains to land-rights: most 
lots are still owned by the city and development thus involves complex lease 
agreements with the authorities. Many attractive lots are actually controlled by 
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Box 6.2 continued 
Even if a lot can be secured, building permits can take years to obtain (two 
years in the case of the Radisson). To connect a new hotel to the electricity, water 
and gas networks, approvals from the utility companies are needed. Once the 
building is complete, an operating license is needed before the hotel can be 
opened, as well as various other licenses (e.g. from the local fire department). At 
all levels, non-transparent procedures and ample scope for arbitrary decisions 
create a fertile breeding ground for corruption or permit-vested interests to keep 
out the competition.  
All hotel projects involving foreign investors have dragged on for years and 
all have run into massive complications. The SAS Radisson in Kyiv – Ukraine’s 
only international-standard hotel – took more than seven years to complete and a 
number of empty lots and half-finished buildings are testimony to the hostile 
environment that foreign investors encounter. An indication of the pent up 
demand in this sector is the fact that the SAS Radisson has been fully booked ever 
since it opened. These examples from the hotel industry illustrate how corruption 
and administrative red tape can prevent trade in services and FDI even in markets 
where no official trade barriers exist. If deeper integration between Ukraine and 
the EU is to materialise, these problems will have to be addressed. 
6.3  Economic governance 
6.3.1 Corruption 
Corruption as an endemic condition in post-communist societies has defied simple 
or rapid remedial action. Yet over the medium-term results can be achieved as other 
European countries have shown.      
The corruption problem in all Central and Eastern European states is 
recognised to be extremely damaging for economic development and so 
pervasive that it defies simple remedial action. Business surveys, such as 
that conducted by the European Business Association in Kyiv, rank 
corruption in Ukraine as the biggest barrier to trade and investment. The 
most reputable international survey of corruption – that by Transparency 
International, which collates seven different sources – ranks Ukraine in 
107th place out of the 159 countries surveyed. According to this source, in a 
ranking from 1 to 10, the EU-15 average is 8.0, and the 10 new EU member 
states average 5.0. The four current candidate states (Bulgaria, Romania, 
Croatia and Turkey) average 3.5, which is far closer to Ukraine’s grade of 
2.6. Ukraine is not alone in Europe in this position, and is in the same 
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yet have EU candidate status (Serbia and Montenegro, Albania and 
Macedonia). The record of the EU’s new and candidate states suggests that 
while progress is a long and hard process, results can be achieved.  
Table 6.2 Corruption ratings (2005) 
Region Rating 
EU-15 member states, average  8.0 
Best rating, Finland  9.6 
Worst rating, Greece  5.3 
EU-10 new member states, average  5.0 
EU-4 candidate states, average (BG, CR, RO, TR)  3.5 
Other Balkan states, average (CS, MK, AL)  2.6 
European CIS six states, average  2.6 
Ukraine (107th place of 159 countries)   2.6 
Central Asian CIS five states, average  2.2 
Source:  Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (2005)  
(retrieved from http://www.transparency.org). 
For Ukraine the will to make progress in cutting corruption has been 
demonstrated by the Orange Revolution at the level of the people and the 
leadership that it then elected. Yet so far this has not translated into a 
perceptible improvement across the board. While there is no simple recipe 
for eradicating corruption, some key actions do lead the process. It is 
encouraging that on 1 January 2006 Ukraine joined the ‘GRECO’ initiative 
of the Council of Europe, i.e. the Group of States against Corruption. The 
recent re-privatisation of the Kryvorizhstal steel firm was exemplary for its 
transparency, and sets a new standard in that domain. Laws on corporate 
governance and competition policy are other key factors, which we discuss 
these in the next sections. To support deep free trade a number of 
benchmarks could be established.   
There is a vital need to eliminate corruption in Ukraine’s parliament, 
which has become notorious for the over-representation of business interest 
groups. These groups are hindering legislation aimed at cleaning up 
economic governance. Here the role of civil society could be especially 
important and the initiative of civil society in Romania in preparation for 
its November 2004 elections deserves special mention here. In this case civil 
society NGOs undertook a coordinated programme to research and publish 
the CVs of all candidates, with details of their business interests and 
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long resulting ‘black list’ and the political parties became obliged to 
withdraw many of the initial candidates.      
The experience of some EU candidate states with very serious 
corruption problems is not discouraging in suggesting the extent of 
progress that is achievable within a medium-term period, of say five years. 
For example, the four candidate states, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and 
Turkey, have until recently been close to where Ukraine stands today. The 
average for these four countries now (with a 3.5 ranking according to 
Transparency International) might be taken as a target for Ukraine in five-
year’s time. Achievement of the 3.5 ranking could be taken as a benchmark 
for moving on after five years of the FTA+ to a further deepening of the 
EU–Ukrainian relationship.  
The European Business Association and other sources22 identify a 
vast number of opaque administrative and technical regulations that are at 
best time-consuming burdens and at worst a source of corruption, such as 
the persistent lack of a ‘one window’ registration procedure for businesses, 
deficiencies in the databases of the Land Register and the Register of Rights 
to Real Estate, contradictory legal requirements related to the construction 
business for foreign investors, the lack of transparent procedures for 
foreigners to acquire non-agricultural land and the absence of a clear 
definition of joint ventures.  
6.3.2  Competition policy  
Ukraine’s competition policy law is being deeply modelled on that of the EU, but a 
key law on state aid is still lacking, and implementation may require the executive 
authority to be buttressed by external institutional or jurisdictional support. 
EU legal experts regard Ukrainian competition policy law as the most 
comprehensive case of drawing on the model of EU law by any non-
candidate state (basically the laws on Protection against Unfair 
Competition of 1996 and on Protection of Economic Competition of 2002). 
The challenges of capacity-building within the Anti-Monopoly Committee 
and implementation are of course huge, but progress is real. This area is an 
example of how during the Kuchma regime there were developments in 
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legal and administrative infrastructures that reflected the ‘European 
choice’, even if the regime as a whole was deeply vitiated.  
Nevertheless, these laws did not cover state aid, which was the 
subject of a draft law that was rejected in December 2004 by the parliament. 
The law certainly had various legal imperfections, but its rejection was far 
more political. Apparently, it was voted down partly owing to concerns 
among business interests heavily represented in parliament that the powers 
of the Anti-Monopoly Committee might seriously reduce their ability to 
influence the allocation of state funds. This result indeed would be a major 
objective of the policy. Another reason was controversy over whether the 
head of the Anti-Monopoly Committee supported the spirit of the Orange 
Revolution. It is presumed that the law on state aid will be resubmitted and 
eventually passed, perhaps with amendments. Although the draft law is 
largely a copy of EU law, legal experts on the EU side tend to consider that 
a gradualist approach to the implementation of this important policy 
reform might be most feasible.  
Even with this completion of the set of basic laws there remain 
difficult issues of leadership and implementation; indeed these will grow 
all the more serious given the intensely political nature of state aid. The 
situation bears comparison with the recent experience of the new member 
states of the EU, when they were building up their capacities to implement 
EU competition policy. The Polish experience is highly instructive. In that 
case the task of legal compliance was the easy part, but the task of 
establishing a strong enough competition authority to execute it properly, 
protected from political and business pressures, was found to be 
formidable. In fact it was judged impossible until the time of full accession, 
when the ultimate authority became the Competition Directorate-General 
of the Commission, subject to appeal to the European Court of Justice.  
The comparable problem for Ukraine will presumably be more 
difficult still. A question therefore is whether Ukraine should consider 
introducing some element of external support or oversight for its 
competition policy authority. It is already the case that the Anti-Monopoly 
Committee has EU advisers from a Tacis project in-house. This could easily 
move on to a medium-term twinning project with an EU member state’s 
competition authority. Yet mere advisers cannot be expected to have real 
leverage over heavily lobbied or disputed cases. A number of conceivable 
arrangements might be considered to introduce an element of 
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The least ambitious of these would be to have arbitration procedures 
for cases contested by European business interests, as for example is the 
case for some aspects of the EU–Chile FTA, where there are three 
arbitrators, one from the EU, one from Chile and one from a third party, 
with majority rule over decisions. This provision has never been activated, 
however, and in any case does not apply to competition policy. The EU and 
Ukraine might consider other possible mechanisms, for example for the 
panel of individuals constituting the Ukrainian competition policy 
authority to include an expert or judge from an EU member state.  
More ambitious still would be to draw on the model of the European 
Free Trade Area (EFTA) and the EEA, which have seen the creation of the 
EFTA Court of Justice. The Court has jurisdiction over internal market 
disputes between EEA/EFTA states, and gives advisory opinions on the 
interpretations of EEA rules. If, for example, Ukraine deepened its 
relationship with the EFTA, it might be agreed to use this Court as a 
neutral judicial authority, possibly with addition of one Ukrainian judge 
and one EU judge to the panel. The European Court of Justice could be 
used alternatively, but Ukraine may consider this insufficiently neutral. 
Recourse to the external court could in a cautious variant be limited to 
‘prejudicial references’ (i.e. where the Ukrainian authority or courts wanted 
an interpretation of the law). A stronger variant would be for the external 
court to be the court of appeal for complaints, either just for cases where 
European companies or governments had interests at stake, or for any 
Ukrainian party to appeal to.  
6.3.3 Government procurement 
A government procurement agreement could usefully feature in an FTA+, with or 
without a prior agreement between Ukraine and the WTO.  
Even though reliable figures are difficult to obtain, it is reasonable to 
assume that procurement by public institutions and state-owned 
companies accounts for between 10 and 20% of Ukraine’s GDP. As long as 
public procurement is governed by non-transparent practices (which are 
highly correlated with corruption), a large part of the economy remains 
closed to outsiders. Because of this linkage between government 
procurement and trade, procurement rules are an important element of the 
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Single Market. In 2000, Ukraine adopted the Law on Procurement of 
Goods, Works, and Services that is based on international model laws and 
on EU directives.23 It requires open and competitive tenders and also 
contains the principle of non-discrimination. Since Ukraine operates a 
decentralised procurement system, the enforcement of these rules is patchy 
at best.  
Ukraine is not intending to join the government procurement 
agreement under the auspices of WTO as part of the accession package, but 
is willing to open negotiations for this upon accession. Conclusion of an 
agreement in this sector with the EU, possibly going beyond a WTO 
commitment, could become a plausible part of the FTA+ package. As 
exemplified for example by the EU–Chile FTA the core principles are those 
of non-discriminatory and transparent national treatment, with explicit 
definition of key features of tendering procedures and a dispute-settlement 
procedure. 
6.3.4 Corporate governance 
Ukraine has yet to make internationally compliant accounting standards 
mandatory at least for large firms or to pass essential joint stock company 
legislation. Without these measures there can be no adequate reform of corporate 
governance.  
This broad field is crucial to whether the Ukrainian economy is going to 
achieve the qualitative paradigm shift onto European and international 
standards. There are several strategic elements missing so far in Ukraine’s 
laws and practices.  
Both accounting and audit standards in the EU now converge 
respectively on the International Accounting Standards (IAS), and 
International Standards on Auditing (ISA). A key EU directive of 2002 set 
2005 as the deadline for mandatory compliance in the EU with IAS for all 
stock-market listed companies and listed securities. For non-listed 
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companies, rules of the EU’s 4th and 7th Company Law Directives apply, 
which, however, leave many options for national implementation. It is 
nonetheless expected that the rules for non-listed companies will over time 
converge with the IAS. Estonia has in fact done this already – first of all 25 
member states. As regards audit, a 2005 directive on the statutory auditing 
requires compliance with ISA rules.  
Since 2000, Ukraine has taked many legislative steps to converge on 
these European and international accounting standards. But the adoption 
of IAS standards has so far been largely voluntary, while Ukrainian tax law 
has required reporting on a different basis. This inconsistency fosters a 
disincentive to work with the IAS as well, unless the company has a 
specific motivation to do so. At some point a switch to mandatory IAS-
compliant standards must come, although to follow the EU in going for 
listed companies alone would be inappropriate, since there are today only 
11 such companies. More plausible would be a size criterion ($x million 
turnover or assets), which would cover all large enterprises and financial 
industrial groups, along with certain categories such as banks, insurance 
companies and public-interest entities. Some financial industrial groups are 
now becoming more financially transparent and have the incentive of 
raising capital on international markets, but more than this is needed.  
Such a measure would go with a clear differentiation between IAS-
compliant accounting and Ukraine’s accounting standards, which might 
remain optional for small businesses. The auditing profession also needs 
huge development from its present small and weak base, apart for the 
major international audit/accounting/consulting firms, which are today 
servicing mainly international businesses. These international firms could 
serve as important training establishments for new generations of 
accountants, qualified according to international standards.  
The law on joint stock companies in Ukraine is highly unsatisfactory, 
since there are problems of inadequate protection for shareholder interests 
(especially minorities) and defective corporate procedures, with numerous 
violations occurring constantly (asset stripping, non-disclosure of 
information, etc.). There has been some issuance of voluntary standards by 
the Securities and Stock Market Commission since 2003, but a key draft law 
for joint stock companies failed to be adopted by the parliament in 2003, 
and has remained in limbo. This law, which should also address minority 
shareholder rights, will be resubmitted to the parliament in the foreseeable 
future. The EU can only provide limited guidance in this area, as there is 
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corporations, although there are standards issued by international bodies 
such as the OECD and the World Bank.  
6.3.5 Environmental standards  
Any EU–Ukraine FTA needs to include a solid sustainable development and 
Environmental dimension drawing on existing good practice (as set out in recent 
OECD studies) as regards the incorporation of environmental provisions in 
regional free trade agreements. While Ukraine has to avoid excessively costly and 
premature commitments to EU environmental standards, a new factor is Ukraine’s 
accession to the Kyoto Protocol, which could lead to cooperative implementation 
measures with the EU.  
Over the past few years, the potential impact of planned regional and 
multilateral free trade agreements have attracted increasing attention. Such 
attention is for instance reflected in the Commission’s programme of trade-
related Sustainable Development Impact Assessments (SIAs) launched in 
1999, which aim at looking into the economic, social and environmental 
aspects in an integrated way. The SIAs not only attempt to identify the key 
economic, social and environmental effects resulting from trade 
liberalisation, they also make suggestions on how these effects can be 
enhanced (in the case of positive ones) and prevented/mitigated (in the 
case of negative effects).  
To help ensure that a possible EU–Ukraine FTA will make a real 
contribution to achieving sustainable development, such effects would 
need to be identified and, subsequently, appropriate enhancement and 
preventative/mitigation measures would have to be designed. With 
respect to the latter aspect, it would be important to incorporate a solid 
sustainable development and environmental dimension in any future EU–
Ukraine FTA (e.g. taking guidance from recent comparative OECD studies 
on environmental provisions in regional free trade agreements).24  
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As regards whether, under such an FTA, Ukraine might be asked to 
apply the EU environmental acquis, it needs to be borne in mind that the 
investment needed to comply with all the EU’s main environmental 
standards, notably its water and air pollution directives, would be 
considerable. For example, the cost of adopting the EU’s environmental 
standards has been estimated to average around €1,000 per capita for the 
new member states, ranging from €760 for Romania to €1,668 for Bulgaria. 
This means a total of €22 billion for Romania, which might be doubled for 
Ukraine. In the new member states the EU has contributed substantially to 
paying these costs. In the case of Lithuania, half the costs were borne by 
EU, 20% by national budget and 30% by the private sector. Financing was 
also made easier by long transition periods that allowed for costs to be 
spread and investments to be made when old technologies needed to be 
replaced. 
These costs also need to be put into perspective. While considerable, 
it was found that for the new member states the benefits were also 
extremely important. Modernising infrastructure and technologies has led 
not only to environmental benefits, but also to significant health and 
economic benefits as more efficient technologies were adopted by industry. 
In addition, protecting the environment will be necessary if Ukraine is to 
develop its significant tourism potential (as discussed in section 6.2.5). 
There is no evidence that the environmental acquis is harming the 
competitiveness of the new member states.  
There are therefore good arguments for Ukraine to clean up its 
environment, with its energy-consuming industries needing fundamental 
modernisation, especially metallurgy and coal-burning power generations, 
but with of course the understanding that a realistic time-horizon is 
required. It is also essential to consider the costs of inaction, not the least in 
the area of public health. Such an approach is offered by the EU–Ukraine 
ENP Action Plan, which foresees step-by-step convergence with the aims 
and principles of the environmental acquis, particularly in the areas with 
cross-border impact. This policy will be backed up by a new EU financial 
instrument. 
Furthermore, a new and potentially helpful factor is Ukraine’s 
accession to the Kyoto Protocol. Although exact numbers are not yet 
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credits25 that could be sold to other countries. It is estimated that the 
amounts could be up to 2 billion tonnes for the period 2008-12. Ukraine 
could sell these credits through joint implementation (JI) projects or 
through emission trading under the Kyoto Protocol. The price of the Kyoto 
credits will be market determined. JI credits are currently priced at $5-10 
per tonne. 
Ukrainian and international experts held a workshop in Odessa in 
September and October 2005 devoted to JI projects. Ukraine is preparing 
emission reduction projects, which could qualify for JI (i.e. with foreign 
investment), with substantial opportunities in power generating, district-
heating, oil, gas, cement, coal mining and in the metallurgical and forestry 
sectors. The Ukrainian government is expected to adopt guidelines for the 
approval of JI projects early in 2006.  
Ukraine is also preparing a domestic emissions-trading system, 
which might conceivably be linked at some stage to the EU’s recently 
activated emissions-trading system. The EU’s system explicitly foresees 
links to the emission trading schemes of third countries that have ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol and have established a domestic emission-trading 
system that is compatible with that of the EU. 
It would be a positive step for the overall EU–Ukrainian relationship 
for Ukraine to be deepening its energy and climate change cooperation 
with the EU within the Kyoto framework. 
6.3.6 Movement of people and labour market regulation 
The free movement of people is a natural complement to free trade, especially for 
trade and investment in services. A beginning has been made with Ukraine’s 
scrapping of visas for EU citizens and the opening of negotiations over EU visa-
facilitation. There is much to be done in improving working conditions in many 
Ukrainian industries, but little case for Ukraine to seek to become compliant with 
EU labour market law as part of an FTA. 
Ukraine took the important step in the summer of 2005 of abolishing visa 
requirements for EU (and US) citizens. This step will surely be positive for 
Ukraine, for the tourism sector, for business connections and for people-to-
people contacts in general. It is also a clear strategic signal, and a positive 
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one, for Ukraine’s international reputation. An accompanying measure 
would be to ease the bureaucratic burden of obtaining work permits for EU 
nationals entering Ukraine. There are criticisms levied by members of the 
European Business Association in Kyiv in this regard. 
The EU and Ukraine have now opened negotiations over possible 
visa-facilitation measures for Ukrainian citizens to travel to the EU. 
Negotiations over the possible lifting of visa requirements for short-term 
stays will for the EU side be linked to broader issues, such as illegal 
migration and security concerns. As the movement of persons becomes 
freer the policy agenda will lead on towards questions concerning the 
recognition of professional qualifications, provisions for ‘key’ personnel, 
coordination on social security and the supply of services in mode 4 
(presence of natural persons).  
The area of occupational health and safety (OHS) of the working 
population is a matter of very serious concern in Ukraine. The rate of fatal 
industrial accidents is twice as high as in developed countries, and the 
percentage of related fatalities mortalities increased from 2.1% in 1993 to 
4.9% in 2003.26 The root causes of this distressing record are obsolete 
production facilities that do not match European OHS standards (70% in 
metallurgy, 90% in agriculture) and to societal disorders (one-third of 
industrial accidents are due to drunkenness). The Law on Labour 
Protection of 2002 (No. 229-IV), however, was a landmark act, bringing 
Ukrainian law in line with European OHS law. Of course the task of 
implementation remains huge and will take a long time and large renewal 
of investments. To induce Ukrainian enterprises to improve safety 
standards it might be more helpful at this stage to introduce a system of 
liability insurance, binding upon companies, rather than adopt many new 
laws.  
Other areas of EU labour market law are far less plausible for 
approximation by Ukraine, e.g. the detailed and onerous regulation of part-
time and temporary work, working time, hiring and firing regulations and 
parental leave provisions. The EU is itself in the middle of a period of 
reflection on where regulatory burdens have become unduly heavy and 
whether they could be rolled back in parts. This climate makes it all the 
more inappropriate for Ukraine to anchor on the EU acquis in this area.  
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6.4  The human capital factor 
Ukraine’s human capital is strong in the mathematical and natural sciences, which 
is a good basis for the expansion of knowledge-intensive industries. Yet the social 
sciences still need radical modernisation and EU education programmes should 
make a major contribution here, for which the resources are available with the 
foreseen expansion of Tacis/European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI). 
In common with most of Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine inherited 
from the communist period advanced levels of general education by 
comparison with Western countries. The European transition countries are 
evidently in a completely different category compared with the standards 
achieved in the southern (Arab–Mediterranean) neighbourhood states, 
which are much more poorly placed. Although detailed and comparable 
data for Ukraine are not available, there is little doubt that Ukraine finds 
itself broadly in the same category as Russia and some of the new EU 
member states, and considerably higher than the weakest of the EU-15 
member states such as Portugal and Greece. The overall picture is that on 
some basic quantitative measures schooling is comparable to that between 
the European transition countries and the advanced Western countries, 
while the level of achievement in completing university education may be 
somewhat lower (Table 6.3).  
Table 6.3 Educational indicators  
Regions Average  years  of 
schooling 
Population completing 
higher education (%) 
Advanced countries  9.8  13.0 
European transition 
   countries 
9.7 9.9 
North Africa, Middle East  5.4  3.4 
Notes: Covers the total population aged 25 and over; indicator takes into account typical 
duration of each level of schooling within countries.  
Source: Barro & Lee (2000). 
More qualitative studies of the levels of educational achievement 
suggest that the European transition countries actually exceed the levels 
observed in much of Western Europe in the fields of mathematics and the 
physical sciences (Table 6.4). In these fields there is no problem of political 
obsolescence. These deep strengths in the mathematical sciences provide a 
good human capital base for the growth of new electronic and 
technological sectors of industry.   110 | FROM DEEPER FREE TRADE TO DOMESTIC ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 
Table 6.4 Educational performance 
Groups of countries  Performance index* 
EU – average of France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK  511 
EU – average of Greece and Portugal  450 
EU new member states – average of Czech Republic, 
   Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
530 
Russia 539 
North Africa – average of Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan  415 
* These ratings are derived from the Third International Mathematics and Science Study 
(TIMSS) conducted in 1995 by the International Association for the Evaluation of the 
Educational Achievement and the TIMSS-Repeat study conducted in 1999. Mean 
performance: TIMSS-95/TIMSS-Repeat Study, re-scaled, weighted by sampling 
probabilities.  
Source: Schuetz et al. (2005).  
 
By contrast, in the social sciences – especially economics, politics, 
management studies, international relations and the new field of European 
studies – the problem has indeed been one of the total obsolescence of 
Marxist-Leninist political economy theory, textbooks and knowledge of a 
large proportion of teachers. Here there is a huge task of modernisation still 
to be achieved, even 15 years after the start of the post-communist period. 
Indeed this is a task for one or two generations.  
The EU and the member states have opened their educational 
programmes to Ukraine, yet on a scale that is not yet up to the task. The EU 
Tempus programme and the bilateral programmes of some EU member 
states have been active, but the number scholarships awarded to 
Ukrainians to study in the EU has only been in the order of dozens. The 
new Erasmus Mundus programme is an important global initiative for the 
EU, but Ukraine’s allocation is for 23 students out of the global total of 808 
for the year 2005-06. As a further example, the London School of 
Economics, which is one of the largest and most internationalised 
universities in the social sciences, has about 5,000 non-British students, of 
which 6 are from Ukraine.  
Thus at present the scale of the EU’s educational effort for Ukraine is 
only a small beginning. The most relevant comparison could be made with 
neighbouring Poland, which has the same population size. Under the 
Erasmus programme the annual number of incoming Polish students 
studying elsewhere in the EU has risen from 200 in 1998-99 to 1,400 in 2003-
04, with the number of Polish teachers having risen to 750 in 2003-04. The THE PROSPECT OF DEEP FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE| 111 
EU plans to raise the level of its grant aid to Ukraine from €50 million in 
2003 to €100 million in 2006. This resource is a very precious one, since 
grant funds on this scale are hardly available from any other source. 
Correspondingly there has to be a major effort to define the most cost-
effective ways of using these funds, given that many projects of the Tacis 
programme have also been extremely difficult to execute. We would 
recommend that a high percentage of this increase be devoted to the 
strengthening of Ukrainian human capital, for example by a transfer of 
funds from Tacis (or the future ENPI) for execution by the Erasmus 
programme. The unit cost of a year’s university studies in the EU may be 
about €30,000. On this scale a budget of €30 million would buy 1,000 
scholarships. We suspect that a programme on this scale would be getting 
closer to the needs of Ukraine to create a new elite professional group, 
capable of driving the country’s transformative modernisation during the 





7.  INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 
7.1  Role of the international financial institutions 
In support of an FTA+ there is important scope for the coordination of incentives 
and conditionalities used by the EU and international financial institutions (IFIs) 
in their financial instruments. Such coordination can enhance the overall 
incentives for Ukraine and mitigate the absence of EU membership prospects.  
The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) are already significant 
players in Ukraine and there are important opportunities for donor 
coordination with the EU. The EU is revising its grant aid instrument, 
Tacis, which will become the European Neighbourhood Instrument 
according to proposals of the European Commission. Tacis commitments 
are set to rise from €50 million in 2003 to €100 million in 2006. The EU is 
also extending its role as financier through the European Investment Bank 
(EIB). A mandate was agreed in December 2004 for the EIB to invest €500 
million in Ukraine until mid-2007 in trans-European networks and 
corridors for transport, energy, telecoms and the environment.  
The IFIs are actively seeking to coordinate their work with the EU in 
the wider European area, for which they gained notable experience during 
the pre-accession period with the Central and Eastern European states. The 
World Bank in particular has clearly been supporting reform efforts within 
the framework of convergence on EU economic standards and regulatory 
policies. While the EIB is a newcomer to Ukraine, it is already signalling its 
willingness to co-finance projects with the EBRD and World Bank. It is 
highly desirable that these intentions be given the opportunity to fully 
develop. For example, the policy adjustment loans of the World Bank entail 
detailed technical assistance and financial incentives for Ukraine to adopt 
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currently being framed to support objectives of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan and they work could be 
amplified further for supporting an FTA+. Major bilateral suppliers of 
assistance, including EU member states and the US, can reinforce these 
policy thrusts.   
7.2  EFTA & EEA connections 
An EU–Ukraine FTA+ would presumably lead to at least a simple free trade 
agreement between Ukraine and the members of the European Free Trade Area 
(EFTA). The EFTA-Ukraine agreement might be further deepened with some 
special roles for the EFTA Surveillance Authority and EFTA Court of Justice.  
The prospect of free trade between the EU and Ukraine prompts the 
question of whether there should be a link to the EFTA states as well 
(Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland). The parties have already 
signed a Declaration on Cooperation (2000), providing for technical 
assistance. In the context of a free trade agreement between Ukraine and 
the EU a first scenario would be for Ukraine to make simple free trade 
agreements with the EFTA states, as has been the normal pattern when the 
EU makes a new FTA with a third party.  
Consideration might then be given to deeper links with EFTA. 
Accession to the EFTA is not as simple as it might sound. That is because 
the EFTA has transformed itself beyond its original free trade formula into 
a virtual merger with the EEA. The Vaduz Convention of 2002 updated the 
earlier EFTA Convention to take account of the fact that all the EFTA states 
except Switzerland had acceded to the EEA. This means that the EFTA 
states are now trading with each other on a basis analogous to the EEA, 
although with some special provisions for Switzerland given that is not 
part of the EEA.  
There are nonetheless several EFTA links that could be considered. 
The EFTA states and Ukraine might discuss the idea of an associate-
membership relationship. This relationship might not only define the rules 
for trade between the parties, but provide additional technical assistance 
and even some institutional anchorage for Ukraine. An alternative might be 
for Ukraine to become associated with the EEA – not to make premature 
moves towards total compliance with the EU’s internal market law as is the 
case for EEA members, but to profit from a mentoring relationship on the 
complex issue of choosing how far and fast to go towards EU compliance. 
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purposes and assume the role of mentor for Ukraine in helping it to plan 
and execute a progressive course for EU acquis compliance.  
The EEA has also seen the creation of the EFTA Court of Justice, 
which has jurisdiction over issues of compliance by the EEA states with the 
EU acquis. The Court has interesting features in the present context. While it 
is located in Luxembourg, the judges are all from EEA states, an 
arrangement intended to make the institutional structure less 
asymmetrical. The EU could accept this degree of external jurisdiction 
because of the high level of trust in the competence and professional 
integrity of the EEA judges. For Ukraine, at least for an initial period, the 
EFTA Court might be mandated with responsibility for ruling on EU–
Ukraine disputes, possibly with the addition of one EU and one Ukrainian 
judge. Such a mechanism could have the qualities of both professional 
competence and neutrality with respect to the EU and Ukraine. 
Of course all such ideas would be for the EFTA states and Ukraine to 




8.  POLITICAL ECONOMY 
FROM SENSITIVE SECTORS TO A 
REBRANDED UKRAINIAN ECONOMY 
8.1  General interests 
The Ukrainian business community has in the last decade come to be 
dominated by a number of powerful financial–industrial groups (FIGs). 
During the Kuchma period, these interests sought to secure various 
economic privileges, such as favourable conditions for acquiring privatised 
assets, tax advantages for individual firms, or regional special economic 
zones. At the last election, the parliament became notoriously over-
represented by these business leaders, the oligarchs. A recent World Bank 
report claims that this ‘insider economy’ threatens to become a primary 
obstacle to Ukraine’s economic development.27 The new government has 
already taken bold measures to reduce these corruption-prone ‘insider 
privileges’, swiftly eliminating hundreds of them in early 2005. But the new 
government has not been able to assure parliamentary majorities for the 
various laws required for WTO accession, nor for other laws vital for a 
correctly functioning market economy (e.g. the refusal of parliament to 
pass laws for joint stock companies and the protection of minority rights or 
EU-compliant competition policy).  
It is therefore still an open question as to whether the Ukrainian 
leadership can gather sufficient support for the transformation of its 
economic model along the lines implied by an FTA+. In part this question 
                                                      
27 See World Bank, “Ukraine – Country Economic Memorandum’’, Washington, 
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has to be resolved by the March 2006 parliamentary elections, after which it 
will become clearer whether a stable majority can be found for a real 
convergence on European standards of economic governance. 
On the positive side there is an evolution of the perceived interests of 
the new business leaders of Ukraine. Having acquired valuable economic 
assets in the first phase of the post-communist transition, the second stage 
in the last five years has seen fast economic growth based on exports. The 
metal boom is over, however, and these same interests now need to find 
more diversified and sustainable business strategies. Such strategies will 
require investment (especially since many existing industrial assets are 
heavily depreciated) and access to international financial and capital 
markets, which in turn necessitates convergence on EU and international 
standards of corporate governance. Tendencies in this direction are now 
being amplified by the willingness of both the government and business 
interests to sell strategic assets to foreign investors (such as in the re-
privatisation of the Kryvorizhstal steel company and the Raiffeisen 
International acquisition of Aval bank). These seminal steps may lead on to 
the formation of a political majority in favour of a change of economic 
paradigm, away from the insider economy and towards an open economy 
obeying international standards of corporate governance. Such a change is 
without doubt in line with the long-term interests of the Ukrainian 
population in order to help them achieve better living standards. 
The European business community has a broad interest in expanding 
the EU’s Single Market into neighbouring non-member states. This would 
not only mean openness for trade and investment, but also a favourable 
business climate and regulatory framework based on European standards. 
While Russia is clearly the biggest neighbouring market, Ukraine perhaps 
presents itself as a more willing partner to converge on EU standards, as 
signalled politically by its ‘European choice’. The European Round Table, a 
powerful group of 45 leading EU companies (with a combined turnover of 
€1,500 billion and 4.5 million employees), produced a monograph in 2004 
on the ERT’s Vision of a Bigger Single Market, which advocates a step-by-step 
progression from WTO accession to free trade for all neighbourhood 
countries and ultimately full inclusion in the Single Market in the long 
term.28 With the EU’s recent enlargement up to the Ukrainian frontier and 
                                                      
28 See the European Round Table, ERT’s Vision of a Bigger Single Market, Brussels, 
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Ukraine’s fast economic growth in recent years, awareness of Ukraine’s 
potential interest as an economic partner is growing.  
There is currently a major political debate in the EU over how to face 
up to the growing challenge of globalisation and Asian competition in 
particular. This debate is cast in rather general terms over the optimal 
degree of trade policy openness, and even if the most acute concerns are 
over Chinese competition there is a tendency for this to also colour the 
debate about other trade liberalisation initiatives. Additionally, there is also 
sensitivity in some EU countries, especially France and Germany, over the 
transfer of jobs to the new member states. Yet the proposition of deep free 
trade with Ukraine should objectively be seen as a potential advantage in 
relation to these concerns, rather than an additional threat. Given the 
proximity of Ukraine and its political will to converge on EU standards, a 
plausible strategy for EU business interests is to regard Ukraine as a 
potentially important part of the European value-added chain, in due 
course and in many industries. European enterprises that bear high labour 
costs in any case can regard outsourcing to neighbours with lower labour 
costs as a way of improving or defending their competitiveness in the 
global market. Nevertheless, the complexity of modern supply-chain 
management means that Ukraine would have to become an extremely 
reliable and open partner for the EU, hence the need for deep free trade 
with a strong emphasis on Ukraine’s convergence on EU technical 
standards and regulatory policies.  
8.2  Sectoral interests  
Defensive anxieties on the EU side are typically concentrated in the 
agricultural, steel and textile sectors. In agriculture and steel Ukraine has 
significant capacities, actual or potential. Ukrainian defensive interests are 
most apparent in agriculture, but also in automobiles. These several sectors 
are now briefly discussed (and in more detail in the annexes), since they are 
sectors in which the greatest protectionist resistances might be expected. 
Yet it turns out that in some of these cases the problems may be less severe 
than initial apprehensions.      
Agriculture. Ukrainian agriculture has a natural comparative 
advantage with its huge endowment of high quality soils for agriculture 
(see annex 1). But the competitive condition of the sector is for the time 
being seriously handicapped by the lack of an advanced market economy 
system and the absence of capabilities to meet EU technical sanitary and 
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export virtually any animal products or processed foods to the EU. The 
Ukrainian agricultural producers association would like technical 
assistance from the EU to achieve EU standards, but Ukraine’s own 
standards are sometimes even more demanding. Ukrainian agriculture is 
now privatised, but it will take time for the management culture to change. 
For example, the farm sector is strongly represented in parliament by a 
large contingent of former collective-farm managers. Farm interests have 
secured very high levels of tariff protection, even if these have been 
reduced in Ukraine’s offer to the WTO.  
COPA, the EU’s farm lobby, is not against moving towards free trade, 
but would press for several conditions, such as gradualism to prevent 
sudden market disruption with long transitions (there was a noticed surge 
in Ukrainian cereal exports in 2002), the maintenance of SPS, the 
recognition of exclusive marks for geographical origin and progress 
towards meeting animal welfare and environmental standards.  
Overall, there will be great caution on both sides over a rapid move 
to free trade in agriculture. The sugar industry on both sides has managed 
to maintain highly protective support systems, even if the EU sugar policy 
now seems set for serious reform. In due course there would be good long-
term prospects for trade and complementarity in food produce. EU 
processed food manufacturers can see a growing future market in Ukraine 
for high value-added foods and could use competitive Ukrainian 
commodity exports. Moreover, as income increases in Ukraine, imports of 
high-quality EU products will likely increase more than proportionally (as 
for Poland in the last decade).   
Steel. For steel, the prospects for trade expansion with the EU are 
very considerable, since the EU’s present steel quota system will have to 
end when Ukraine joins the WTO (see annex 2). This is already understood 
on the EU side in both official and private-sector circles, and has prompted 
steel enterprises to begin thinking about cooperative schemes for market 
integration, for instance through mutual foreign investment projects. Thus 
the largest EU steel group, Arcelor, made a major bid for the re-
privatisation of Krivorizhstahl, and even if they were outbid in this, it 
signals a new direction for European steel interests in Ukraine and is 
unlikely to be the last attempt of its kind. A major Ukrainian industrial 
group has already made significant investments in the Polish and 
Hungarian steel sectors, signaling that Ukrainian interests are also looking 
towards an integrated European business strategy. EU steel companies see 
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simple commodity. This trend means that much of the sector’s production 
is in specialised market niches, which gives plenty of scope for two-way 
trade expansion. The EU steel industry is looking for growth abroad (given 
the slow growth of its home market) and for investment opportunities that 
will lead to partnerships of industry interests. Elimination of Ukraine’s 
export duty on scrap metals, which give Ukrainian producers a competitive 
advantage, will surely feature among the EU’s conditions for free trade. 
Textiles. Trade in textile products between the EU and Ukraine was 
completely liberalised  in March 2005.29 The recent agreement removes 
export and import licences – some of the remaining restrictions on trade in 
textiles and clothing products. Both sides are also to maintain customs 
tariffs on each other’s textile exports at low levels.30 An earlier agreement of 
2000 provided for the reciprocal liberalisation of textile and clothing trade 
from 1 January 2001. In accordance with the terms of the agreement, 
Ukraine implemented tariff reductions for EU exports of textile products 
from 23 February 2001 and the EC lifted all quantitative import restrictions 
on 26 March 2001. Ukraine then continued to reduce its maximum tariff 
rates until they were fully aligned with EU tariffs in 2004.  
The EU is a major textiles trading partner for Ukraine. In 2004 
Ukraine exported $500 million31 worth of goods to the EU or 60% of total 
textile exports. Still, Ukraine remains a relatively small supplier to the 
European market as its share in textile imports amounted to 0.7% in 2004. 
Moreover, the clothing industry itself is quite small in Ukraine; its share in 
total industrial output is a mere 1.1%. 
The trade volumes between the EU and Ukraine are rapidly 
increasing. Ukraine’s proximity to the EU and its comparatively low labour 
costs makes for good opportunities for the intra-industry trade. Currently, 
about 80% of the Ukrainian clothing industry relies on the imported inputs 
recorded as goods made on commission (textiles and knitted fabric) coming 
largely from the EU.  
                                                      
29 The description of the bilateral agreements’ chronology is taken from the website 
of the European Delegation to Ukraine, Ukraine–EU Trade Relations (retrieved 
from http://www.delukr.cec.eu.int/site/page36088.html). 
30 Ukraine and the EU apply the same tariff levels, which do not exceed 4% for 
yarns, 8% for fabrics or 12% for clothing. 
31 Data derived from the EU. Trade in textiles is one of the areas where there are 
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Investment in the sector will grow as the EU manufacturers move 
further east from the new member states and accession countries, where 
there are upward wage pressures and labour shortages.32 Total foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in the industry was estimated to be $120 million in 
2004. Competition from China, Turkey and India – the EU’s major 
suppliers – will significantly increase because of the Multi-Fibre 
Agreement. But the short order-to-delivery cycles in the textile industry33 
enable Ukraine to exploit its geographical advantage. Hence, if the 
country’s transport and logistical inefficiencies are reduced, FDI and 
clothing exports to the EU can be expected to grow rapidly. 
Automobiles. Car-making in Ukraine is one of the major industrial 
sectors enjoying a number of substantial breaks. Thus, over 2003-04,34 the 
fact that the highest growth in the machinery sector was in vehicle output 
is owing to both domestic demand for durable goods and protectionist 
government policy. The industry traditionally has had strong lobbyists in 
parliament, which provided a range of privileges to the car-makers such as 
exempting individual enterprises from customs duties, reducing tax rates 
or even removing tax obligations. Some of the privileges have contradicted 
WTO terms and certain clauses in the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement that require equal conditions for both domestic and foreign 
manufacturers. 
The government will likely liberalise the industry by 2009, if a three-
year transition period with the WTO is negotiated. The government also 
                                                      
32 The textile companies producing in Bulgaria, for example, estimate a 10% annual 
increase in labour costs. The average annual wage in Bulgaria’s textile sector is 
€1,400 (€900 in Ukraine). (See Oxford Business Group, Emerging Bulgaria 2005, 
London, 2005.) Increased labour costs and shortages caused a big Lithuanian 
knitwear firm, Utenos Trikotazas, to shift production to Ukraine. See also the 28 
September 2005 issue of the Economist, p. 89. 
33 EU retailers have to adapt quickly to the seasonal and fashion changes in the 
market. Hence, traditional up-front ordering to China (five months prior to the 
selling season) is often more expensive for the retailers in terms of demand-
forecasting errors than the in-season replenishments from the nearby higher-cost 
producers (see D. Muller-Jentsch, Deeper Integration and Trade in Services in the Euro-
Mediterranean Region, World Bank, Washington, D.C. and the European 
Commission, Brussels, 2004). 
34 In 2004, car-making output grew by 63.3% and by 78.1% for passenger cars. The 
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has legally binding obligations with investors to maintain certain 
preferences until 2008,35 although in 2005 some of the most contradictory 
privileges were removed.36 Further legal amendments remain likely since 
both importers and producers have responded negatively to the changes.  
Support for the car-making industry has been largely through an 
inefficient allocation of public money in Ukraine. Although investment in 
the industry is growing fast,37 as privileges are lifted Ukraine’s industry 
will not be able to effectively compete with Chinese, Central European or 
Russian car-makers. These countries have attracted far greater investment 
into this sector from the top international car-makers.38 The largest foreign 
investor in Ukraine’s car industry, the South Korean company Daewoo, 
went bankrupt in 2000.  
Despite the failures of the protectionist policy, Ukraine still could 
effectively participate in the global car production chain. Ukraine’s major 
car-makers are often major car importers as well, along with the assembling 
sites for the Russian, Japanese, Chinese and European companies. Domestic 
car-makers will likely continue to increase the level of localisation and 
move away from the SKD (semi-knocked down parts) operation as is 
carried out at the Skoda assembly plant in western Ukraine. Low labour 
costs and proximity to the European markets have already attracted some 
of the big car parts manufacturers like Leoni and Yazaki.  
                                                      
35 Investment programmes and related breaks for a number of large enterprises in 
the sector, such as for ZAT Lviv Car Plant and ZAT Zaporizhzhia Car Plant, were 
enshrined in law in the 1990s and are valid until 2008. 
36 The government amended the laws several times over 2003-05. With the 18 
March 2004 Law on the Development of the Car-Making Industry in Ukraine, the 
government cancelled some privileges and reduced the base of beneficiaries. In 
2005, among others, the country-of-origin criterion and related duty exemptions 
were lifted, but the import duties for new cars have also been increased to 20%.  
37 Capital investments in the industry grew by 46% and amounted to $63 million in 
2004. A case of outward investment was reported in 2005. The Ukrainian owner of 
the country’s major car manufacturer, ZAT Zaporizhzhia Car Plant, acquired the 
Daewoo-FSO (with a line capacity of 200,000) production site in Poland. The Polish 
company is a major supplier of the components to its Ukrainian counterpart. 
38 Slovakia and Russia have been the destination of big investments from 
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More generally, Ukraine has the potential to become the location for a 
massive expansion of industrial and service-sector investment with deep 
intra-industry linkages with the EU. The example of Mexico under the 
impact of the NAFTA points to the scale of this potential. Arguably 
Ukraine is even better poised for such a development, given its 
combination of high educational levels and very low wage costs, as well as 
geographical proximity (see Box 8.1).  
Box 8.1 How Ukraine might become a Mexico for Europe 
The deeper integration of Ukraine into the EU’s Single Market could 
considerably enhance EU competitiveness in the global economy. Monthly 
wages in Ukraine are about 10% of the EU average and less than half of those in 
Romania and Bulgaria.
∗  If Ukraine and Turkey are brought into the wider 
European market, they will create, together with Romania and Bulgaria, a low-
wage industrial powerhouse in Europe’s back yard – a zone of 150 million 
people even able to compete with China and India.  
That thought might frighten highly paid workers in Germany or France. 
But it is better for all of Europe if new investment goes to Eastern Europe and 
not faraway China or Brazil. More investment and more growth in low-wage 
Europe generate more demand for goods and services from high-wage 
Europe…Enlargement is globalization in miniature. If the EU holds its 
neighbours at bay, it is putting off a shock of adjustment that will get bigger and 
bigger the longer it is delayed.
∗∗  
Ukraine could become a low-cost production site for Europe and a key 
regional leader in attracting hi-tech investment during the next decade. The 
Eastern European Working Group (which encompasses major electronics 
manufacturing companies and whose combined global revenues in 2004 stood at 
$100 billion) announced their plans to develop an alternative to Asia by 
expanding R&D and manufacturing capacities in Eastern Europe.† Initial 
production sites in Ukraine have already been launched by such electronics 
manufacturing companies as Flextronics International and Jabil Circuit. These 
companies provide manufacturing and design services for Ericsson, Nokia, 
Alcatel, Philips and other leading brands. Other multinational companies (e.g. 
Intel and Foxconn) are considering starting production in Ukraine.  
With its highly qualified, competitive workforce and borders with the EU, 
Ukraine merits their consideration. Ukraine has a strong network of schools and 
universities, which is why it is known for having a generally better-educated 
population than even some developed countries. Today, some 30% of Ukrainian 
students major in engineering, mathematics and information science. The labour 
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Ukraine is also quite attractive for export-oriented, full-scale electronics 
production. Placing some of a company’s manufacturing facilities in Ukraine 
and gaining access to pan-European Transport Corridor V (which runs Venice–
Ljubljana–Budapest–Uzhorod–Lviv), would make it possible for transnational 
companies that currently manufacture in China to cut delivery times to the 
European market by 20-25 days and to reduce dependence on China. For 
example, Hewlett Packard expects Ukraine-manufactured PC prices to be 
around $40–100 less than those manufactured in Europe because of lower costs 
related to logistics and labour.†† 
The majority of the above-mentioned companies use imported 
components to assemble their products and export most of them to the EU. At 
present, Ukraine presents several problems for such companies. First, Ukraine 
lacks a supplier base, although the country has the necessary raw materials and 
components to develop a strong supply network to start full-scale production. 
Second, Ukraine applies import duties of 5 to 10%, which makes it very costly 
since most components are imported. As discussed elsewhere in this study, the 
third major problem is the complicated customs procedures.††† The reform of 
customs and logistical systems is key to fostering Ukraine’s integration with the 
global production networks, despite the fact that it will require time and 
significant effort. Meanwhile, establishing industrial parks and granting a 
customs-free status to those investors who manufacture in Ukraine and export 
100% of their products could compensate for the cancellation of various 
exemptions connected with special economic zones. The recent statements made 
by the president and other high-ranking officials may indicate that some form of 
compromise can be reached.  
Ukraine might develop a deep industrial and trading relationship with 
the EU comparable to that of Mexico in relation to the US – enabling the EU and 
Ukraine together to compete more effectively with China.  
 
∗ See Deutsche Bank Research, “Ukraine: The Long Road West”, Current Issues, Frankfurt, 
27 May 2005. 
∗∗ Quoted from “Meet the Neighbours – A Survey of the EU’s Eastern Borders”, 
Economist, 25 June 2005. 
† It is estimated that in 2005 Eastern Europe will account for 54% of total European EMS 
production (worth $45.4 billion), while in 1997 the figure was a mere 15% (out of $12.5 
billion). See “Ten new member countries join the EU this month with far reaching 
implications for the future of electronics manufacturing”, Electronics Supply & 
Manufacturing, 15 August 2004 (retrieved from http://www.my-esm.com/print/ 
showArticle.jhtml?articleID=19205595).  124 | POLITICAL ECONOMY 
†† HP started the production of PCs in Ukraine (100,000 line capacity) in 2005. See the 
Interfax-Ukraine newswire of 18 October 2005. 
††† In the EU, the only organisation normally involved in clearing goods across borders is 
customs, while other organisations carry out post-clearance audits. In Ukraine, the border 
process is more time-consuming and complex because of the multiplicity of organisations 
involved: customs, quarantine services, the national sanitary and medical agency, the 
ecological department and certification authorities. Owing to the difficult import process 
in Ukraine, international companies like Leoni, Yazaki or Jabil Circuit are consolidating 
all their raw materials outside the country before importing them. 
Source: Much of the text in this box draws extensively from ICPS, 2005(b), along with 





9.  SUMMARY OF SOME OPTIONS, THEIR 
FEASIBILITY AND COST BENEFITS 
The preceding chapters have shown that the contents of conceivable 
packages for free trade and deeper integration have many possible 
variables, which could make for numerous alternative packages. But for the 
policy-maker, these possibilities have to be concentrated and organised into 
a manageable number of well-identified options, to facilitate evaluation of 
their feasibility and likely cost/benefit qualities. For focus we therefore 
highlight four categorical options: 
1.  Simple free trade 
2.  Customs union 
3.  Deep free trade 
4.  European Economic Area (EEA) market integration 
Each are summarised for its possible content, feasibility and cost 
benefits. 
1.  Simple free trade package (FTA) 
Content.  This package would comprise, beyond the conditions for WTO 
membership, the elimination of customs tariffs over a short- or medium-
term period, some additions to the already the very extensive list of 
services to be liberalised in the WTO offer, completion of capital market 
liberalisation and some visa-facilitation measures by the EU for the 
movement of persons to complement the scrapping of visas by Ukraine.  
Feasibility.  This approach is feasible in terms of Ukrainian 
administrative capacity, since it either frees public bodies from various 
burdens of regulatory or executive activity (e.g. for the licensing of service-
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regulatory burdens (for customs). In terms of political economy feasibility 
it has to be observed that obtaining parliamentary support even for WTO 
accession is still proving difficult. With the WTO accession completed the 
building of support for simple free trade with the EU might be easier, 
especially if its political implications at that time are considered as positive.  
Impact and cost/benefits. The economic impact of the steps that would 
need to be taken in additional to WTO membership will not be great, and 
there are even some risks of negative effects if liberalisation is not 
accompanied by adequate complementary measures for improving the 
domestic business climate.  
2.  Customs union  
Content. This strategy would mean adding to the simple free-trade scenario 
the alignment of Ukraine’s external customs tariffs with those of the EU, as 
well as convergence on various other EU trade policy measures such as 
anti-dumping rules and exceptional quantitative restrictions.  
Feasibility. The technical and administrative burden of full alignment 
on the EU’s external tariffs and other trade policy measures has already 
been seen (in the case of Turkey) to be heavy. To which has to be added the 
political tensions that can arise in having to adopt new EU trade policy 
measures. For Ukraine these burdens would be as heavy if not more so.  
Impact and cost/benefits. From an economic cost/benefit standpoint, a 
customs union is problematic when a partner state has an important trade 
relationship with a third party, since it leads to trade-diversion effects. For 
Ukraine this would be all the more applicable since it already has a free 
trade relationship with Russia, which would have to be scrapped unless the 
EU also forms a free trade area with Russia, and that is not on the horizon.  
3.  Deep free trade package (FTA+) 
Content. In addition to the free trade in goods and services and free capital 
movements arising from option 1, the deep free trade package would 
consist of a large but still selective set of priority actions, many of which 
already feature in the ENP Action Plan for Ukraine in some formulation. 
An illustrative but non-exhaustive priority list might include:  
•  the reform of customs services; 
•  product standards, with a medium-term programme for 
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•  the adoption of agri-food standards (sanitary and phytosanitary 
rules), in the context of a medium-term action programme;  
•  convergence on regulatory policies; 
•  financial services, with complete openness but a staged process for 
regulatory approximation (Basel I); 
•  civil aviation, with full acquis compliance and inclusion in a common 
aviation area; 
•  road transport, with liberalisation and acquis compliance, plus 
investment in pan-European corridors; 
•  telecommunications, complete with openness and compliance with 
the 1998 acquis; 
•  the energy sector, with extensive acquis compliance for regulatory 
norms; 
•  electricity, if grid linkage is sought, then full acquis compliance would 
be necessary; 
•  competition policy, with staged convergence on EU practices; 
•  corporate governance, for which basic measures of best international 
practices are needed; and 
•  the environment, with a start on a long-term process of gradual acquis 
compliance and links to Kyoto measures.  
Feasibility.  The feasibility of deep free trade is surely much more 
difficult than for simple free trade as regards administrative capacity, 
which is why a heavy investment in institution- and capacity-building 
would be needed. As regards political economy feasibility this is surely a 
somewhat fluid matter in the current political climate, and in the period 
ahead will depend on the broad political-will factor, which will stem from 
political leadership, public understanding of the issues and perceptions of 
sectoral and national priorities on the part of different business and civil 
society interest groups. In an unsettled political situation, typical of a mid-
way stage in the transition process, there is a special need and value for 
external anchorage for the reform process. But in the Ukrainian case there 
is also a vital need for the authorities to engage in stakeholder 
consultations, in order to prepare business interest groups and the 
parliament to support the reform process. The difficulties in even passing 
WTO-compliant legislation have illustrated the obstacles that can arise 
when basic processes of information and consultation are neglected. These 
needs will surely be on a larger scale with a deep free trade agreement.    128 | SUMMARY OF SOME OPTIONS, THEIR FEASIBILITY AND COST BENEFITS 
Impact and cost/benefits. The evidence from contemporary experiences 
of the post-communist transition in Europe is suggesting that the benefits 
to Ukraine from an effectively implemented and well-designed FTA+ 
package could be of major importance for inducing rapid and sustainable 
economic growth. Its relevance is enhanced by the now evident need for 
Ukraine to restructure as quickly as possible into an energy-efficient, rather 
than energy-wasteful economy. There are also many synergies between the 
individual elements of the deep free trade package and the credibility of 
the whole, which together acquire a holistic quality and constitute a strong 
reason not to reduce the level of ambition by taking only sub-sets of the 
package. For the EU, the economic impact will in any case be rather minor, 
but not without interest for industries confronting the challenges of 
globalisation. Furthermore, the EU has a major political interest in seeing a 
prosperous, stable and democratic Ukraine, to which a deep free trade 
strategy could make an important contribution.  
4.   Complete market integration (EEA) 
Content.  This theoretical case would consist of full compliance with the 
entire EU Single Market acquis for goods, services, capital and labour at the 
level of commitments made by Norway and other members of the EEA. 
The EEA commitment is also dynamic in the sense of the automatic 
obligation to comply with new EU legislation. 
Feasibility.  This approach would not be feasible within a medium-
term period, although it could become feasible in the long run. The initial 
problems of feasibility would certainly be those of the implementation 
capacity for the Ukrainian private sector to adopt many of the most 
complex parts of the acquis, for the Ukrainian executive branch to regulate 
the application of EU directives and for the judiciary to enforce them. A 
major question of political feasibility is whether the Ukrainian parliament 
would be willing to cede so much sovereignty to the EU without 
membership.    
Impact and cost/benefits. This strategy would in theory be superior to 
the deep free trade package in terms of the ultimate benefits to Ukraine’s 
economy, but since it is not feasible over at least a medium-term period 
further discussion is not necessary.  
The model of the EU-Swiss agreements is sometimes suggested as a 
more realistic variant of the EEA for Ukraine. Its selectivity is a 
consideration, but its content is dependent on a very high mutual-
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Yet some kind of association between Ukraine and the EEA could be 
both feasible and beneficial. With independent technical assistance on how 
Ukraine might best converge progressively on the EU acquis, this element 
could be added to the deep free trade scenario.   
5. Intermediate  packages 
Between the simple and deep free trade packages above it would in 
principle be possible to construct a continuum of sub-options, adopting or 
setting aside some areas of action or selecting different sequencing paths. 
To test this idea one may consider breaking the deep free trade package up 
into the following four modules, each of which has internal coherence, and 
looking at the case for a more selective approach: 
a)  Deepened free trade in goods. This module would take the first three 
headings in the above list for customs and product standards. 
b)  Deepened free trade in services. This aspect would encompass the 
headings listed for the main service sectors – financial, transport, 
telecommunications and energy distribution. 
c)  Deepened investment in infrastructures. The focus here would be on the 
pan-European corridors and related regulatory policies. 
d)  Deepened reforms of corporate and public economic governance. These 
reforms would concern competition policy and basic elements of 
corporate governance.  
Would there be a case for prioritising one or another or a sub-set of 
these options? One could argue in favour of a traditional free trade model, 
with deepened free trade just for goods (a). But this would be to ignore (b) 
and the strong argument that free trade in services is at least as important 
for both external trade and internal reform. One could draw the line there, 
but already under (c) substantial arrangements are underway for 
investment in pan-European transport infrastructures, which would be in 
support of (a) and (b) and in which it would make no sense to exclude 
Ukraine. One might then draw the line by saying that under (d) there are 
items far removed from the trade policy agenda. But these items are also 
major prerequisites for obtaining the full benefits from trade liberalisation, 
especially for a country such as Ukraine with weak corporate and public 
economic governance.  
Overall the case for advocating a more limited agenda does not seem 
persuasive. It would be possible to make purely semantic distinctions, by 
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other economic policies and are covered by the ENP. From an economic 
perspective, however, and a diagnosis of the needs of the Ukrainian 
economy, the quantitative economic analysis shows evidence of synergies 
to be derived from a holistic approach, which would mean embracing all 
four modules together. It is no coincidence that the ENP Action Plan also 
follows a comprehensive and holistic approach. The deep free trade 
proposition could be seen as giving the plan backbone and a stronger focus.  
Of course there would be many variables, such as the speed and 
intensity of undertaking the individual components of deep free trade, 
offering opportunities for alternative ways of fine-tuning the content of an 
agreement. Yet this degree of detail is beyond the scope of the present 
study and would in any case become subject matter for the official 
negotiation process.   
As an example of an intermediate scenario between the simple and 
deep free trade packages, the EU–Chile FTA has quite rich content, but the 
absence of the European neighbourhood factor makes it a less relevant 
model for Ukraine.  
6.  Overall assessment  
A summary of these four main scenarios for free trade between the EU and 
Ukraine is: 
•  Option 1 – simple free trade is the most easily feasible, but its impact 
is weak and the cost/benefits less impressive. 
•  Option 2 – a customs union is rejected because of its serious 
disadvantages in terms of both feasibility and cost/benefits. 
•  Option 3 – deep free trade is complex and demanding in terms of 
feasibility, but offers the prospect of large economic advantages of 
strategic value. 
•  Option 4 – complete market integration is not feasible at least for the 
medium term.  
A persuasive logic does not emerge for identifying specific 
intermediate packages lying somewhere between the options of simple and 
deep free trade. Therefore, option 3 is the scenario that invites special 
consideration, by virtue of both its coverage and potential interest for 
Ukraine. There could be many ways of fine-tuning the content and the 
sequencing of individual measures, some of which are discussed in some 
detail in this study (in chapter 5 and annex 3).  
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GLOSSARY LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ACAA  Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of 
Industrial Products 
ASAs  Air service agreements 
CEECs  Central and Eastern European countries 
CGE  Computable general equilibrium (model) 
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States 
COPA  Committee of Agricultural Organisations in the European Union  
EASA  European Aviation Safety Agency 
EBRD  European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
EEA  European Economic Area 
EFTA  European Free Trade Area 
EIB  European Investment Bank 
ENP  European Neighbourhood Policy 
ENPI  European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 
Eurofer  European Confederation of Iron and Steel Industries  
FDI  Foreign direct investment 
FIGS Financial–industrial  groups 
FTA  Free trade agreement 
FTA+  A ‘deep’ free trade agreement 
GATS  General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GSP   Generalised System of Preferences 
IAS  International Accounting Standards 
IBRD  International Bank of Reconstruction and Development 
IFI  International financial institution 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
ISA  International Standards for Auditing 
ISO International  Standards  Organisation 
JI  Joint implementation (projects) 
MES  Market economy status 
MFN Most-favoured  nation 
MoU  Memorandum of Understanding 
Mt Million  tonnes 
NAFTA  North American Free Trade Agreement 132 | GLOSSARY LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
NBU  National Bank of Ukraine 
NCRC National  Communications Regulatory Commission 
NERC  National Energy Regulatory Committee 
NGOs Non-governmental  organisations 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OHS  Occupational health and safety 
PCA  Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
SEECs  South-Eastern European countries 
SES  Single Economic Space 
SIAs  Sustainable Development Impact Assessments 
SPS   Sanitary and phytosanitary standards 
SSSMC  State Securities and Stock Market Commission 
t/ha Tonnes/hectare 
TBT  Technical barriers to trade 
UAH Ukrainian  hryvnya 
UEPLAC  Ukrainian–European Policy and Legal Advice Centre 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UNICE  Union of Enterprises of the European Community 
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1.1  Background and policy developments 
As the traditional ‘bread basket’ of the former USSR, Ukrainian agriculture 
holds serious advantages for competing in the world market, with large-
scale fields and good soils. Yet for the time being these are underexploited 
assets. Employment in agriculture amounts to 5.7 million people (19.8% of 
the active population). Nevertheless, during 1990-99 agricultural output 
dropped by nearly half and around 40% of rural residents are living in 
poverty, with average monthly agricultural wages below $40.  
Important reform measures were introduced at the end of 1999, when 
collective farms were transformed into private enterprises and former 
collective-farm members started receiving properly issued titles to their 
land. This move was followed by the abolition of state orders, farm debt 
relief and protection against arbitrary state intervention. 
The years 2000-04 saw a major recovery in Ukrainian grain 
production and exports. By 2002-03, Ukraine had become the world’s third 
largest exporter of wheat and its fifth largest exporter of grain. Agricultural 
production began to cover its costs.  
The situation has been more favourable in food processing, where 
privatisation occurred earlier, and in contrast to crop production and 
animal husbandry, has since 1997 witnessed significant capital inflows and 
technological modernisation. Positive developments are observed in the 
food industry. Its output in 2004 was double that of 1999. Substantial 
increases took place in the following products:1 fat cheeses (4.2 times), 
vegetable oil (2.3 times), margarine products (2.6 times), sausage products 
and alcoholic beverages (2 times), mineral water (3.3 times), confectionery 
(1.7 times) and granulated sugar (by 15%). 
Regrettably, anti-reform trends in some areas have returned since 
2004. Poor grain yields (mostly owing to weather conditions) in 2003-04 
served as an official argument for reinstating government intervention in 
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agricultural markets, mainly in the form of administered pricing and 
restrictions on the free movement and sale of commodities. Ukraine’s 
foreign trade policy for agricultural products suffers unjustified 
protectionism on the imports side, given the competitiveness of its major 
products. The concept of ‘food security’ in Ukraine is still widely 
misunderstood to mean achieving self-sufficiency in food production. This 
autarkic approach is difficult to reconcile with Ukraine’s aspirations for 
international trade integration.  
Regardless of official policies, foreign trade in agriculture and foods 
has been developing and diversifying quite well, with exports growing in 
recent years despite fluctuations in grain yields. Trade with the EU has 
increased significantly, especially in cereals, animal feeds and processed 
vegetables and oils. The lack of compliance with EU food safety regulations 
means that Ukraine finds it harder, if not impossible, to export value-added 
food products to the EU (see discussion below).  
The potential of Ukraine’s agrarian sector is high but to a great extent 
underutilised. For example, the yield capacity of the main grain crops 
grown in Ukraine is currently 3-6 t/ha less than in neighbouring countries, 
while this figure for sugar beets is 20-50 t/ha lower (see Table A.1). 













Country  1999 2004 1999 2004 1999 2004 1999 2004 1999 2004 
Germany  8.8 9.1 6.0 5.8 1.4 1.4 7.5 8.2  56.4  61.6 
France  9.0 9.0 6.3 6.8 2.3 2.4 7.2 7.6  74.2  79.1 
Czech  Rep.  6.6 6.4 3.9 5.0 2.2 2.2 4.7 5.8  45.6  50.3 
Hungary  6.4 4.2 3.1 4.3 1.5 2.5 3.6 5.1  44.6  51.3 
Poland  5.8 6.1 3.1 2.5  –  – 3.5 3.9  33.8  39.3 
Ukraine  2.5 3.0 1.9 1.9 1.0 0.9 2.3 3.2  15.6  23.8 
Note:  t/ha = tonnes/hectare 
Source: FAO. 
 
The major change in the structure of agricultural production after 
1999 was the reduction of the share of animal products, from 45.6% down 
to 35.7% of the total, whereas the share of plant products (especially grain 
crops) increased notably. Favourable weather conditions, the profitability 
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and expansion of grain exports, some progress in farm restructuring and 
improved access of farms to credit resources contributed to the growth of 
grain production. 
Production of sugar beets was unstable during the same period. 
Tariff quotas for preferential imports of raw cane sugar allowed a 
replenishment of supplies with sugar made of cheaper, imported raw cane 
material. There is a large surplus of sugar-producing capacities, but they 
are not competitive, mainly because of obsolete technology. Policies in the 
sugar sub-sector continue to be mostly focused on helping existing 
refineries to survive, rather than pursuing long-term restructuring 
objectives. 
The share of potatoes, vegetables and sunflower seeds in the 
structure of agricultural production increased from 19% to 23%. Potatoes 
and vegetables are mainly produced by private farmers or on private plots, 
where manual labour-intensive production technologies are used. Growth 
of sunflower seed production was stimulated by favourable export 
markets. 
So far, however, technologies, crop rotations and farm specialisation 
remain mostly as inherited from traditional Soviet-style practices, thereby 
continuing an inefficient use of resources. Although progress in land 
reform and the restructuring of agricultural enterprises after 1999 has 
contributed to the development of agricultural production, the growth has 
been more of an extensive nature, and only limited qualitative change has 
taken place. 
There are various assessments of the potential for Ukraine’s 
agricultural production. The weather and climatic conditions are 
exceptionally favourable for growing of all kinds of cereals, especially 
wheat for food consumption. For instance, in the most favourable 1990 crop 
year, the average yield of winter wheat was 4 t/ha, which was 76% higher 
than in Canada and 50% more than in the US. Experts judge that with 
improvements in technology, even without expanding the cultivated area 
the gross output of grains might be increased by 20%, or to about 52 Mt. 
This level of output would enable the doubling of grain exports to the level 
of 14-15 Mt (7.6 Mt in 2004). 
Because of its low competitiveness and the shrinkage of the domestic 
market, it is more difficult to assess the potential of the animal husbandry 
sub-sector, but physically Ukraine should be capable of producing at least 
18 Mt of milk (13.8 in 2004) and 2.5 Mt of all types of meat (1.6 in 2004). THE PROSPECT OF DEEP FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE| 141 
1.2  Foreign trade in agricultural goods 
In 1999-2000, the trade surplus for agricultural and food industry products 
was as low as $0.5 billion, because of a temporary loss of demand from 
Russia following the 1998 financial crisis and a cut-back of grain supply for 
export. Since 2000, however, the average year-on-year growth of exports (in 
monetary terms) was around 30%. As a result, exports of agricultural and 
food industry products reached $3.5 billion in 2004, with net exports of $1.5 
billion.  
In the overall structure of agricultural foreign trade, members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) import the largest share of 
Ukrainian exports – about 47% (based on nine months in 2005). The CIS 
consumes 99% of Ukraine’s exports of meat products, 80% of dairy 
produce, 89% of alcoholic beverages, 92% of cocoa and products thereof, 
75% of sugar and confectionary. Yet for plant products a geographical 
redistribution of Ukrainian agricultural exports has taken place, with major 
supplies going to Asia (45%), the EU (26%) and Africa (23%).  
In 2004, the share of the EU-25 in Ukraine’s overall agri-food exports 
was about 20%, of which a little under half is accounted for by the new 
member states. Ukraine’s trade balance with the EU-25 remains positive. 
Since 1999, significant liberalisation of agricultural imports has taken 
place in Ukraine. In particular, the application of the minimum customs 
values was phased out during 1999-2000; previously, they were applied to 
an extensive list of goods, including meat, milk products, grain crops, flour, 
fruit and vegetables. In 2000, the list of excised goods was cut dramatically: 
coffee, sea and fish products, and other foodstuffs were withdrawn, while 
import duty rates were decreased for some goods. Excise tax is now paid 
only on importation of ethyl alcohol, alcoholic beverages, raw tobacco 
materials and tobacco products. The recent adoption of Law No. 2775 
concerning changes to import duty rates for agricultural products 
substantially liberalised access to Ukraine’s market. The Law sets zero or 
low ad valorem rates for some commodities (5-10%), which correspond to 
Ukraine’s tariff offer at the WTO accession negotiations. For sensitive 
commodities (e.g. ch. 02 – meat and edible meat offal; ch. 04 – dairy 
produce; ch. 11 – milling products; and ch. 17 – sugars), combined tariffs 
remain in force. While their ad valorem part has been reduced, the high 
specific rates have been preserved. But as soon as Ukraine joins the WTO, 
all tariffs for these goods should be converted to ad valorem alone and be no 
higher than 10-12%. 142 | BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Major obstacles to exports. There are both internal and external 
factors restraining Ukrainian agricultural exports. Domestic obstacles 
include obsolete grain storage systems, a costly transport infrastructure, 
over-regulated and time-consuming export procedures, underdeveloped 
market-information systems and the poor access of producers to 
information, as well as a low supply of high quality products, especially 
grain. All risks and costs associated with these factors are ultimately paid 
by farms, with farm gate prices being traditionally depressed. In as much 
as primary agricultural producers cannot obtain a better price for their 
output, they are not properly stimulated to improve technology, diversify 
or make long-term investments. Obviously, this does not add to the 
development of export potential or the proper utilisation of land. 
Another important domestic factor is non-reimbursement of VAT on 
exports (as of September 2005, the state’s arrears on VAT reimbursement to 
exporters of grain were as high as UAH 400 million). This situation actually 
means that farm’s gate prices are further depressed and that farmers (not 
exporters or traders) are subject to this additional tax. Ukraine also 
continues to administer export duties for raw hides and skins and for 
oilseeds (further discussed in the WTO section below). 
External factors include unstable access to foreign markets, both in 
the form of unpredictable tariff changes (which has happened frequently 
with the EU and Russia), and many cases where Ukrainian goods are 
subject to sudden veterinary and sanitary inspections from various 
countries. The extensive application of non-tariff barriers by the EU is 
described below. 
Entry into the WTO.  In its WTO accession negotiations, Ukraine 
committed to reduce the average tariff for agriculture and food products 
(chs. 1-24) down to 12% in 2007. The only exceptions will be sugar (with a 
50% rate) and sunflower oil (with 30%). Ukraine has also committed to the 
sole use of ad valorem rates upon accession, with combined and specific 
rates applied only to excised goods until 2009. The schedule of Ukraine’s 
market access commitments has already been agreed with most of the 
working party members (38 out of 48 bilateral protocols have been signed). 
To complete the WTO negotiations, a number of outstanding issues 
have to be resolved. One of them is the tariff rate quota for raw cane sugar, 
for which the quantity and distribution mechanism must be agreed. 
Ukraine’s previous position (annual tariff quota of 260,000 tonnes at 2% 
duty, with 50% duty above the quota) was changed in 2005 to 15% within 
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volume of this tariff quota (of 260,000 tonnes) has been agreed in bilateral 
protocols with Brazil, Cuba, India, Paraguay and the EU. Nevertheless, 
based on information about the expansion of legal and illegal imports of 
raw sugar and white sugar into Ukraine, Australia is demanding that the 
tariff quota be increased to 408,000 tonnes. Australia also insists on the 
abolition of the compulsory re-export of sugar made using imported raw 
materials.  
Ukraine was requested to cancel export duties for agricultural goods 
before the accession. The 23% export duty for sunflower seeds and other oil 
crops was reduced to 17% in 2001. When Ukraine becomes a WTO member 
the export duty rates for seeds of flax, sunflower and rape will be set at 16% 
of their customs value, with further reductions by 1 percentage point 
annually down to 10% from 1 January 2007. 
Ukraine has a draft law that would abolish the export duty for live 
animals and reduce them for raw hides and skins starting from 1 January 
2006. It is proposed that there be a 15% export duty for raw hides in 2006, 
with subsequent annual 1% reductions starting from 1 January 2007 down 
to the 10% level. But this draft law has failed so far to win enough votes in 
the parliament.  
1.3  Foreign trade with and foreign direct investment from the EU 
Formally, Ukraine benefits from the EU Generalised System of Preferences 
(GSP). Most agricultural and food industry products are in the ‘sensitive’ 
goods category, however, where the margin of preference is small and 
procedures are complicated (particularly by rules of origin). Also, 
information about GSP advantages has not been efficiently delivered to 
Ukrainian producers and exporters; hence the level of GSP usage by 
Ukraine remains low. 
One of the major restrictive factors for Ukrainian agricultural exports 
to the EU was the introduction of quotas for low- and medium-quality 
wheat starting 1 January 2003 (2.98 Mt of low- and medium-quality wheat 
at a duty rate of €12/tonne, €95/tonne above the quota). Only the US and 
Canada obtained bilateral shares in the quota, while the rest, 2.37 Mt, was 
open to all other countries, including Ukraine. For comparison, Ukraine 
exported 3 Mt of grain to the EU in 2001-02, and about 5 Mt in 2002-03. This 
measure was painful for Ukrainian exporters and producers through 
depressed farm gate prices, during these years of grain surplus. Yet EU 
policy for some agricultural commodities is a flexible on/off regime, i.e. 
switching between restrictive versus free conditions for imports depending 144 | BIBLIOGRAPHY 
on market conditions. Since 16 November 2005, EU imports of wheat have 
been tariff-free.2 This condition signals that the market for free trade in this 
important sector is relatively favourable, and effectively a temporary free 
trade regime prevails at present. For Ukraine, in the context of a possible 
FTA+, this tariff-free regime could be made permanent.  
Table A1.2 Exports and imports of selected agricultural commodities between the 
EU and Ukraine in € millions (for commodities exceeding €10 million) 







Milk/cream concentrate  11  – 
Meat   –  26 
Dried vegetables  11  – 
Coconuts, brazil nuts  11  1 
Fruit/nuts – uncooked  14  1 
Coffee –  24 
Wheat 145  17 
Rye 10  – 
Barley 29  4 
Maize or corn  11  8 
Malt –  11 
Sunflower seeds  171  3 
Cane/beet sugar  –  25 
Food preparations  –  20 
Oilcake 51  3 
Unmanufactured tobacco  –  16 
Mixes of onions, etc., substances  –  31 
Casein 25  – 
Raw hides – bovine  38  3 
Total 594  370 
Source: Eurostat. 
                                                      
2 See European Commission, Regulation (EC) No. 1865/2005 of 16 November 2005 
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In the structure of Ukraine’s agricultural exports to the EU-25, the 
share of milk and dairy produce is very small, at only 2%. The low 
competitiveness of Ukraine’s dairy sector is further aggravated by the non-
conformity of Ukrainian dairy products with EU requirements on safety 
and quality. A similar situation is observed for meat and edible meat offal, 
which Ukraine does not export to the EU at all, while the share of these 
products in total agricultural imports from the EU-25 amounts to 40%.  
In January 2004 the EU amended the list of countries from which it 
can import live animals and meat products. The import of such categories 
as the fresh meat of domestic animals and meat products, the fresh meat of 
wild animals, live cattle, live swine and live poultry from Ukraine to the EU 
is not allowed. Permission to import from Ukraine to the EU is given to 
only one category, namely live horses and donkeys. 
Investment from the EU-25 accounts for 57% of total foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in agricultural production ($129 million) and 70% for the 
food industry ($777 million). EU investment in the agri-food sector 
accounts for 10% of total FDI in Ukraine. While these absolute numbers are 
still extremely low given the size of Ukraine, the potential of its agriculture 
and its geographical proximity to the EU, the relative figures suggest that 
FDI in agri-food sectors could become important with a free trade area.  
Table A1.3 FDI in agricultural and food production (US$ ’000s)  
Agricultural 
production 01.01.2001  31.12.2001  01.01.2002 31.12.2002 01.01.2004 31.12.2004 
Total  35,893 45,133 45,908 60,663  205,994  227,125 
CIS 587  947  949  1,342  7,860  11,853 
EU-15  11,854 18,408 18,587 22,702 73,692  100,357 
CEEC-10  4,584 6,042 5,949 7,688  20,973  29,034 
Other  18,868 19,735 20,424 28,930  103,469 85,881 
        
Food 
industry 01.01.2001  31.12.2001  01.01.2002 31.12.2002 01.01.2004 31.12.2004 
Total 615,309  600,346  633,281  654,795 1,006,458 1,123,684 
CIS  3,030 3,416 4,564 5,360  12,128  19,307 
EU-15  431,761 414,466 422,038 432,695 593,946 667,339 
CEEC-10  42,474 46,116 60,388 59,661  111,481  110,584 
Other  138,044 136,349 146,291 157,079 288,901 326,454 
Note: CEEC-10 refers to the 10 EU accession countries from Central and Eastern Europe. 
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1.4  Technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
Based on the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and on Art. 
51 of the EU–Ukraine Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, Ukraine 
undertook to introduce in its national legislation the international and 
European standards for health and safety, while ensuring product 
competitiveness and removing unnecessary barriers to trade. Ukraine 
reaffirmed at the negotiations its intention of reviewing and replacing all of 
its national standards with international standards or technical regulations 
based on them, in accordance with the Action Plan of full harmonisation of 
standards and technical rules for 2005-11 developed by the State 
Committee for Technical Regulation and Consumer Policy. 
Yet only 52% of the total number of Ukraine’s state standards (DSTU) 
for agricultural products is harmonised with international standards; for 
the food industry this indicator is only 29%.  
Table A1.4  Extent of introduction of international and European standards 
(ISO, IEC, EN) in Ukraine 
Standards harmonised with 
international and European ones 
 
Sector  
DSTU  GOST  Total 
Percentage of harmonised 
DSTU standards 
Agriculture  122  77  199  52 
Food industry  196  62  258  29 
Note: GOST refers to Russian standards, ISO to the International Standards Organisation, 
   IEC to the International Electrotechnical Commission and EN to European standards.  
Source: The State Committee for Technical Regulation and Consumer Policy of Ukraine as of 
  1 July 2005. 
Ukraine’s draft law on the development and application of standards, 
technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures has been 
prepared and should be passed. The draft defines legal and organisational 
principles surrounding these activities and the granting of the right of 
conformity signs usage for all goods, processes and services. The draft also 
contains provisions about the recognition of equivalence of foreign and 
Ukrainian technical regulations and about the creation of a centre for 
inquiry processing and messaging.  
Steps are also being undertaken to ensure the compliance of the 
sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS) system with all provisions of 
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foodstuffs and raw food materials have been passed and draft laws on 
amending legislation on veterinary medicine and plant quarantine 
have been developed. In May 2005, the SPS reference and message centre 
was established, and will start working as soon as Ukraine has joined the 
WTO. 
For cereals and vegetable products major exporters from Ukraine do 
not regard current SPS and TBT standards as a significant factor restraining 
international sales, since indeed there are few technical requirements for 
these products. Most of Ukraine’s primary agricultural output has a 
considerable price-competitive advantage, owing to low production costs, 
and the potential for further export growth is high.  
By contrast, for animal products and processed foods improved 
compliance is vital. The need to meet up-to-date international and 
European requirements would also greatly contribute to the introduction of 
new technologies, the restructuring of the animal breeding sub-sector and 
advances in the quality to the level required for import substitution and 
promotion on foreign markets. 
For Ukrainian dairy products, the hygienic quality in particular 
prevents their access to the EU market. Only the top quality milk in 
Ukraine meets European standards for somatic cell count. For bacterial 
plate count, the European ceiling is 100,000/cm3, while the Ukrainian 
maximum is 300,000/cm3 for top quality milk and 3,000 for other types.  
Residues of veterinary preparations and other substances not allowed 
for use in the EU have been found in Ukrainian dairy products. Widely 
discussed was the presence of antibiotics banned by the EU in Ukrainian 
dry non-fat milk, as well as certain pollutants (for instance, 
chloramphenicol) in 2002. 
With regard to meat and meat products, this lack of compliance is 
even greater, starting with requirements for the maintenance of live 
animals and the personal hygiene of workers, and ending with standards of 
processing and transporting ready products. This situation further 
complicates the low competitiveness of Ukrainian meat production and 
makes any exports to the EU impossible.  
The biggest obstacle for Ukraine’s agriculture will not only be to 
comply with SPS rules, but also with EU food safety regulations. The entire 
range of EU food safety regulations, in particular Council Regulation (EU) 
No. 178/2002, exceeds the SPS standards set by the WTO. The food safety 
regulations/directives are set over and above trade agreements, meaning 148 | BIBLIOGRAPHY 
that despite an expected FTA, certain agricultural products that are non-
compliant with food law regulations will be stopped at borders. 
The regulatory impact on Ukrainian agriculture could be costly. This 
has been observed in the 10 new accession countries, which despite being 
member states of the EU were not allowed to export certain agricultural 
products into the EU-15 without meeting EU food safety standards. 
Although a transitional period allowing imports for some products was 
implemented, a huge restructuring of food processing plants took place to 
meet these regulations. The strict application of these EU food laws is also 
evident intra-EU, where at times internal cross-border trade is hindered 
because of food safety standards. 
Also, there are no legislative acts to regulate relations in the field of 
genetic engineering or define principles for using genetically modified 
organisms in Ukraine. Some of Ukraine’s immediate neighbouring 
countries permit genetically modified organisms and products containing 
such organisms, thus almost certainly cause their unauthorised and 
uncontrolled distribution in the territory of Ukraine. Hence, a relevant legal 
framework needs to be created as soon as possible. 
1.5  Interest groups and the political environment 
So far, the recent democratic changes in Ukraine have not directly resulted 
in more reasoned and market-oriented agricultural policies. Discussions on 
the need for greater subsidisation and the perceived danger of liberalisation 
are not surprising in a country where one-third of the population is 
dependent on agriculture, and whose main neighbours and trade partners 
also tend to protect their market and subsidise. Moreover, agriculture 
keeps playing an important social role by employing excess manpower in 
subsidiary plot farms and by restraining great social difficulties through 
the deceleration of migrations between urban and rural areas. 
Interest groups in Ukraine’s agrarian sector include large agricultural 
enterprises established on the basis of former collective farms, farmers 
(small enterprises), exporters and traders of agricultural products and 
industrial-agrarian holdings. All of them are represented through a large 
number of public professional associations (more than 50). 
These interest groups are rather active and successful in advocating 
and promoting the interests of their members. They take part in the policy 
discussion and formulation process, including the development of 
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of annual memoranda on the coordination of actions between the 
government and leading public associations of the agro-industrial complex 
in the markets of grain, sugar, milk, meat, bread and bakery products.  
The first group of public associations includes producers and processors 
of agricultural products by sectoral specialisation: the Union of Dairy 
Enterprises of Ukraine, the Union of Grain Processors, the Ukrainian Grain 
Association, the Ukroliyarpom Association, the National Association of 
Meat Product Manufacturers of Ukraine and the National Association of 
Sugar Producers of Ukraine, etc. 
The second group includes representatives of service providers and 
suppliers of inputs: the Association of Agricultural Equipment Producers, the 
Association of Insurers in the Agrarian Sector of Ukraine, the Ukrainian 
Association of Seed Producers and Distributors, the Ukrainian Association 
of Plant Protection and the Union of Ukrainian Breeders, etc. 
The third group includes associations by form of economic management 
and ownership in agriculture: the Association of Farmers and Private Land 
Owners of Ukraine, the All-Ukrainian Association of Lessors, the All-
Ukrainian Public Organisation ‘Council of Female Farmers of Ukraine’, the 
All-Ukrainian Union of Agricultural Enterprises, the National Union of 






Ukraine is a major player in the world steel industry, yet one that has been 
largely kept out of the EU market so far. It therefore merits special attention 
in this study. The basic economics of the Ukrainian steel industry have 
been analysed well in a recent World Bank study on Ukraine’s trade policy. 
The outstanding issues are those of clarifying the extent of possible trade 
expansion as and when quota restrictions might be lifted, and the policy 
options that Ukraine may negotiate in the framework of its WTO 
membership.  
1.  Overview of the steel sector 
Steel has been the leading growth sector in the recovery of the Ukrainian 
economy over the last five years. In 2004 the sector accounted for 27% of 
the country’s industrial output. Of the 33 Mt of rolled steel production in 
2004, 26 Mt were exported, which amounts to 7.5% of the world steel trade. 
Ukraine entered the world steel markets in 1992 to compensate for the fall 
in domestic demand. The competitiveness of Ukrainian steel was the result 
of available iron ore and coking coal deposits, a favourable location and 
competitive energy supplies and labour costs. From 1994 to 2004 steel 
exports more than doubled and Ukraine became the third largest exporter 
of steel in the world. 
Currently, semi-finished steel products take up around a quarter or 
more of Ukraine’s metal product mix.1 Yet the low value added of 
Ukrainian steel exports is compensated by the robust external demand for 
the semi-finished products, given the dominance of mini-mills across the 
world and the aim of developed countries to outsource environmentally 
unfriendly stages of the production process. (The low presence of mini-
                                                      
∗ This annex was prepared by Ildar Gazizullin.  
1 In 2004 the share of semi-finished steel products in Ukrainian exports was 32%, 
down from 47% in 1999. The world’s average share of this production is 12-15%. 
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mills in Ukraine is explained by the former USSR’s concentration on 
integrated mills, with almost no investment made in mini-mills there).2 
Ukrainian steel exports surged in 2002-04 when the world prices for 
this commodity increased dramatically. Steel export revenues3 in 2004 grew 
by 60% to $10.76 billion, accounting for one-third of all merchandise 
exports. Countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East account for the lion’s 
share of the exports, while the access of the finished steel products to the 
markets of the EU and the US is restricted by quotas and duties. In 2004, 
half of the rolled steel exports went to Asian countries, with only 10.1% 
(2.59 Mt) to the EU and another 6.6% to other European non-members of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. The noticeable 
slowdown in export activity in the first half of 2005 was in part the result of 
a drastic reduction (by 76% from January to June 2005) in the exports of 
Ukrainian steel to China, since that country has changed into a net exporter 
of metals. Despite this, Ukraine’s steel exports continue to grow, given high 
world steel prices and a well-diversified exports structure.4 
2. Sector  restructuring 
The dramatic fall in production in 1990-95 was not matched by an adequate 
reduction in employment or by any significant shut down of capacity. This 
resulted in an average capacity utilisation of about 50% in the mid-1990s. 
The industry enjoyed the soft budget constraints. By 1998 the enterprises 
were burdened with debts and making losses. The impact of the 
unfavourable situation in the world markets and a series of anti-dumping 
investigations became significant. To remedy the situation, in 1999 the 
                                                      
2 The development of mini-mills was not a priority for the former USSR as the 
country had abundant resources of the ore, coal and natural gas needed to power 
the integrated mills and capacity satisfied the internal demand. The presence of 
very few mini-mills explains most of the capital productivity gap between the CIS 
and other countries and the low share of high value-added products in the product 
mix, especially coated sheets and specialty products. See the McKinsey Global 
Institute, Unlocking economic growth in Russia, Washington, D.C., 1999. 
3 These relate only to revenues for Code 72 projects. 
4 In January-September 2005 the structure of the metallurgy exports (in tonnes) 
from Ukraine was the following: Middle East (22.4%), the EU-25 (15.4%), other 
Europe (5.2%), Asia (19.2%), Turkey (11.7%), the CIS (12.9%), Africa (9.8%) and the 
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government launched an ‘economic experiment’ in the sector, entailing 
debt restructuring, loans and reduced taxes. The experiment ended in 2002 
as the financial standing of the enterprises had improved and world steel 
prices started to pick up.5 
Indirect subsidies to the steel sector are of limited scope and are 
decreasing. A major benefit to the metalworking sector has consisted of 
subsidies to the coal industry and the resulting low prices for coking coal. 
State aid to the coal sector is decreasing, however, as the private sector is 
becoming dominant in coke mining and in the by-product coke industry. 
The government intends to completely stop subsidies to the private mines, 
which will reduce instances of transfer pricing.  
Government intervention in the steel sector sought to protect the 
internal market, but for the most part was not effective. For instance, to 
soften the effect of the rapidly rising domestic prices for iron ore and steel 
and resulting shortages of resources in 2003-04, the government undertook 
the following actions and policies: administering the assignment of the 
resources among the enterprises; introducing temporary price controls in 
the metals sector;6 imposing a €30/tonne export duty on ferrous scrap and 
the licensing of the iron ore exports. The first two initiatives were largely 
ignored, as about 93% of the industry is in private hands and the 
government does not have much leverage on the industry participants.  
The steel industry has been privatised to domestic investors, with 
foreign companies largely kept out at first. Four Ukrainian financial–
industrial groups (FIGs) own the key companies in the industry and also 
control the assets connected with the steel sector – the ore-mining and 
                                                      
5 During the time of the experiment, the profits of the 10 major enterprises in the 
sect o r m o re t h an  do ub led . Bart er o p er at io n s a lo n g w it h  w age a n d deb t  arrears 
were significantly reduced while the tax payments increased. For an economic 
analysis of the experiment, see World Bank (2004c), op. cit. 
6 Cabinet Instruction No. 179-r of 26 March 2004 set volumes for metal product 
deliveries to the domestic market at 1 January 2004 prices for a number of sectors, 
including machine-building and piping companies, as well as for deliveries of 
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enrichment plants and by-product coke plants.7 Western investors were 
represented by the ISTIL mini-mill, which only has a 1.2 Mt capacity. 
The 2004 sale of a 93% stake in Kryvorizhstal, Ukraine’s largest steel 
works was the most substantial privatisation transaction ($0.8 billion) in the 
history of modern Ukraine. Yet the privatisation was not carried out to 
benefit society in the long run, but to serve the short-term interests of those 
in power and certain oligarchs by redistributing property.8 Given the 
favourable situation on steel markets and the plant’s launch of profitable 
performance and investment programmes, a company like this could have 
been sold for a much higher price. Instead, a speedy sale before an election 
meant that the privatisation revenues could go mostly to increasing social 
outlays rather than to investing. The conditions of the tender largely 
predetermined the winner, which is why foreign participants complained 
about them as being clearly unfair. This kind of treatment negatively 
affected Ukraine’s investment image. 
Nevertheless, the Orange Revolution has arguably begun to bring 
this ‘insider economy’ system of Ukraine to an end. In August 2005, the 
state property fund announced a tender for the repeat sale of Kryvorizhstal, 
with a starting price of $2 billion.9 As the result of fair tender and auction, 
                                                      
7 These FIGs are: 1) ZAT System Capital Management (the AzovStal steel works, 
the Enakeevo steel mill, the Khartsysky pipe mill and 56% of Kryvorizhstal); 2) the 
Industrial Union of Donbass (the Alchevsk steel works, the Dzerzhinsky steel mill 
and the Lenisnky pipe mill); 3) Interpipe Corporation (44% of Kryvorizhstal, the 
Nikopol ferroalloys plant, the Nizhnedneprovsky pipe plant, the Novo-Moskovsky 
pipe plant and the Nikopol seamless pipe mill); and 4) Privat Holding (the 
Petrovka steel mill, the Zaporizhzhe ferroalloys plant and the Stakhanov 
ferroalloys plant). 
8  The winner of the tender was Investytsiyniy Metalurgiyniy Soyuz [Steel 
Investment Union], an industrial and financial consortium that includes: 1) the 
Interpipe Corporation (Viktor Pinchuk) and the affiliated Nyzhniodniprovsk 
Piping, Bipe, a Ukrainian-Cypriot company, Kredyt-Dnipro Bank, and Aura, an 
insurance company; 2) ZAT UkrInvest, a shareholder in UkrSibBank; and 3) 
AzovStal, a Mariupol-based steel works, Avdiyivka Coking Plant, MarkoKhim 
Coking Facility – all controlled by ZAT System Capital Management (Donetsk-
based Rynat Akhmetov). 
9 It is likely, however, that further revisiting of privatisation tenders will stop with 
the dismissal of the Tymoshenko government, as ex-Premier Yulia Tymoshenko 
largely initiated all revisions. 154 | ANNEX 2. STEEL 
the winner, the world’s largest steel producing group Mittal Steel,10 paid 
$4.84 billion for the company. 
The oligarchs’ influence in securing state protectionism in certain 
sectors is thus being reduced. This trend can also be seen with regard to 
another problem, namely the notoriously low degree of financial 
transparency of the steel industry. Ukraine’s FIGs were actively practicing 
transfer pricing and showed very little if any taxable profits. A recent 
tendency for more financial openness is driven by both an increased 
pressure from the new government and active attempts of the major FIGs 
themselves to improve their access to international capital markets and 
increase the capitalisation of their assets. Initial public offerings still have a 
long way to go in the steel industry, but they have certainly become an 
objective for some companies.  
3.  EU–Ukrainian trade policy in steel 
In spite of various trade restrictions, steel is an important commodity in 
EU–Ukrainian trade. In 2004 Ukraine exported 2.6 Mt of rolled steel ($1.91 
billion) to the EU, with steel replacing energy as the largest export 
commodity.11 Ukraine is among the top three steel exporters to the EU,12 
with Italy, Germany and the Netherlands being the major importers of 
Ukrainian steel in 2004. The key steel products imported by the EU include 
semi-finished steel products, hot rolled coil, wire rod, galvanised sheet, hot 
rolled plates and cold rolled sheet. Figures for the EU’s steel imports in 
                                                      
10 Other main bidders at the tender were the consortium of Arcelor SA and the 
Industrial Union of Donbass, and the Ukrainian Smart Group. 
11 In 2003, iron and steel accounted for 15.2% of merchandise exports, while energy 
led with a 22.2% share of Ukraine’s exports to the EU. 
12 In the first four months of 2005 the EU-25’s key import sources included Russia 
(2.2 Mt), Turkey (1.2 Mt), Ukraine (1.1 Mt), China (0.9 Mt), India (0.6 Mt) and Brazil 
(0.5 Mt). In the first half of 2005, Germany’s largest supplier outside of the EU was 
Russia, supplying 5% of the total, followed by Mexico, Romania, Ukraine and 
Brazil. Italy’s major suppliers were Russia and the Ukraine, both supplying 9% 
each, followed by China (7%), Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania (see ISSB Ltd, at 
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2005 indicate that those from Ukraine further increased, especially semi-
finished steel products that face no quantitative trade restrictions.13 
The trade of steel between the EU and Ukraine is restricted by the 
EU’s steel quota system and anti-dumping duties.14 In 1996-2002 the quota 
amounted to an average of 250,000 tonnes for certain steel categories.15 In 
addition, the EU maintains anti-dumping duties in the range of 38-52% 
against a number of steel products in Ukraine, such as seamless and 
welded pipes, steel cables and wires. Import tariffs for the metals are 
hardly restrictive to trade, reaching on average 2.6% in the EU16 and 4% in 
Ukraine.  
In 2001 the EU and Ukraine reached an agreement for 2002-04 that 
anticipated an increase of quotas by 35% to 355,000 tonnes, provided 
Ukraine eliminated restrictions on the ferrous scrap exports to the EU. The 
EU did not sign the agreement because of the dilatory VAT refunds to the 
ferrous scrap exporters in Ukraine. After Ukraine introduced an export 
duty on ferrous scrap, the EU retaliated by reducing the steel quota in 2003 
by 30%. The impact of the fixed €30 export duty has diminished, however, 
as the scrap prices reached $220-230 by the end of 2004. Exports of scrap to 
the EU have also been channelled through Moldova, which has an FTA 
with Ukraine. 
                                                      
13 Imports by the EU-25 in the first six months of 2005 increased by 33% to 16.3 Mt. 
The EU-25 has been a net importer of steel since August 2004, although in June 
2005 imports fell significantly, making it a net exporter. In both Germany and Italy, 
the major steel-importing countries, about half the increase were in slabs, blooms 
and billets (see World Steel Review, September 2005 retrieved from 
http://www.steelonthenet.com/production.html). 
14 In the early 1990s, the former USSR countries became major exporters of metals, 
which created a supply shock in the world markets. In response, the EU imposed 
trade barriers against imports of steel from Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine.  
15 The quota covers about 20% of all Ukraine’s exports of metal products to the EU. 
These are hot-rolled coils (SA1), heavy plate (SA2), other flat-rolled products (SA3), 
beams (SB1), wire rod (SB2) and other long products (SB3). Detailed information 
on the quota volumes is provided by the on-line source, SIGL (at 
http://sigl.cec.eu.int/querysteel.html). 
16 All tariffs were expected to disappear in 2004 in line with the EU’s commitments 
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The expansion of the EU in 2004 had mixed results for Ukraine’s 
exports of steel. As a result of negotiations to ease the negative impact of 
EU expansion, some anti-dumping probes17 have been postponed and the 
quota for metal products to the EU-25 was set at 606,800 tonnes in 2004. 
This figure was not the increase Ukrainian producers had expected, since in 
2003 Ukraine exported nearly 800,000 tonnes of metal products to the EU-
10 alone. On the other hand, the import tariffs for steel have decreased, e.g. 
from 10% (in Poland) to 2.6%18 in the EU.  
The import quotas in 1997-2004 were used by the Ukrainian side by 
an average of 60%. This level is explained by low demand in the EU for 
some of the steel categories and problems with licensing and distribution in 
Ukraine. Since the quotas are given directly to the firms (and not to the 
traders), large transaction costs make it unattractive for the metalwork’s’ 
management to negotiate small steel export volumes with EU buyers.  
In March 2005, the EU and Ukraine reached an agreement that the 
quota for 2005 will be increased to 980,000 and 1,004,500 tonnes in 2005 and 
2006 respectively. The agreement also stipulates that the quotas could be 
increased for the Ukrainian companies that open new steel wholesale 
centres in the EU. 
The quota system will be cancelled when Ukraine becomes a WTO 
member, which is expected in 2006. Other issues such as the anti-dumping 
investigations and EU concerns with regard to the dubious accounting 
standards, state-interference in pricing in the metal sector and non-
operating bankruptcy laws have yet to be dealt with by Ukraine.  
4. EU–Ukrainian  trade  outlook 
The trade in steel between the EU and Ukraine has great potential for 
growth as Ukraine joins the WTO. Total steel imports from Ukraine could 
more than double to 6 Mt or 4% of the EU market. As the quotas are 
removed, the exports of flat-rolled and long products might grow threefold 
                                                      
17 After joining the EU, new member states were supposed to automatically launch 
the same anti-dumping probes against Ukraine that had earlier been initiated by 
the EU-15. As a result of negotiations, three probes into Ukrainian chemicals were 
postponed until May 2005. The remaining three probes into chemicals and steel 
products have been pursued in full since 1 May 2004. 
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to about 2-2.5 Mt a year. Ukraine is interested in the diversification of its 
exports to European markets from its present heavy reliance on Asian 
markets. Strong demand in the EU for semi-finished steel products will also 
drive up exports of slabs, blooms and billets. Despite a recent increase in 
the share of the high value-added steel products in Ukraine’s exports, the 
share of semis will continue to be significant in the country’s exports in the 
next 5–10 years, given the current structure Ukrainian steel production 
capacities and the expected strong demand for semis in the EU. 
Ukraine will, however, face strong competition from both EU 
companies and other major exporters to the EU market. The EU steel 
industry has obvious technological advantages and better access to the 
large European buyers of steel. Moreover, the EU will intensify its efforts to 
achieve fair competition or a level playing field at a time when trade 
liberalisation will enable Ukrainian firms to fully utilise their cost 
advantages over their EU counterparts. It is very likely that the anti-
dumping investigations against certain Ukrainian steel products (e.g. 
pipes) will continue and possible cases of indirect state aid (e.g. to support 
unprofitable production capacities) will be carefully monitored;19 These 
issues will compel the Ukraine’s government to liberalise the steel industry. 
Integration of the EU and Ukrainian steel companies would be 
beneficial to both. The metal works in the accession countries have 
traditionally been relying on Ukrainian supplies of iron ore, coke and semi-
finished steel. The outsourcing of production and some high value-added 
products to the CIS, in particular to Ukraine, is being considered by some 
                                                      
19 Since the expiry of the ECSC Treaty in 2002, the general EC state aid rules apply 
to the steel sector. Yet instead of these EC restructuring guidelines, the 
Commission issued a Communication on rescue and restructuring aid and closure 
for the steel sector (OJ C 70/21 of 19.3.2002), which stipulates that such aid is not 
permitted. Only closure aid, as an exception from the prohibition to grant 
restructuring aid, is exceptionally allowed. Such closure aid may be used to help 
redundant employees who are laid off or to support companies in the closure of 
their facilities. But the latter is only acceptable if the entire legal entity is closed (see 
M. Lienemeyer, “State aid for restructuring the steel industry in the new member 
states”, Competition Policy Newsletter, No. 1, spring, 2005). 158 | ANNEX 2. STEEL 
of the European steel-makers.20 Ukrainian companies are already actively 
acquiring mills and steel traders in the EU to overcome current trade 
restrictions and expand the customer base.21 
Ukraine will also face fierce competition both from the traditional 
exporters to the EU (Turkey and Russia) and some emerging ones, such as 
China and India. Russia is currently the main competitor to Ukraine in the 
EU market. Russian companies have the following advantages over 
Ukrainian ones: 1) lower energy prices; 2) more up-to-date steel production 
capacity; 3) greater political leverage on EU policy; and 4) common steel 
production projects between EU and Russian companies. Russia’s major 
disadvantages, however, are: 1) greater transportation costs; 2) the 
likelihood of later accession to the WTO; and 3) more conspicuous state 
support for steel expansion.22 Another major exporter of steel to the EU, 
Turkey, is very closely integrated with the EU. Turkish steel companies and 
their national association are associate members of Eurofer. But the fact that 
Turkey is the largest importer of ferrous scrap in the world makes it a high-
cost producer.23 Therefore, unless Ukraine takes steps to compete more 
effectively with both low cost and high-tech steel-makers, it will not be able 
 
                                                      
20 In 2005, Arcelor announced its plans to move some of its production to the low-
cost countries, in particular to the CIS. At present, the company has a common 
production project with the Russian Severstal Group. The partnership formed by 
Arcelor and the Industrial Union of Donbass to tender for Kryvorizhstal during its 
privatisation may signal future expansion of EU–Ukrainian cooperation in steel 
production and trade. 
21 This issue is a relevant issue for the Ukrainian manufacturers as the semi-
finished products often cannot be sold directly to end-users because they require 
further processing. 
22 A 2005 OECD report on steel capacity expansion claims that Russian producers 
benefit from domestic scrap prices that are below Russian export prices and world 
market prices. Since 1999, Russia has imposed a tax of 15% (currently – 12%), with 
a minimum tax of €15/tonne, on exports of ferrous scrap. Russia also retains high 
levels of government subsidisation for energy and electricity. See OECD, Capacity 
Expansion in the Global Steel Industry, Report from the OECD Special Meeting at 
High-Level on Steel Issues, “The Outlook for Steel”, held in Paris on 12-13 January 
2005. 
23 Being Ukraine’s major importer of ferrous scrap, Turkey was most interested in 
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to increase its share of the European market and in the medium run could 
even lose some of its share to China, which is both a low-cost and high-tech 
steel-maker.  
5.  Overall outlook for the Ukrainian steel industry 
In 2004, Ukraine’s steel industry reached one of highest levels of capacity 
utilisation – 95.4%, up from 52.1% in 1998. A major reduction of inefficient 
steel production capacity – from 47 to 40.9 Mt – was achieved in 1998-2000. 
As world prices started to rise in 2003, firms responded with higher 
existing capacity utilisation and some investment into new capacity (1.5 
Mt). Capital investment was insufficient over the period, however, with the 
depreciation of the steel-making investments reaching 60-70%.  
It very likely that the steel industry will pursue better utilisation of 
the existing steel-making capacity rather than its expansion. Replacing the 
outdated capacity to increase its efficiency will become a main goal of 
investment, given the expected fall in world prices after 2008 and rapidly 
rising domestic transportation and energy costs.  
State plans for the steel sector’s development do not envisage any 
significant capacity expansion or reduction.24 The output of crude steel for 
2011 is expected to reach 40 Mt, 1 Mt above the 2004 figure. The share of the 
domestic market for steel is expected to increase twofold to almost 40% of 
total production. The government’s policy objectives for the steel sector are 
to close down excessive and inefficient capacities and introduce modern 
and environmentally friendly technologies. In the coming five to six years 
the mining and metalworking sectors are forecast to attract $10 billion, 
most of it coming from the private sector.  
Private sector investment and development plans seem to fit well 
with the state’s intentions of modernising the sector assets. Fixed 
investment in the steel sector in 2004 grew by 43% to $620 million. Despite 
the government’s decision to revise certain privatisations, thus reducing 
incentives for investment in related companies, the growth of investment in 
the steel sector during January-June 2005 stood high at 56%. The total 
volume of announced investment in the metalworking sector is estimated 
                                                      
24 See the 28 July 2004 Cabinet Resolution, “On the State programme for 
developing and reforming the mining and metalworking for the period until 2011”, 
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to be $6 billion for 2005-08.25 Yet typical investment projects only 
encompass the modernisation of the existing capacity and the rehabilitation 
of open-hearth production, and green field projects tend to be rare.26 Hence 
Ukraine’s steel industry attracts less investment per tonne of steel 
produced than Russia or EU countries.  
Moderate local investment plans are compensated by an active global 
expansion of Ukrainian companies. Ukrainian FIGs own four 
metalworks/mills and a number of wholesale and retail metal traders in 
Europe (in Hungary, Italy, Poland and Switzerland).  
6.  Steel and the environment 
Ukraine dramatically cut the volume of its environmental pollution after 
1990, because of the economic recession. But with the recovery in 2000-04, 
its pollution performance deteriorated again, although the current level of 
emissions remains well below the 1990 level.27 The steel industry is the 
second largest air polluter in the country, responsible for 28% of all air 
pollution.  
The current policy regarding harmful emissions does not encourage 
the reduction of pollution in Ukraine, since fines and fees for polluting 
above the established limits are financially insignificant for businesses. For 
example, the total amount of ecological payments owed by the steel 
industry in 2003 was a mere $13 million. Further, the proportion of 
environmental fines levied against polluters in the country that were 
actually paid into the budget fund was well under 100%. Emission 
reductions are achieved mainly as a result of the current trend in the steel 
                                                      
25 See the interview of Mr V. Grishchenko, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Industrial 
Policy, in the Interfax-Ukraine newswire of 29 September 2005. 
26 A number of such projects were announced by some domestic investors. One 
example is a company in the ferrous scrap business that intends to build a 2 Mt 
capacity, electric arc furnace steel mill in 2006-07. 
27 The inflow of hazardous substances into the atmosphere from stationary sources 
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industry towards increasing capital investment.28 The improvements are 
not dramatic though, as open-hearth furnace technology still dominates the 
industry technology mix.29  
Meanwhile, the environmental burden on the EU’s steel industry is 
increasing. EU member states each have differentiated targets that 
collectively amount to an 8% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions over 
period 2008-12 compared with 1990. Eurofer claims that the reduction of 
CO2 emissions can be achieved only by reducing production, given that 
actual CO2 emissions in the industry are almost down to the theoretical 
limit  and the margin for future improvement is small for technological and 
economic reasons.30  
The international trading of emissions therefore provides promising 
opportunities for both the EU and Ukraine, in particular under the Kyoto 
Protocol.31 According to the Kyoto Protocol, participating countries have 
the right to trade quotas for greenhouse gas emissions and to carry out joint 
projects to reduce such emissions. Ukraine can use both options: its current 
emissions are below the norm, set at the 1990 level, while the inefficiency of 
its economy (particularly its steel industry), makes investment into state-of-
the-art, energy-saving technologies profitable. EU steel companies could 
thus use Ukraine’s untapped potential to meet the emission targets using 
                                                      
28 According to MetalurgProm, a production association, the proportion of 
environmental costs in the gross investment made in metalworks and steel plants 
more than doubled, from 6% in 2003 to 15% in the first half of 2004 (see the 
Interfax-Ukraine newswire of 15 October 2004). While in the overall economic 
investment in environmental projects increased by 2.3 times during 2000-03, its 
share of all capital investments remained unchanged at 1.4-1.7%.  
29 Ukraine has the largest share of the open-hearth production of steel in the world 
– 43.4% compared with the world’s 3.2% (figures derived from the IISI). 
30 See J.-P. Debruxelles, “The Greenhouse Gas Challenge: How the EU Steel 
Industry Competitiveness Could be Affected”, Presentation at the OECD Special 
Meeting at High-Level on Steel Issues: “The Outlook for Steel” held in Paris, 12-13 
January 2005. 
31 In 2005, the Kyoto Protocol came into force, which Ukraine signed on 23 
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the Kyoto Protocol’s project-based mechanisms.32 The gap between the 
Kyoto target for Ukraine and the current levels also allows a moderate 
outsourcing of steel-producing capacity to Ukraine.33   
A number of factors hinder the cooperation of the EU and Ukraine in 
the environmental sphere. Unlike the EU, Ukraine does not have a 
domestic emissions trading programme and therefore lacks the 
institutional and technical means to introduce and utilise the necessary 
instruments. Moreover, until recently, the international carbon trade 
market was not yet functioning. With the Kyoto Protocol coming into force, 
active emissions trading is expected to take place in 2007-08. In general, EU 
member countries are interested in investing in Ukraine to benefit from the 
Kyoto mechanisms, with electricity generation for the moment as one of the 
priority areas.  
 
                                                      
32 The Council of Ministers and the European Parliament agreed (in April 2004) on 
a text for the EU Directive (2004/101/EC) Linking Joint Implementation and the 
Clean Development Mechanism, which will allow entities covered by the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme to use emission units from the Kyoto Protocol’s project-
based mechanisms towards meeting their emissions targets. The use of the 
mechanisms is to be supplemental to domestic action, in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakech Accords. The EU 
Directive does not include recognition of assigned amount units (i.e. governments’ 
overall emissions allocation under the Kyoto Protocol). (See J. Newman, Policies to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions in industry: Implications for steel, Paper presented at 
the OECD Special Meeting at High-Level on Steel Issues, “The Outlook for Steel” 
held in Paris on 12-13 January 2005.) 
33 As Newman (2005, ibid.) notes, the EU countries could, “along with energy taxes 
and related measures, create incentives for producers to source increasing 
quantities of semi-finished steel (i.e., slabs and billets) from countries which are not 
taking aggressive measures to limit GHG emissions. They could alter the market 
for semi-finished products, and would effectively shift emissions to the semi-
finished steel exporting areas.”   
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1.  Banking and financial services 
1.1 Banking 
Even though Ukraine’s financial sector is very much bank-dominated, its 
banks remain small by international standards. All of the 156 licensed 
banks together have less than €20 billion in assets – the equivalent of a 
small bank in the EU.1 Ukraine’s 10 largest banks account for about 60% of 
total assets, while many of the smaller banks remain ‘pocket banks’ of 
enterprise groups and are too small to survive on their own. The positive 
implication of the low banking penetration of the economy, however, is an 
enormous growth potential that makes the Ukrainian market attractive for 
multinational banks. For instance, the credit-to-GDP ratio was only 30% in 
late 2004, even though it had already doubled since 2000. The ratio of 
mortgage credits to GDP is less than 1%, compared with 40-60% in more 
developed economies. The same holds for credit card ownership, consumer 
credit, etc.  
In the Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEECs) that have 
acceded to the EU, international banks play a critical role in the 
modernisation of the banking sector. They have brought foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to recapitalise banks and expand their operations, 
introduced modern management and technology to improve efficiency, 
and rolled out new financial products such as mortgages and leasing. In 
Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, for instance, multinational 
banks now own over 80% of banking assets and they compete fiercely to 
the benefit of the host countries. A handful of major European banks own 
                                                      
∗ This annex was prepared by Daniel Müller-Jentsch. 
1 According to the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU), banking sector assets in 
Ukraine have grown from the equivalent of 20% of GDP in 1999 to 43% of GDP in 
2003. (See World Bank, A Strategy for Modernising Ukraine, Washington, D.C., 
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subsidiaries across the CEECs (e.g. Bank Austria or Societé Générale) and 
they are driving the process of regional integration in this sector.2  
The most promising strategy for Ukraine to develop its financial 
services industry and to integrate it more deeply with that of the EU would 
be to attract some of these regional players. The easiest way to do so would 
be to privatise the remaining state-owned banks and to increase regulatory 
pressure regarding the separation of banking from non-banking activities. 
Currently, most major banks are owned by oligarchs and are integrated 
into the financial–industrial groups (FIGs) that control large segments of 
the economy. An important regulatory instrument in this regard will be the 
proposed law on banks and banking, which will make related-party 
lending much more difficult.3 It is a precondition for WTO accession, but its 
adoption has been obstructed for several years. 
Until recently, the presence of Western banks in Ukraine was limited 
to small operations serving corporate clients. The first substantial entry of a 
major EU bank came in August 2005, when Austria’s Raiffeisen 
International bought 94% of Aval Bank for over €500 million. This move 
gives Raiffeisen over 12% of the market share, as Aval is Ukraine’s second 
largest bank with 18,000 employees, 1,400 branches and net assets of UAH 
14.8 billion.4 The IMF estimates that this takeover will bring the percentage 
of foreign ownership in Ukrainian banking from the low teens to the mid-
20% range in terms of net assets. 
                                                      
2 The largest regional player is Italy’s Unicredit (including subsidiaries Hypo-
Vereinsbank and Bank Austria-Creditanstalt) with 2,300 branches and 48,000 
employees in a dozen CEECs. The other main players are Austria’s Erste Bank, 
Belgium’s KBC Group and Austria’s Raiffeisen International (see Financial Times 
Deutschland, 13 June 2005). 
3 As banking crises in Turkey and other countries have shown, related-party 
lending poses a major threat to the stability of the financial sector and thus its 
prevention is an important part of prudential regulation. The main practical 
problem in enforcing related-party lending restrictions is the need to reveal the 
ultimate ownership of the banks and their clients – a severe problem in a country 
with FIGs and non-transparent business practices. Ukraine’s legislation on related-
party lending is fine, but legislation on ownership transparency still needs to be 
passed.  
4 The bank serves 3 million private and 210,000 corporate clients (Financial Times 
Deutschland, 22 August 2005). Raiffeisen International plans to combine Aval 
together with a small existing operation, and to buy out the minority shareholders. THE PROSPECT OF DEEP FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE| 165 
In December 2005, BNP Paribas announced the purchase of a 51% 
stake in Ukrsibbank for an undisclosed price. With 760 branches, a market 
share of 5% and UAH 7.6 billion in net assets, Ukrsibbank is the fourth 
largest player in the market. The current owners are businessmen 
Alexander Yaroslavsky and Ernest Galiev, who were close to the previous 
government. They plan to retain their remaining shares, but are granting 
the buyer the option to expand its stake to 60% at a later stage. In addition, 
several international banks were also said to explore a possible purchase of 
Ukrsotsbank – Ukraine’s third largest bank with net assets of UAH 9.2 
billion. The majority owner of Ukrsotsbank is tycoon Viktor Pinchuk, the 
son-in-law of former President Leonid Kuchma. If those takeovers actually 
materialise, this could mark the exit of some notorious oligarchs from 
Ukraine’s banking sector. The country’s largest bank, Privatbank, with net 
assets of $18.4 billion, is also owned by tycoons.5  
Less than 20% of Ukraine’s banking sector remains government 
owned. The main public bank is the savings bank,  Oschadbank.6 With 
40,000 staff, it accounts for almost half of Ukraine’s banking sector 
employees and controls more than half of the market for individual 
deposits. Its large network of 530 branches with several million clients 
covers the entire country and constitutes a potentially attractive asset. 
Oschadbank has been in need of some significant restructuring, however, 
and received technical assistance from the World Bank. The sale of 
Oschadbank to an international strategic investor would considerably 
increase the share of foreign ownership in the market. In mid-2005, Erste 
Bank of Austria expressed its interest in Oschadbank and met with 
government officials to explore options.  
                                                      
5 The three owners are the Dnipropetrovsk-based Ihor Kolomojsky, Hennady 
Bogolubov and Oleksy Martynov (Wall Street Journal, 8 September 2005). 
According to the annual ranking of Eastern Europe’s richest persons by the Polish 
business weekly Wprost, Mr Kolomojsky had a net worth of $2.8 billion, Mr 
Pinchuk $1.5 billion and Mr Yaroslavsky $650 million. Businessman Fedir Shpig, 
who sold his controlling stake in Aval to Raiffeisen International, was valued at 
$800 million. 
6 The second state-owned bank is the export-import bank of Ukraine, 
UkrEximBank, with 29 branches and 2,900 employees. UkrEximBank provides 
trade-related banking products and handles intergovernmental credit lines. It has 
31,000 corporate and 91,000 individual clients. 166 | ANNEX 3. SERVICE SECTORS 
A key benefit of FDI in the financial sector is that it helps to import 
better regulation and corporate governance – as long as the foreign bank 
comes from well-regulated countries. The reason is that foreign banks are 
being supervised by their home regulators. This feature could provide an 
important external anchor for the development of a sound financial sector 
in Ukraine. Better corporate governance in financial services would also 
spill over into the rest of the economy, as private banks will demand high 
levels of transparency and good corporate governance from their clients as 
a means to reduce their own lending risks.  
The regulatory framework and the prudential regulation exercised by 
the central bank  (National Bank of Ukraine or NBU) are generally 
considered sound. Compliance with Basel capital ratio requirements is 
reasonably good and overall the financial system appears stable. As part of 
their joint Financial Sector Assessment Programme, the World Bank and 
the IMF analysed the structure and stability of Ukraine’s financial sector in 
2003. The IMF continues to provide advice and technical assistance to the 
NBU. As part of its assistance to Ukraine, the EU should fund a twinning 
arrangement with counterpart institutions in a recent accession country for 
both the NBU and for the financial market regulator (as discussed below).  
As far as trade liberalisation  is concerned, market access to the 
banking sector is largely open to foreign players and Ukraine’s GATS 
proposal in this area is very liberal. The main restriction is that foreign 
banks can only operate through subsidiaries (supervised by the Ukrainian 
regulator) and not through branches (supervised by the home regulator). 
Nevertheless, this does not create any major constraints for the industry.7 
Overall, there appears little need for additional liberalisation measures as 
part of an EU–Ukraine FTA.  
1.2 Financial markets 
Non-banking financial services, including securities and insurance, are at a 
very early stage of development and total assets in these sub-sectors are 
                                                      
7 In practical terms, a more binding constraint for market access thus far has been 
the fact that most Ukrainian banks are controlled by local oligarchs. After all, the 
way to enter a market is normally through the purchase of an existing bank, since 
the establishment of a country-wide network from scratch tends to be very 
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equivalent to around 5% of the assets in the rather small banking sub-sector 
(this figure includes a small third pillar of the pension system).  
Given the critical importance of modern capital markets for cross-
border investment flows, comprehensive reforms in this area will be 
required for deeper integration between the EU and Ukraine. But Ukraine’s 
capital markets remain illiquid and shallow. According to the IMF, total 
stock market capitalisation is equivalent to a mere 20% of GDP. With 
several licensed stock exchanges but very few listed companies, Ukraine’s 
securities markets are in need of consolidation. It is estimated that more 
than 90% of securities-related deals are settled outside the trading floor and 
the regulator is lobbying for legislation that would require trades to be 
conducted through the exchange. Two measures that could help to develop 
financial markets are the new Pension Law of 2004 (which will encourage 
the establishment of pension funds) and the framework Law on Mutual 
Funds of 2001. The State Securities and Stock Market Commission, which 
regulates the industry, is a young and relatively immature institution. The 
recent replacement of its head is hoped to improve matters, but significant 
capacity-building will be needed in the future.  
Severe constraints on the development of securities markets are the 
low levels of transparency and poor standards of corporate governance. 
This is not only a hindrance to the development of financial markets, but 
also a major deterrent for foreign investment. Investors often simply do not 
know what they are buying into or how to control their interests. A key 
priority in that context is the protection of minority shareholders. To 
address these problems, the Ukrainian government needs to adopt the joint 
stock company law that has been under discussion for several years and it 
needs to ensure greater transparency and the rule of law.  
In the development of its financial markets, Ukraine could also 
benefit from the activities of EU companies that are expanding their 
activities across the CEECs. An example is the Vienna stock exchange, 
which is in the process of establishing a regional network. In 2004, it 
bought 68% of the Budapest stock exchange and it plans to bid for the 
Warsaw stock exchange, which is to be privatised in 2006. Negotiations 
have also been launched to draw the Czech, Slovak and Slovenian 
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would retain a high degree of autonomy.8 In the medium term, the 
participation of the Ukrainian stock exchange in this network should be 
considered as a means to transfer know-how and to help develop Ukraine’s 
limited financial markets.  
Two key donors supporting financial sector development are the 
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World 
Bank. As in other countries of the region, the EBRD is playing an important 
role in the development of the Ukrainian financial sector. Its projects to 
date include several credit lines to small and medium enterprises, the 
establishment of a venture capital fund and a credit line for mortgage 
lending. The EBRD is trying to extend its credit lines through local banks to 
help them build capacity and develop new financial instruments. The EU 
institutions, which have a good working relationship with the EBRD, 
should encourage the latter to expand its financial sector activities in 
Ukraine, possibly including equity participation in local banks or 
privatisation assistance to the government. The World Bank has provided 
technical assistance to the financial sector for several key pieces of financial 
legislation as part of a Sector and Structural Adjustment Loan and is 
currently helping to establish a market for mortgages, among other 
activities.9 
The only segment of the financial sector where Ukraine’s GATS 
proposal contains a significant restriction is the insurance market. For a 
five-year period after accession to the WTO, foreign insurance companies 
will be prohibited from entering the market. As part of a possible FTA, the 
EU should seek more liberal market access for its companies. As the 
domestic sector is in need of significant investment and development, this 
should also be in the interest of Ukraine. Many of the 340 insurance 
companies are owned by enterprises and mainly used as tax-saving 
vehicles. The largest formerly state-owned insurance company, Orata, was 
transferred to a group of investors that were associated with the son-in-law 
                                                      
8 See the Financial Times Deutschland, 19 January and 17 June 2005. On a global 
scale, all these stock exchanges are very small. All CEEC exchanges together 
(including Vienna) have a market capitalisation of only €200 billion – about a third 
of Germany’s 30 largest quoted companies. Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia could 
also become part of the regional network.  
9 See World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy for Ukraine for 2004-07, Washington, 
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of former President Leonid Kuchma through a dirty privatisation deal and 
there have been some rumours about a possible re-privatisation. 
Ukraine’s currency, the hryvnya, is pegged against the US dollar as 
part of a fixed exchange rate regime. As the $/UAH rate has remained 
stable since mid-2001 and the euro has appreciated against the dollar, the 
hryvnya has thus depreciated against the euro and is now undervalued. If a 
fixed exchange-rate regime were to be maintained, it would be preferable 
to peg the hryvnya against a basket that reflects Ukraine’s trading patterns 
(about a third of Ukraine’s trade is with the EU). Notably, however, the 
IMF is advising the government to move towards a more flexible exchange 
rate, for which it provides technical assistance to prepare for such a move.10 
A flexible exchange rate would also facilitate trade with the EU in the 
longer term.11 
In financial services, the EU acquis does not seem an appropriate 
template for Ukraine at this stage of its development. First, the acquis in this 
sector is still evolving to a great extent and thus remains a moving target. 
Second, it is extremely complex and geared towards developed financial 
markets, instead of a banking-dominated financial services industry like 
the one in Ukraine. Third, one of the potential benefits of acquis compliance 
– simplified access for Ukrainian banks to EU markets above and beyond 
access gained through GATS – would not just require some regulatory 
convergence, but 100% compliance with all existing and future EU rules, 
acceptance of existing and future jurisprudence in this area as well as 
effective application of existing and future EU rules and jurisprudence on 
competition and state aid. The reason for this is that the EU’s ‘single 
passport system’, which allows banks to open branches across the EU once 
they obtain a license in one member state, requires full compliance. Yet 
such a passport would bring few additional benefits to Ukraine. 
 
                                                      
10 The main technical challenge of the transition is that inflation will have to be 
controlled through a domestic inflation target instead of the exchange rate. For 
that, the NBU will need to upgrade its institutional capacity. 
11 The reason is that a $/UAH peg makes the €/UAH exchange rate subject to $/€ 
fluctuations. A peg of the hryvnya against the euro does not seem a plausible 
alternative, as the majority of Ukraine’s trade is denominated in dollars. 170 | ANNEX 3. SERVICE SECTORS 
2. Transport 
Transport is not only an important sector in its own right, but the efficient 
flow of goods and people is crucial for deeper integration between the EU 
and Ukraine. Current transport sector inefficiencies thus constitute an 
important non-tariff barrier. Even though a sufficient physical 
infrastructure is a necessary condition, many frictions and bottlenecks are 
policy-induced (e.g. the state ownership of airports, limited competition for 
port services and border-related red tape).12  
Despite the fact that transport services themselves constitute one of 
Ukraine’s main services exports, important aspects of the sector are 
excluded from the WTO/GATS framework.13 The investment decisions and 
policy reforms required to render regional transport flows more efficient 
thus need to be addressed through domestic policy reforms in Ukraine or 
bilaterally between the EU and Ukraine. From the perspective of deeper 
integration, the three main priorities should be: i) the negotiation of an 
open skies arrangement with a gradual inclusion of Ukraine in the EU’s 
common civil aviation area; ii) facilitation measures along major land 
corridors; and iii) a elimination of border-related frictions, with a specific 
emphasis on customs reforms.  
Currently, trade in transport services mainly takes place through 
mode 1 (cross-border supply) and mode 2 (consumption abroad). Trade 
and transport facilitation could unlock growth potential in both of these 
modes, but the main unexploited opportunity for deeper integration in the 
sector appears to be trade through mode 3 (commercial presence). Even if 
market access for foreign companies might not be formally prohibited, the 
natural monopoly nature of many transport facilities (e.g. ports, airports, 
                                                      
12 For a detailed review of international best practice and EU policies in the 
transport sector, see D. Müller-Jentsch, Transport Policies for the Euro-Mediterranean 
Free Trade Area – An Agenda for Multimodal Transport Reforms in the Southern 
Mediterranean, World Bank, Washington, D.C. and European Commission, 
Brussels, 2002. 
13 The reasons underlying that exclusion are that: air transport is governed by a 
separate multilateral regime (the Chicago Convention); cross-border land transport 
via road and rail mainly takes place between immediate neighbours (and is 
therefore not of much relevance for a multilateral regime); and the main policy 
issues arising in maritime transport relate to ports, which are largely considered a 
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roads and railways) and widespread state ownership imply that FDI will 
require privatisation (e.g. of port services and logistics companies) and the 
issuing of concessions (for airport terminals, container port terminals, 
major roads, etc.). 
Although EU–Ukrainian cooperation on transport should focus on a 
few priorities, cross-border transport flows are also a function of the 
general performance of Ukraine’s multimodal system. Broader domestic 
transport reforms that enhance efficiency across modes will also promote 
deeper integration. Particularly important are measures that improve the 
efficiency of modal interfaces, increase the degree of containerisation in 
general cargo (essential for modal exchanges) and promote the 
development of the third-party logistics industry (which packages different 
transport services into multimodal logistics solutions). 
A major bottleneck for transport flows between Ukraine and the EU 
are border-related frictions. The main problems are the red tape and delays 
associated with customs controls. Consequently, comprehensive customs 
reforms in Ukraine should receive priority attention in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan. Reform needs to include a 
subordination of the customs authority to the Ukrainian Ministry of 
Finance (it is currently reporting directly to the president), the 
computerisation and streamlining of procedures (there are many 
superfluous requirements), more transparency for traders and a campaign 
to root out smuggling and human trafficking.14 Juxtaposed controls 
between the border guards of Ukraine and its EU neighbours – as those 
introduced on the joint border with Poland in 2005 – are also important. As 
p a r t  o f  t h e  E U ’ s  e f f o r t  t o  s e c u r e  its external border, more technical 
assistance should be provided to Ukraine’s border guards.  
2.1 Air  transport 
Deeper integration of Ukraine’s air transport sector into the EU’s common 
civil aviation area would be a powerful catalyst for the expansion of 
                                                      
14 Customs-related corruption and smuggling are widespread. Its prevalence is 
illustrated by this example: according to an official interviewed by the mission, 
only 200,000 mobile phones were officially imported into Ukraine in a year in 
which the number of mobile phone subscriptions in the country increased by 2 
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people-to-people contacts, business travel and tourism.15 It should be 
treated as a key priority for the EU–Ukrainian partnership and seems 
feasible over the course of the next five years. In September 2005, the 
European Commission proposed to open negotiations with Ukraine 
towards that goal, but is yet to receive a negotiation mandate from EU 
member states.16 Previously, in March 2005, the Commission started 
negotiations on a common European aviation area with the Western 
Balkans (Serbia-Montenegro, Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Kosovo and 
Bosnia).17 As with the EU’s Energy Treaty, which was signed by the EU and 
south-eastern European countries and was extended to Ukraine (see the 
section on energy), so too could a common aviation area in principle be 
expanded to Ukraine. Alternatively, a bilateral agreement along similar 
lines should be negotiated.  
The core of the air transport sector – international traffic rights – is 
excluded from the WTO–GATS framework and is generally not covered by 
a free trade agreement. Instead, traffic rights are regulated by the 
multilateral Chicago Convention and by bilateral air service agreements 
(ASAs) between governments. Other key policy issues for the sector – such 
as the regulation of ground handling and airport services – remain in the 
domain of domestic policy. Because of this, there would be considerable 
value added in a regional agreement. 
While there has been an international proliferation of open skies 
agreements in recent years (i.e. ASAs with liberal market access 
provisions), the EU has the most deeply integrated air transport market of 
any group of sovereign countries in the world. The policy framework for 
the Single Market in air transport includes several key elements. On the one 
                                                      
15 In 2004, 1.5 million passengers travelled between the EU and Ukraine – a 25% 
increase within a year. 
16 The European Commission’s Communication on developing the agenda for the 
Community’s external aviation policy (COM(2005) 79 final, Brussels) proposed a 
strategy that was endorsed by the European Council on 27 June 2005. It foresees 
the creation of a wider European common aviation area with ENP countries by 
2010. A more specific strategy for Ukraine was proposed in September 2005 in the 
Communication on developing a common aviation area with Ukraine (COM(2005) 
451 final, Brussels, 27.9.2005). 
17 There are separate negotiations between the EU and Russia on a horizontal open 
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hand it abolishes all ASAs among member states and fully liberalises traffic 
rights and market access. On the other hand, it addresses domestic policy 
issues such as the liberalisation of ground handling services, the 
transparent regulation of airport charges and slot allocation as well as 
common standards and institutional cooperation on air traffic control and 
safety/security issues. Neighbouring countries Norway and Switzerland 
have already been integrated into the EU’s civil aviation area, through 
bilateral agreements and the adoption of the relevant acquis. Air transport 
is a sector where acquis compliance could also be highly beneficial for 
Ukraine. 
A first step towards deeper integration into the EU’s common civil 
aviation area has been the ‘horizontal agreement’ between Ukraine and the 
Commission, which was signed in June 2005 but has yet to be ratified. It 
will modify the bilateral agreements that Ukraine has with all 25 EU 
member states, by permitting EU airlines to fly to Ukraine from any 
country in the Union. This step will lead to a moderate liberalisation of 
cross-border traffic.18 A more ambitious option would be the negotiation of 
a ‘global aviation agreement’ between the EU and Ukraine, which should 
be launched as soon as the Commission receives the mandate.  
A key element in any deeper integration package for air transport 
should be cooperation on air traffic management and on safety/security 
issues. In 2004, Ukraine became a full member of Eurocontrol, which 
coordinates air traffic control across Europe. A more ambitious strategy 
would be the adoption of the Single European Sky legislative package by 
Ukraine. As far as safety and security are concerned, Ukraine is still to 
become a full member of the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA), which has 39 
member states and whose functions are to be integrated into the European 
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).19 Ukraine should join the JAA and seek 
technical assistance from the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 
the International Civil Aviation Organisation and EASA for its aviation 
safety agency (DerzhAviaSluzhba), since low safety standards reduce the 
                                                      
18 In addition, the bilateral agreements between Ukraine and several EU countries 
became more liberal in 2005. 
19 The EASA is still evolving: in November 2005, the Commission called on EU 
member states to expand EASA’s mandate to include the monitoring of compliance 
by non-EU airlines with EU safety and security rules and the institution could also 
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competitiveness of its airlines: in 2005, the FAA downgraded Ukraine from 
category 1 to category 2, which restricts the access of Ukrainian airlines to 
international destinations. 
After the country’s separation from Russia, Ukraine was left without 
a flagship carrier.20 As the example of Slovakia (which separated from the 
Czech Republic in 1993) shows, however, the absence of an entrenched 
incumbent lobbying for protectionism can facilitate the transition towards a 
liberal air transport regime. Sky Europe, Central Europe’s leading low-
budget carrier, has its hub in Slovakia’s capital Bratislava and is expanding 
rapidly. Since September 2005, the airline has been quoted on the Vienna 
stock exchange and it plans to use its initial public offering receipts to triple 
the size of its fleet from 15 to 47 planes by 2009, while increasing the 
number of passengers from 1 to 6 million annually. Thriving in an open 
skies environment, the stock market value of the young airline is almost as 
high as that of Austrian Airlines.21  
A major objection against open skies is the argument that Ukraine’s 
domestic airlines are too small and too weak to compete internationally. 
The two largest domestic airlines, AeroSvit and Ukrainian International 
Airlines (UIA), are very small by EU standards (i.e. each of them has no 
more than a dozen airplanes). The government has stakes in both of them 
(23% and 62% respectively) and is contemplating a merger of them in order 
to create a national flagship carrier.22 For the development of the sector, it 
                                                      
20 A good overview of air transport policies in Ukraine can be found in ICPS, 
Problems and Prospects for Developing the Air Passenger Carrier Market in Ukraine, 
Kyiv, 2005(c). 
21 See the Financial Times Deutschland (13 September 2005) and the Economist (15 
May 2005). A similar example comes from Lebanon, where the government was 
long reluctant to open aviation markets to protect the small flagship carrier MEA. 
In 2001 Lebanon adopted an open skies policy and within a year, tourism grew by 
14% in a globally stagnant market. MEA also benefited from this growth and 
recorded its first profit in 16 years. 
22 Among Ukraine’s 60 commercial airlines, 3 are partly state-owned. AeroSvits has 
four other private investors. The other main shareholders in UIA are Austrian 
Airlines (23%) and the EBRD (10%). AeroSvit, UIA and the other two largest 
players (Ukrainian Mediterranean Airlines and Donbassaero) accounted for 80% of 
passenger traffic. One argument for a possible merger is the fact that both airlines 
have complementary route networks: UIA mainly flies to Western Europe and 
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might be better to sell the state-owned shares in both airlines separately to 
leading international airlines, under the condition of further investments 
and their integration into international airline alliances. If this was done 
three or four years prior to a full opening of the market, it would grant 
those international investors a head start in the local market. A 
commitment to market opening after a relatively short transition period 
would create an incentive to expand operations quickly.  
It should be stressed, however, that the notion of a flagship carrier is 
somewhat outdated. In Europe several countries no longer have a national 
airline: Belgium’s Sabena went bankrupt, Switzerland’s Swiss Air was 
taken over by Lufthansa and the Netherlands’ KLM was taken over by Air 
France. In other EU countries, the importance of flagship carriers has 
significantly diminished, as low-budget airlines have rapidly grown. In 
Eastern and Central Europe, budget airlines have also become important 
players (e.g. Air Polonia in Poland, Wizz Air in Hungary or Sky Europe in 
Slovakia). Yet to create regional hubs and to expand their networks, these 
airlines need an open skies environment. In another sign that budget 
carriers are ready to expand into markets like Ukraine, the CEO of Ryanair 
(Europe’s leading low-budget airline) recently appealed to policy-makers 
to expand the EU’s open skies policies to neighbouring countries. 
A major constraint for the development of domestic airlines is the 
VAT charged on imported planes, in an effort to induce airlines to purchase 
aircraft from the local aircraft manufacturer Antonov. This policy should be 
changed. Instead, Ukraine should seek cooperation with the EU for the 
restructuring of its local aircraft manufacturing industry. Appropriate 
measures could be included in a deeper integration package. Moreover, the 
government should transfer the responsibility for civil aviation from the 
Ministry for Industrial Policy to the Ministry for Transport and elaborate a 
development strategy for the sector.23  
Of Ukraine’s 30 airports, 18 handle international traffic, with Boryspil 
International  in Kyiv being the major one. Transforming the capital’s 
                                                      
23 This strategy should cover the following: convergence with the EU acquis, a 
transition towards open skies, the development of domestic routes, the 
privatisation of stakes in airlines and airports, the regulation of airport services, the 
upgrading of air traffic control and security, and the development of the country’s 
airports (e.g. the division of labour and allocation of investment among them and 
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airport into a transport hub is a priority for the government and will 
require the modernisation of the airport. The airport is reaching its limit 
with regard to transfer capacity and will need significant investment in its 
infrastructure. Such investment has repeatedly been postponed, however. 
The best way to improve operational efficiency and to finance 
infrastructure expansion would be to concession the airport to a leading 
international airport operator. In the EU, most major airports are already 
privately owned and this trend is spreading to Eastern Europe. In 
December 2005, Hungary privatised its capital airport in Budapest (sold to 
Britain’s BAA) and Slovakia sold its two largest airports (to Austria’s 
Vienna Airport) after competitive biddings. Ukraine should try to benefit 
from the significant investor interest in the region’s airport. An interesting 
model for Boryspil International could be the case of Albania’s main airport 
in Tirana, which was sold to a consortium involving the EBRD and 
Hochtief, a leading private airport operator.  
2.2 Land-based  transport 
Most freight and passenger traffic between the EU and Ukraine is 
transported by road and rail. As a large share of that traffic moves through 
a few major corridors, the facilitation of transport along these arteries is a 
natural priority for deeper integration efforts. In fact, four of the pan-
European corridors between the EU and its Eastern neighbours, identified 
at the 1994 Pan-European Transport Conference in Crete, extend into 
Ukraine: Corridors III, V, VII and IX. Corridor VII is an inland waterway 
corridor (the Danube) and only touches Ukraine’s southern border. The 
other three corridors are multimodal and comprise both rail and road:  
•  Corridor III runs from the Polish/Hungarian border to Lviv and then 
on to Kyiv.  
•  Corridor V extends from the Hungarian/Slovak border to Lviv, 
where it meets Corridor III.  
•  Corridor IX runs from Finland to Greece. After branching out in St 
Petersburg (to Moscow and Pskov respectively) both legs meet again 
in Kyiv. In Ljubashevka, the corridor splits again, with one branch 
going to Odessa and the main branch to the Moldovan border.  
In the 1990s, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed for 
each corridor between the countries concerned and the European 
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established to monitor and coordinate the development of the respective 
corridor. The progress achieved through these instruments has been mixed.  
After the recent EU enlargement, most of the pan-European corridors 
are now within the EU. In the context of the ENP, a High-Level Group was 
established on the issue to make proposals for the extension of the existing 
corridors to neighbouring countries. The report of the group, presented in 
late 2005, identified five priority corridors for the ENP regions. For one of 
them, the ‘central axis’, Ukraine plays a major role:24 three legs of this axis 
basically correspond to Corridors III, V and IX. Of the newly included 
sections, three cross Ukraine. These are the inland waterway Belarus–Kyiv–
Odessa (i.e. the Dnepr), the road/rail connection Minsk–Kyiv and the 
road/rail link from Kyiv to Kharkiv and to the trans-Siberian/Caucasus. 
Two additional branches, propagated by the concerned governments but 
not officially included, are the road/rail link between Warsaw and Kyiv 
and the road/rail link from the Ukrainian border to the industrial town of 
Zilina. 
All these routes should receive priority attention in future EU–
Ukrainian cooperation. While the High-Level Group has stressed the need 
for further studies, it has already identified a number of key projects along 
the central axis. For rail transport, the most important projects in Ukraine 
are the Beskyd tunnel (already in preparation) and a new logistics centre 
and infrastructure in Chop. For roads, the priorities are an upgrading of the 
road between the Polish border and Lviv as well as two sections on the 
Kyiv–Odessa route. For multimodal transport, three logistics centres are 
planned in different areas of the country. 
Infrastructure improvement projects along the road corridors have 
begun, especially along Corridor III: the EBRD has funded the 
rehabilitation of the first section west of Kyiv and recently signed a loan 
agreement for the expansion of the eastern section through the Carpathian 
mountains; it is now about to start negotiations for funding the middle 
section (with co-financing from the European Investment Bank or EIB). The 
                                                      
24 See European Commission, Networks for Peace and Development – Extension of the 
Major Trans-European Transport Axes to the Neighbouring Countries and Regions, 
Report from the High-Level Group chaired by Loyola Palacio, Brussels, November 
2005(b). In addition to the central axis, another of the five priority corridors 
marginally touches Ukraine: the Motorways of the Sea project, which includes the 
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entire upgrade of the corridor should be completed by 2010. Along 
Corridor IX, the Ukrainian government has also removed some bottlenecks 
along the Kyiv–Odessa section in recent years. Along Corridor III, the 
section between the border and Lviv is a single-carriageway trunk road 
that still needs to be upgraded. 
Three pan-European rail corridors extend into Ukraine:  
•  the rail section of Corridor III runs from Mistiska at the Polish border 
to Lviv and then to Kyiv. Since the change between the European and 
the Russian gauges poses a fundamental problem for cross-border rail 
transport, Ukraine Railways has proposed an 84 km extension of the 
European gauge from the border to Lviv and estimates that this 
would reduce waiting times by three to four hours.  
•  Rail Corridor V extends from Chop at the Hungarian border to 
Batewo and Lviv, where it meets Corridor III. Except for a 1.8 km 
tunnel at Beskyd, the 264 km line is double track and electrified. The 
expansion of the tunnel is being facilitated through an EBRD project.  
•  The Ukrainian rail section of Corridor IX is 871 km long – 722 km of 
which are double track and 789 km are electrified. Automatic 
signalling has been installed along the entire corridor and container 
trains and shuttle trains are being operated. With the Odessa port 
being an end-point of the corridor, modal interfaces and port-related 
bottlenecks will also have to be addressed.  
The focus of the development of pan-European corridors has long 
been on infrastructure investments. But as goods and people are 
transported through a corridor, they encounter both physical and 
‘software’ bottlenecks. In other words, infrastructure investments need to 
be accompanied by complementary regulatory and institutional reforms 
that facilitate transport flows along these corridors. The most pressing issue 
in this regard are the frictions at border crossings as a result of customs and 
other border-related controls. European exporters and traders frequently 
cite the inefficiency of border controls and high levels of corruption as a 
major concern. A streamlining of border controls and comprehensive 
customs reforms between Ukraine and its western neighbours should thus 
be one of the top priorities in any strategy for deeper EU–Ukrainian 
integration. The EU should provide technical assistance for customs 
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agree on a set of concrete reform measures and clear progress indicators 
(e.g. customs clearance times) that could be included in the EU–Ukraine 
ENP Action Plan.25 They should also establish a complaint and dispute-
settlement mechanism so traders can voice their concerns on border control 
issues. 
The work of the EBRD along the pan-European corridors shows how 
infrastructure projects can be designed to also promote the institutional 
reforms and capacity-building that are needed to render transport flows 
more efficient.26 The EBRD loans for road Corridor III not only fund 
rehabilitation work between Kyiv and Chop, but the EBRD (in cooperation 
with the EU’s Tacis programme) is helping Ukravtodor27 to restructure its 
road financing and administration functions and to introduce competitive 
tendering for civil works contracts. These efforts should reduce the costs of 
future infrastructure investment and ensure that what is currently in place 
is maintained more efficiently. In rail transport, the EBRD is also packaging 
infrastructure project funding with technical assistance. As part of a loan 
for track maintenance on the section between Lviv and Kyiv, the EBRD 
(with Tacis co-financing) helped UZ, the railway transport of Ukraine, to 
modernise its maintenance procedures (to reduce life-cycle costs) and 
develop a commercialisation programme (i.e. the phasing out of cross 
subsidies and the establishment of a five-year business plan). A follow-up 
loan, approved in mid-2004, will also mix infrastructure financing and 
technical assistance. The infrastructure component includes the removal of 
a key bottleneck in Corridor V through the construction of the Beskyd 
tunnel, the continuation of the track rehabilitation programme and new 
rolling stock to speed up intercity passenger traffic. Technical assistance 
will help with the conversion of UZ into a joint stock company and the 
introduction of more efficient procurement methods.  
If transport costs and frictions are to be further reduced along the 
EU–Ukrainian corridors, physical infrastructure investments and policy 
reforms will need to go hand-in-hand. The work of the EBRD provides a 
                                                      
25 For instance, both sides could agree that waiting times at border crossings 
between the EU and Ukraine should be reduced by half over a two-year period. 
For this to occur, however, reliable waiting-time statistics would be needed. 
26 Project fact-sheets can be downloaded from the EBRD website (www.ebrd.org). 
27 Ukravtodor is the Ukrainian state corporation for road construction, 
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good model for such a dual-track approach and should be extended to 
other areas. EU contributions to infrastructure investments along key 
transport corridors should be channelled through the EBRD, and the Tacis 
co-funding of technical assistance packaged with EBRD investments 
provides a good model. Another option would be for the EU to offer 
Ukraine additional funding for corridor investments (e.g. through an 
expansion of EIB lending to Ukraine), in return for explicit conditionalities 
regarding progress on customs reforms and the reduction of frictions at 
border crossings.  
If Ukraine wants to exploit its full potential for transit traffic between 
Europe and the CIS countries and between its northern neighbours and the 
Black Sea, intermodal traffic will be the key for a simple reason: Ukraine 
stretches about 800 km from north to south and about 1,600 km from east to 
west. Hence, any transit will have to be of a long-distance nature. As a rule 
of thumb, rail freight has a competitive edge over road transport from 500 
km onwards. As most rail freight does not have a door-to-door advantage, 
however, the rail transit routes would have to involve multimodal traffic – 
either through containers or through the transfer of trucks/trailers onto 
trains. Both types of intermodal traffic require special equipment and 
transfer facilities as well as reliable shuttle train services. Ukraine and the 
European Commission should develop a strategy to increase 
containerisation rates and facilitate modal transfers along the pan-
European transport corridors. 
In addition, convergence towards EU policies in road and rail could 
help improve the efficiency of Ukraine’s transport sector. Some examples 
for the selected adoption of EU norms and standards include: the European 
rail traffic management system (to harmonise signalling and data 
communication); a mutual recognition of rolling stock maintenance 
standards in rail or vehicle safety standards in road freight; the extension of 
EU rules for competitive access of private operators to rail tracks along key 
routes; and Ukraine’s adoption of the EU acquis for the liberalisation of 
road freight. An interesting model for the extension of EU rules to 
neighbouring countries through regional agreements could be the Interbus 
Agreement. 
In 2000, the EU and 13 accession candidates (including Turkey) signed 
the Interbus Agreement to liberalise coach operations among the 
signatories. It provides for the harmonisation of national legislation and 
fiscal regimes, mutual recognition of documentation as well as common 
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acquis in this specific market segment. It does not extend to regular services 
(i.e. coach lines) or liberalisation measures such as cabotage.28 Other parties 
have since signed up to the Interbus Agreement. Of Ukraine’s non-EU 
neighbours, Bulgaria and Romania have acceded to the agreement, while 
Moldova has signed but not yet ratified it. As a member of the European 
Conference of Ministers of Trade, Ukraine is eligible to join the Agreement, 
but it has not yet applied. Accession to the Interbus Agreement would 
entail a concrete integration measure that could be implemented prior to a 
more comprehensive FTA. 
2.3 Other  transport  modes 
Even though maritime transport is not such an important mode for EU–
Ukrainian trade, it is critical for transit trade and the efficiency of the 
overall multimodal system. Ukraine should elaborate an integrated port 
strategy, including plans for infrastructure development, improved 
linkages with land modes as well as regulatory and institutional reforms. 
The twin ports of Odessa/Illyiehevsk (the country’s largest) were declared 
a priority for the Motorways of the Sea project by the High-Level Group 
and it constitutes an important nodal point for the central axis (i.e. for 
corridor IX). Comprehensive reforms concerning this port should be 
anchored in the EU–Ukraine ENP Action Plan. More specifically, the new 
container port at Illyiehevsk, identified as an important project by the 
High-Level Group, should be concessioned to a private investor. A more 
general liberalisation of port services and concessions for other key 
terminals would open the sector to foreign investors (and thus to trade 
through mode 3) and thus should also be a priority. The European 
Commission has recently proposed its Port Package II measures, which 
would introduce a much greater degree of competition in port services 
across the EU. Its rules could provide guidance for similar reforms in 
Ukraine. Last but not least, Ukraine is one of the countries with the greatest 
                                                      
28 Regular services need to be negotiated on a bilateral basis (i.e. between Ukraine 
and individual EU member states), but accession to the Interbus Agreement would 
facilitate the negotiation of such bilateral agreements. As long as Ukraine remains 
outside the Interbus Agreement, tour operators need an authorisation for each trip. 
The number of privately-owned busses in Ukraine trebled between 1995 and 2000 
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number of seafarers worldwide (about 50,000) and the EU would like to see 
the country tighten its labour laws and their enforcement. 
Ukraine’s 4,400 km of inland waterways play only a marginal role for 
EU–Ukrainian traffic. The country has limited access to Europe’s most 
important inland waterway: the Rhine–Main–Danube corridor, which runs 
about 3,500 km from Rotterdam on the North Sea to Sulina (Romania) on 
the Black Sea. Ukraine has signed an MoU for the development of pan-
European Corridor VII (the Danube) and is a member of the steering 
committee.29 Yet the river merely skirts Ukraine’s territory along the 
southern border with Romania and only a small section of the delta lies on 
the Ukrainian side.30 Most of the traffic actually bypasses Ukraine via the 
Danube–Black Sea Canal in Romania. Plans of the Ukrainian Ministry of 
Transport to re-open the silted Prorva Canal from the Danube to the 
Ukrainian Black Sea coast would violate Ukraine’s international 
commitments to preserve the Danube delta – a fragile biosphere that was 
declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1991. Another important cross-
border inland waterway is the Dnepr between Belarus and Ukraine, which 
is also part of the central axis that has been identified by the High-Level 
Group. 
A very specific transport mode that is important for the long-distance 
transport of oil and gas are pipelines. About three-quarters of Russia’s gas 
exports to the EU are transported through Ukraine via transit pipelines. 
Since the policy issues related to pipelines are more intertwined with 
energy sector issues, however, they are discussed in the energy section of 
this report. 
 
                                                      
29 There are no important bottlenecks along Corridor VII within Ukraine, such as 
water depth, channel width or free air draft under bridges. Other transport issues 
addressed by the steering committee include interoperability and border-crossing 
frictions. 
30 Ukraine also participates in the Danube cooperation process among the 10 
countries through which the river runs. This process covers various policy areas, 
including transport. Ocean-going vessels can only enter the lower part of the 
Danube and inland waterway vessels cannot reach the Ukrainian port of Odessa, 
which is 150 km away from the Danube delta. As a result, the Danube is not really 
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3.  Telecom and IT-enabled services 
A comprehensive reform of Ukraine’s telecom sector will be needed for the 
development of a knowledge-based economy and for deeper integration 
with the global economy (including the EU). Fixed and mobile penetration 
rates remain low, only a small percentage of the population has access to 
the Internet and service quality in most parts of the sector are far below 
European standards. To solve these problems, a number of key issues will 
have to be addressed: the development of the Communications Regulatory 
Commission into an effective regulator, the privatisation of fixed-wire 
operator UkrTelecom and the encouragement of more effective competition 
and private investment in fixed-line services. To ensure that these reforms 
are embedded in a coherent strategy, the EU–Ukraine ENP Action Plan 
should include a provision that the government elaborates and publicly 
endorses a national strategy for the development of the information and 
communications technology sector.31 
As part of its WTO/GATS proposal, Ukraine committed itself to the 
comprehensive opening of all forms of electronic communication: voice 
telephony, mobile voice and data, circuit-switched data, private leased 
circuits, electronic and voice mail, online information, etc. Ukraine is also 
subscribing to the Telecom Reference Paper, which codifies key principles 
of sector regulation. The main barrier to trade in telecom services, however, 
is the effective enforcement of these principles as well as in the opening of 
the core of the sector to private investors (i.e. the fixed-wire network) 
through the privatisation of UkrTelecom. To conduct this important and 
technically complex transaction, the government would be well advised to 
seek the assistance of an international finance institution that has the 
appropriate expertise, such as the EBRD or the World Bank. 
The legal and regulatory framework for the telecom sector is still a 
work in progress. The 2003 Law on Telecommunications is in line with the 
GATS commitments, but many of the detailed regulations (which are also 
foreseen by the basic telecom law) still need to be developed – especially 
with regard to licensing, interconnection rules, spectrum management and 
tariff regulation. Most important will be the facilitation of network access 
for competing operators through interconnection rules that provide for 
non-discriminatory and transparent access at prices that are cost-related, as 
                                                      
31 This section draws on World Bank, Electronic Communications in Ukraine: The 
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well as for an effective dispute-settlement mechanism. This item is in fact 
among those listed in the EU–Ukraine ENP Action Plan. In mobile 
telephony, appropriate rules on the sharing of physical infrastructure or 
roaming could help the smaller providers catch up with the two dominant 
market players.  
The National Communications Regulatory Commission (NCRC) was 
only recently established and needs considerable institutional 
strengthening before it can fulfil its functions. To date, only the eight 
commissioners of the NCRC have been appointed. Its statute and 
institutional structure still need to be elaborated, its employees still need to 
be hired and trained, and its working practices still need to be established. 
In terms of budgetary resources, the regulator is still not sufficiently 
independent and public sector staffing rules make it difficult to hire 
qualified staff. The World Bank provided advice on the telecom sector law 
and is helping with capacity-building at the NCRC. This important 
assistance needs to continue and the EU should complement it through a 
twinning arrangement between the NCRC and a telecom regulator from 
one of the recent accession countries.  
In the telecom sector, full acquis compliance is feasible and it would 
be desirable from the perspective of domestic economic development. The 
acquis in this area reflects international best practice and is in line with both 
GATS rules and with the needed regulatory reforms outlined above. Acquis 
convergence in this specific sector, however, will not require the adoption 
of the current set of EU rules (which came into effect in 2002), but of the 
previous set of rules that date from 1998. The 1998 acquis was much more 
detailed and specific. As the telecom market in the EU matured and as 
competition unfolded, however, the EU streamlined its acquis and 
increasingly relied on national regulators for the enforcement of some 
rather general principles.32 Given the relatively early state of development 
of Ukraine’s telecom sector, the 1998 acquis would be more appropriate for 
the time being. In fact, Ukraine’s telecom law is largely based on the 1998 
package of EU rules and thus the country is in formal compliance with the 
                                                      
32 The 2002 acquis is not in contradiction with the 1998 acquis, it is just more general. 
It actually refers back to the 1998 acquis for those countries that are not yet 
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acquis.33 But in practical terms, acquis compliance would require the passing 
of detailed regulations and especially the effective enforcement of these 
rules through a capable and independent regulator, which is yet to occur.  
One way in which the European Commission could support the 
process of acquis convergence in the telecom sector would be to use the 
same assistance instruments as for the non-EU countries of south-eastern 
Europe. For those countries, the Commission 1) prepares a detailed 
regulatory report once a year to monitor reform progress; 2) maintains an 
institutionalised policy dialogue (a working group meets twice a year); and 
3) provides technical assistance by EU telecom experts through field trips 
and capacity-building.  
With 22 telephone connections per 100 persons in 2003, Ukraine’s 
fixed-line penetration rate is considerably lower than that of its EU 
neighbours Slovakia (41), Hungary (35) or Poland (31). In recent years, the 
number of connections has grown by 6% annually and the government 
plans to double teledensity by 2010.34 In 2004, however, about 2 million 
applications for fixed-wire connections were still outstanding. 
Infrastructure deficiencies are particularly pronounced in rural areas and 
with regard to broadband access.35 To address these problems, large-scale 
investments will be required, which can only be mobilised through greater 
private participation and a privatisation of UkrTelecom.  
The privatisation of UkrTelecom has been on the agenda for a 
number of years, but in 2004 the government postponed the scheduled sale 
of a 43% stake in the operator. The privatisation of UkrTelecom will not 
only be crucial to increase sector efficiency and FDI, but also to allow for 
greater trade in telecom services through mode 3.36 But the government 
must ensure that the transaction is fully transparent and structured in a 
way that will attract an international strategic investor with the appropriate 
                                                      
33 For a comparison between the Ukrainian law with the EU acquis and with the 
WTO/GATS requirements in this sector, see ICPS, “Policy memo to the draft Law 
of Ukraine ‘On telecoms’”, Kyiv, February 2003. 
34 See the Economist Intelligence Unit, Ukraine Country Profile 2005, London, 2005. 
35 One measure of the availability of broadband access is bps per inhabitant. 
According to ITU data for 2003, Ukraine had 19 bps per capita, compared with 
1,850 in Slovakia and 1,000 in Hungary.  
36 According to efficiency indicators (e.g. lines per employee), the company’s 
performance lies considerably below that of comparators from other CEECs. 186 | ANNEX 3. SERVICE SECTORS 
know-how and resources for network expansion. The weaknesses of the 
regulatory framework need to be addressed prior to privatisation. 
The fastest growing market segment is mobile telephony. Ukraine 
had 16 million subscribers in early 2005, but the penetration rate of 33% still 
remains one of the lowest in Europe. Neighbouring Slovakia has 81%, 
Hungary has 80% and Romania has 49%. Competition in this sub-sector – 
which is fully privately owned – has lowered tariffs and has led to 
improved services. The two largest providers, Kyivstar and Ukraine Mobile 
Communications (UMC), control 95% of the market. UMC is owned by 
Russia’s Mobile Telesystems, whereas the two main shareholders of 
Kyivstar are Norway’s Telenor (56.5%) and Russia’s Alfa Group (43.5%).37 
In addition, there are four small providers: Golden Telecom, Ukrainian 
Radio Systems and Digital Cellular Communications (DCC). Golden 
Telecom is Russian-owned, whereas DCC belongs to Turkey’s Turkcell and 
the private Ukrainian company System Capital Management. The new 
provider under the brand name of Life:), which is owned by a Turkish 
investor, only entered the market in 2005, but is expanding aggressively 
and might establish itself as a third force next to the two market leaders. 
According to a survey published in October 2005, the number of 
Internet users in Ukraine is rising rapidly, albeit from a low level. The 
percentage of Ukrainians using the Internet regularly more than doubled to 
18% within a year. Owing to access at work and through Internet cafes, 
there are more users than connections. According to measures of Internet 
traffic, Kyiv accounts for 51% of Ukraine’s total traffic and other big cities 
for another 34%.38 Facilitating more widespread Internet usage should be a 
key element in the government’s sector strategy. This objective will require 
higher fixed-wire penetration rates, investment in broadband infrastructure 
and possibly local loop unbundling.  
                                                      
37 In September 2005, Ukrainian Radio Systems was bought by Russia’s 
Vimpelcom, which is co-owned by Telenor and Alfa Group. This deal, initiated by 
Alfa Group, was fought massively by Telenor, which fears a dilution of its majority 
stake in Kyivstar in case Kyivstar is merged with UKS. Telenor and Alfa Group 
have clashed repeatedly and the deep-rooted conflict between the two strategic 
investors remains unresolved. 
38 The survey of Ukrainians aged 41-59 was conducted by a market research 
company and the measure of Internet traffic was conducted by an electronic media 
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A rapidly growing market with significant trade potential between 
Ukraine and the EU is that of IT-enabled services. This market includes a 
wide range of services that can be transacted over the telephone or the 
Internet (i.e. trade in services through mode 1, cross-border supply). 
Examples are call centres, computer programming, database management, 
accounting, billing and various other back-office functions that more and 
more companies in developed economies are outsourcing to low-cost 
countries. Even though India has thus far been the primary beneficiary of 
the rapid growth in this multi-billion dollar industry, CEEC countries are 
increasingly benefiting from this trend.39 With its well-educated workforce, 
low wage rates and geographical proximity to the EU, Ukraine would be 
well placed to compete in this market. An important precondition, 
however, would be comprehensive reforms in the telecom sector. 
4. Energy 
Besides the specific integration measures in the energy sector outlined in 
this section, a more comprehensive approach to energy sector integration 
between Ukraine and the EU would be Ukraine’s accession to the Energy 
Treaty between the EU and the non-EU countries of south-eastern Europe 
(SEE). The Treaty establishing the Energy Community was signed in March 
2005.40 It provides a roadmap for the gradual integration of the entire 
region into the EU energy market over the coming decade. Non-EU 
signatories are committing themselves to full adoption of the entire acquis 
for electricity and gas as well as compliance with competition and 
environmental rules. An estimated €15-20 billion of investments will be 
required to bring the energy infrastructure of the region up to EU 
standards.41 One component of the regional strategy is a set of new 
pipelines from the Black Sea across the Balkans, which would diversify 
European oil and gas supplies from Iran and the Caspian region. A 
secretariat, mainly funded by the European Commission, will oversee the 
implementation of the Treaty. Both Ukraine and Moldova are observers to 
                                                      
39 For a more detailed analysis of trade in IT-enabled services, see D. Müller-
Jentsch (2004). 
40 The signatories are the EU and the countries of former Yugoslavia (Serbia, 
Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo) as well as Bulgaria, 
Romania, Albania and Turkey.  
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this process, but have expressed their intention to become full members. A 
binding agreement in this regard would establish a clear framework for 
deeper EU–Ukraine integration in the energy sector.  
Ukraine’s energy sector is not only of great economic importance, but 
is also one of the most complex in terms of its reform needs. Since many of 
the policy issues at stake are intertwined, the government should develop a 
comprehensive energy-sector strategy that covers all forms of energy (oil, 
gas, electricity and coal) and all key issues such as national resource 
development, import security/diversification, energy transit, energy 
efficiency, investment plans, tariff rebalancing, competition, nuclear safety 
and environmental issues. There is significant potential for deeper EU–
Ukrainian integration in this sector, but various cross-border barriers and 
distortions will have to be removed if the full potential is to be unlocked.  
Few sectors are as prone to the abuse of market power and other 
forms of anti-competitive behaviour as the energy sector. Even in the EU, a 
decade of liberalisation has not yet managed to break up oligopolistic 
market structures. To achieve this, a pro-competitive regulatory regime and 
an effective regulatory authority are essential. If Ukraine wants to reform 
its energy sector in line with EU principles, a strengthening of the National 
Energy Regulatory Committee (NERC) will thus be needed. Steps to ensure 
its full independence from both the government and sector interests are 
needed (in terms of mandate, funding and staffing) along with a 
strengthening of its institutional capacity. For that purpose, the 
government should seek the technical assistance of a donor with the 
necessary expertise (e.g. the World Bank) and complement this by an EU-
funded twinning arrangement with a successful energy regulator from a 
recent accession country in Central and Eastern Europe. 
An important pre-condition for deeper EU–Ukrainian integration will 
be tariff-rebalancing throughout the energy sector. Currently, most energy 
tariffs remain below world market prices. This situation distorts cross-
border competition and violates key principles of the European Single 
Market, as the following examples show:  
1)   The export-oriented and FIG-dominated metallurgical sector relies on 
coke that is implicitly subsidised, as state-owned coal mines sell their 
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2)    Ukraine’s steel and chemical industries also gain an unfair 
competitive advantage through oil and gas prices below world 
market levels (including special VAT treatment for gas imports).42  
3)   If Ukraine were to export electricity to the EU, the fuel costs of the 
power plants would also have to be in line with international prices. 
As a precondition for fair trade, such explicit and implicit energy 
subsidies would have to be phased out.43  
Cost-related energy prices would also provide an important incentive 
for greater energy efficiency and new investments.44 With Gazprom 
pushing for higher gas prices, the gradual convergence of Ukraine on 
world market prices is inevitable. 
Another set of issues that need to be addressed to create a level 
playing field for cross-border competition are environmental standards. In 
the EU, high environmental standards  on emissions, fuel quality and 
nuclear safety are all factored into energy prices. As long as environmental 
standards in Ukraine’s energy sector are far below their EU equivalents, 
cross-border competition will be distorted. Even though EU standards 
cannot be enforced in Ukraine overnight, those issues will have to be 
addressed in the medium term. One option would be an agreement   
 
                                                      
42 The metallurgical sector accounts for 13% and the chemical sector for 11% of all 
gas consumed in Ukraine. Currently, gas prices for industrial consumers are 
$68/1000 m3, but industry observers expect that a gradual increase of gas prices by 
Gazprom will bring prices up to $180/1000 m3 by 2008. (See Concorde Capital, 
Ukraine’s Gas Issue: The Way Out, Kyiv, September 2005). 
43 One important measure in that regard will be whether Naftogaz passes on the 
natural gas that it receives from Gazprom as a transit fee on behalf of the 
government (i.e. 29 of the 87 bcm of Ukraine’s domestic consumption in 2004) to 
consumers – at least to industrial clients – at world market prices. A technically 
complicated problem that would have to be resolved for electricity trade is the 
export of nuclear power, with its low marginal costs. 
44 Energy consumption in Ukraine has been reduced by almost half since 
independence, but the country still has a very energy-intensive industry and 
energy efficiency across the economy remains very low. The only area where some 
degree of subsidisation might be justified is the household sector (which is not 
trade-related). But even here, targeted subsidies to low-income households would 
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on some minimum standards or compensatory mechanisms (or both) to 
eliminate the most significant distortions (e.g. through pollution taxes or 
import duties). 
4.1  Oil, gas and coal 
About 80% of Russia’s natural gas exports to the EU cross Ukraine via 
pipelines (see Figure A.3.1). The transit fee to Ukraine is paid in the form of 
gas and meets a considerable part of Ukraine’s import requirements. This is 
recorded as a service export and accounts for the country’s surplus in 
services trade. The gas transit  is of great economic and geo-strategic 
importance for both Ukraine and the EU, as illustrated by the high-profile 
conflict about gas prices between Russia’s Gazprom and Ukraine in late 
2005. At the beginning of 2006, both sides settled their gas dispute by 
agreeing on a five-year delivery contract that doubles the average import 
price from $50 to $95 per 1000 m3 – considerably below the $230 originally 
demanded by Gazprom, but comparable to import prices for other 
countries in the region. 
Figure A.3.1 Europe’s gas pipeline network 
 
Source: Inogate (EU oil and gas transport cooperation programme). 
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There are indications that Russia’s gas monopolist Gazprom tried to 
use the conflict order to gain control over the transit pipelines.45 This tactic 
would be in line with its general strategy to control all transit routes to 
Europe: in mid-2005, Gazprom and its German partners EON and BASF 
agreed to build a controversial submarine pipeline through the Baltic Sea 
(in order to circumvent transit countries) and in December Gazprom 
managed to gain ownership over an existing pipeline through Belarus in a 
rather non-transparent fashion (no details of the deal were made public). 
The previous Ukrainian government and Gazprom had also concluded an 
agreement in 2002 to establish a joint gas consortium to operate the system 
of pipelines that cross Ukraine, but the new government stopped these 
plans to maintain control over these strategic assets. The EU has a natural 
interest in preventing Gazprom from controlling all transit routes to 
European markets and should engage in a strategic dialogue with the 
Ukrainian government on the future control and ownership structures of 
these pipelines.46  
To reduce its dependency on Russian gas, Ukraine signed an 
agreement to expand gas imports from Turkmenistan in 2004. This deal, 
however, also involved Gazprom, which had already secured the right to 
buy most of Turkmenistan’s gas exports over the 20-year period up to 2028 
as part of its efforts to increase its market power.47 Ukraine’s almost 
complete dependence on Gazprom for its supplies is somewhat balanced 
by Gazprom’s dependence on Ukrainian transit rights for its exports to 
Europe.48 A n  i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  c o u n try’s strategy to diversify supply 
should be the development of domestic oil and gas resources (domestic gas 
accounts for 22% of consumption).  
                                                      
45 See Financial Times Deutschland of 2 January 2006 and Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung of 31 December 2005. During the conflict, Russia put forward a 
compromise proposal according to which price concessions could be made in 
return for a stake by Gazprom in Ukrainian energy assets.  
46 Ukraine has signed the Energy Charter Treaty – a cross-border agreement on 
transit and investment issues. This step, however, can only be seen as an initial one 
in the right direction. 
47 According to the agreement, Gazprom will increase the gas deliveries to Ukraine 
from 44 billion m3 in 2005 to 60 billion m3 in 2028.  
48 See Concorde Capital (2005, op. cit.). A more long-term option to diversify 
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Virtually all of Ukraine’s gas market – from upstream exploration to 
downstream distribution – is being controlled by the state-owned company 
Naftogaz. The company is a sprawling conglomerate of more than 250 
enterprises with low levels of transparency. The government should 
develop a comprehensive strategy for reform of the gas sector and for the 
restructuring of Naftogaz (e.g. for the streamlining of institutional 
structure, more transparent corporate governance and more effective 
commercial management). Compliance with the EU acquis in this sub-sector 
would require the vertical unbundling of Naftogaz (e.g. exploration, 
transmission and distribution) and the opening of certain activities to 
competition.  
Ukraine also plays a major in the transit of oil between Russia and the 
EU and would like to position itself as a transit country for Caspian oil. The 
newly constructed Yuzhny oil terminal in the Black Sea port of Odessa and 
an oil pipeline between Odessa and the Polish border remained unused for 
some years before the Russian–British company TNK-BP reached a deal 
with Ukrtransnafta – the state-owned company operating Ukraine’s oil 
pipelines – to reverse the pipeline. Since late 2004, the company has been 
pumping Russian oil to Odessa, where it is transferred to ships for export. 
A use of the pipeline in the originally foreseen south-north direction, 
however, would help both Ukraine and the EU to diversify their supplies 
away from Russia. Such use would require the construction of a connecting 
pipeline from the border to the Polish town of Plotzk, where it would link 
up to existing pipelines (with estimated costs at €500 million). Both the EC 
and Poland are advocating such a scenario and finding a common solution 
could be a priority cooperation project between Ukraine and the EU in the 
energy sector.49  
Most of Ukraine’s oil imports come from Russia, with Kazakhstan 
accounting for much of the balance. Four of the country’s six refineries 
belong to Russian oil companies and one to a Kazakh oil company.50 Even 
though this was originally meant to secure supplies, the Tymoshenko 
government accused the owners of price fixing in 2005. In response, the 
government introduced controversial price controls and abolished import 
                                                      
49 See the Economist Intelligence Unit (2005), op. cit. 
50 These companies control 90% of the market for refined oil products and 75% of 
filling stations. The Russian oil companies that own Ukrainian refineries are TNK-
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duties for refined oil products.51 In September 2004, a presidential decree 
provided for the establishment of a vertically integrated oil company 
through Naftogaz. A more promising strategy, however, would be to 
reduce market power through unbundling and pro-competitive 
regulation.52 In addition, further privatisations and new concessions could 
help diversify the set of foreign investors, which would also stimulate 
competition. Austria’s oil company OMV, for instance, is already active in 
several CEECs and has expressed an interest in entering the Ukrainian 
market. Growing car ownership is bound to increase future demand for 
refined oil products. The stock of passenger cars has risen by 75% since 
independence, but with 110 cars per 1,000 persons Ukraine still has less 
than half the level of neighbouring Poland (with 250).53 
Coal accounts for almost a third of Ukraine’s energy balance (twice as 
much as in the EU) and the country is one of the 10 largest coal producers 
in the world. Most of the loss-making mines remain state owned and the 
budget expenditures for the coal industry in 2004 alone amounted to UAH 
3.6 billion. The metallurgical FIGs rely on coal for their coke supply and 
thus benefit from these subsidies. Other problems are the coal sector’s 
damaging effects on the environment and the enormous amount of surplus 
staff. The challenges for the government will be to improve the profitability 
of state-owned mines, eliminate subsidies to privatised mines and 
industrial clients, close unviable mines and shed surplus labour in a 
socially acceptable manner, and reduce the environmental pollution caused 
by coal. The EU–Ukraine ENP Action Plan should incorporate some of 
                                                      
51 The abolition of import duties is a market-based instrument to increase 
competition in the domestic market and it also promotes deeper integration 
between Ukraine and the EU in this specific market segment. 
52 This recommendation also holds for other segments of the energy sector. 
Horizontal unbundling can force dominant players who exceed a certain market 
share threshold to sell capacity (e.g. in power generation, oil refineries or gas 
stations). Vertical unbundling can prevent the extension of monopoly power from 
one market segment to another (e.g. between gas transmission and distribution or 
between power generation, transmission and distribution). Other forms of pro-
competitive regulation include price regulation in monopolistic market segments 
or network access to gas pipelines or the electricity grid (i.e. natural monopoly 
functions). 
53 See the Economist Intelligence Unit (2005), op. cit. 194 | ANNEX 3. SERVICE SECTORS 
these measures and the strategy implemented to downsize Poland’s coal 
sector prior to EU accession could provide some guidance. 
4.2 Electricity 
Largely owing to the post-independence recession, Ukraine currently only 
utilises about half of its generation capacity of 56 GW to meet domestic 
demand. About 50% of the electricity generated comes from 4 nuclear 
power stations, 40% comes from 17 thermal power stations (gas, oil and 
coal) and 10% is hydropower. In 2004, Ukraine used about a third of its 
spare capacity for electricity exports to Russia and an agreement signed in 
October 2004 could soon double that figure.54 In the longer term, however, 
there could also be significant potential for electricity trade between 
Ukraine and its EU neighbours (i.e. trade through mode 1, cross-border 
supply).  
Most of the electricity sector remains government owned: the state 
still controls all of the country’s 19 generation companies (energos) and 15 
out of 27 regional distribution companies (oblenergos). The other 12 
oblenergos were privatised in 1998 and 2001, but low tariffs and the poor 
payment discipline in the sector prevented further disposals.55 In 2004, the 
government decided to transfer the remaining state-owned electricity 
assets to a vertically integrated company, the United Energy Company of 
Ukraine. This decision, however, runs counter to international best practice 
and to EU rules in the electricity sector, which require vertical unbundling 
between generation, transmission and distribution. The government should 
therefore reconsider its decision. Moreover, an expansion of trade in 
electricity through mode 3 (commercial presence) would require further 
privatisations of state-owned generation and distribution companies 
(transmission as the key natural monopoly should not be privatised). 
                                                      
54 Ibid. 
55 The enactment of an energy debt-restructuring law, as committed to under the 
ongoing Programmatic Adjustment Loan (PAL) 2 from the World Bank should 
help to address this problem. Previous electricity-sector privatisations were 
apparently not transacted through concessions (which is the standard international 
practice), but through direct asset sales, with minority shares remaining with the 
government. Future privatisations in power generation are constrained by the fact 
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Increased FDI from EU and other foreign companies (i.e. trade through 
mode 3) would help upgrade Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure.  
As far as sector regulation is concerned, Ukraine’s electricity law is a 
framework law that still needs to be complemented through detailed 
regulations – and especially through effective enforcement by the sector 
regulator (as discussed above). Further privatisations should only be 
pursued after comprehensive regulatory reforms and they should be 
implemented in a pro-competitive manner – i.e. by packaging generation 
and distribution assets in a way that will create viable competitors that can 
compete on an equal footing. 
Comprehensive electricity sector reforms along the lines of EU rules 
should be part of the deeper free trade strategy. Electricity is one of the 
backbone service sectors where the EU acquis  seems well suited to 
Ukraine.56 The EU’s internal rules are largely in line with international best 
practice and were explicitly designed with the dual objective of achieving 
market liberalisation and cross-border integration. The main elements of 
the acquis relate to vertical unbundling (between generation, transmission 
and distribution), open network access, transparent regulation through 
independent regulators and the gradual introduction of competition across 
all market segments. As the EU’s internal reform experience shows, 
however, the effective enforcement of these rules requires competent 
regulators with a strong mandate and full independence. Currently, 
Ukraine neither has a regulatory framework nor a regulatory authority that 
would comply with the EU acquis. 
There are three basic models for cross-border power markets. Under 
the single-buyer model, currently used in Ukraine, a central entity 
purchases electricity from all producers and then resells it. This model, 
which does not necessarily require unbundling, limits competition. A 
second model offering open access (third-party) has more competitive 
trading mechanisms. Transmission systems are open to generators, who 
                                                      
56 The main elements of the EU’s economic acquis for the electricity sector are: i) the 
1999 Electricity Directive (unbundling, non-discriminatory access to the 
transmission system, gradual market opening, etc.) and ii) the 2003 package that 
amended the Electricity Directive (completion of market opening, stricter rules on 
unbundling, the requirement for all member states to establish independent 
regulators, etc.), which complemented it through a separate regulation on cross-
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can sell directly to distributors or large customers. Most trades, however, 
continue to take place through long-term contracts. A precondition for such 
an arrangement is the effective regulation of network access and preferably 
the unbundling of transmission. In other words, functioning cross-border 
power markets require complementary domestic reforms. The third and 
most sophisticated type of trans-national power markets are power pools 
or wholesale exchanges. Requirements for the operation of a pool are a 
well-developed regulatory framework and institutional structures (e.g. spot 
and future markets along with power brokers) as well as a sufficiently large 
number of generators of similar size to permit effective competition. EU 
countries have gradually moved along this continuum of deeper 
integration in electricity markets (the process is still underway). Eventually, 
the electricity relations between the EU and Ukraine should evolve along 
the same path.  
Before deeper integration can become feasible, however, a number of 
preconditions must be met. Ukraine needs to progress with its domestic 
reform agenda. At the same time, technical and institutional barriers to 
network integration need to be removed. The key technical barrier to trade 
is the fact that Ukraine’s electricity grid is not yet interconnected with that 
of the EU. The country’s network remains linked to that of the CIS and only 
a small section near the Slovak border, referred to as ‘Burshtyn island’, is 
integrated into the continental European grid. Since this only includes two 
thermal power stations, there is little trade potential. If Ukraine wants to 
hook up to the continental European grid without disconnecting from the 
CIS grid with its different frequency, significant investment will be needed 
to finance new transmission lines with back-to-back stations that act as 
adapters between the two systems.57 The costs for this would be substantial 
but not prohibitive. The physical integration of the Baltic States (who are 
also part of the CIS grid) into the European system could provide an 
interesting precedent in this regard. 
Once electricity grids are physically interconnected, the joint system 
will also have to be managed. More than in most other sectors, the 
integration of national markets for electricity also requires some form of 
cross-border regulatory cooperation. This explains why the sector 
                                                      
57 Ukraine will also need to stabilise the frequency of its domestic electricity grid. 
The link between the grids in Ukraine and Belarus was disconnected after the 
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framework for the Single Market in electricity not only consists of rules and 
regulations, but also has a strong institutional dimension. The main cross-
border institutions are the Union for the Coordination of the Transmission 
of Electricity (for technical management of the interconnected grid), the 
European Association of Transmission System Operators (to ensure cross-
border network access and trade) and the Council of European Energy 
Regulators (to coordinate economic regulation).58 The gradual integration 
of Ukraine into these institutional structures (e.g. starting with an observer 
status) would be desirable. 
5. Other  services 
5.1  Retailing and distribution  
A service sector that remains poorly developed in Ukraine is retailing. 
Especially Western-style supermarkets and large-scale branded outlets 
such as IKEA are still very rare. This situation is in stark contrast to the that 
in the CEE accession countries, where large EU retailers have developed 
regional distribution networks and driven development. Leading European 
supermarket chains include Carrefour, Ahold, Metro and Safeway. 
Examples of specialised retailers are H&M, Zara, Marks and Spencer, and 
IKEA. These and other players could also potentially expand into the 
Ukrainian market. Even though there are no formal barriers to entry, the 
difficulty of not only acquiring land and building permits for suitable sites, 
but also Ukraine’s low purchasing power and difficult business 
environment appear to have deterred market entry. Two EU supermarket 
chains that have launched operations in Ukraine are Metro of Germany and 
Billa of Austria.59  
5.2 Tourism 
Ukraine has significant unexploited tourism potential, especially along its 
attractive Black Sea coast, which includes such highlights as the Crimean 
peninsula and the seaside resort of Odessa. Other destinations with some 
                                                      
58 For a detailed discussion of the EU’s internal rules for the power sector, see D. 
Müller-Jentsch, The Development of Electricity Market in the Euro-Mediterranean Area, 
World Bank, Washington D.C. and the European Commission, Brussels, 2001. 
59 In 2004, IKEA announced $300 million worth of investments in Ukraine. But 
these seem to be geared towards production and not retailing (Financial Times, 15 
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appeal are the capital Kyiv, the historic city of Lviv and the skiing resorts in 
the Carpathian mountains. Most of the country’s tourism infrastructure, 
however, dates back to Soviet times and is poorly maintained. There is 
significant potential for increased tourism trade Ukraine and the EU –
through both mode 3 (commercial presence or FDI) and mode 2 
(consumption abroad). On the one hand, European tourism companies 
could bring the investments and know-how needed to develop the sector 
plus the marketing skills needed to attract Western clients. On the other 
hand, Ukraine could serve EU tourists and thus export services through 
mode 2. To date, however, there have been no EU investment in this sector 
to speak of. The reasons appear to be similar to those that have thus far 
obstructed the entry of international hotel groups into the Kyiv market (as 
discussed in the case study in Box 6.2, chapter 6). In addition, an EU–
Ukraine open skies agreement could help improve the transport access for 
European clients to Ukrainian tourist destinations. 
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ANNEX 4. ECONOMIC MODELLING 
This annex discusses the application of economic models to assess the 
impact of Ukraine’s integration into the main EU economy. In particular, a 
multi-country general equilibrium model is used to assess the potential 
economic effects of integration. This model is an adaptation of that used in 
a previous report for the Commission in 1999 by Paul Brenton and John 
Whalley.1 Thus it can also be seen as an updated version of their work, 
taking account of changes in economic structure and trade patterns along 
with the actual or anticipated integration of Ukraine’s neighbours to the 
west and south into the wider European economy (i.e. with the accession 
states of 2004, the anticipated accession states of the Balkans and the large 
neighbour across the Black Sea, Turkey). The model here is described in 
greater technical detail than in the Brenton & Whalley paper (see in 
appendix B, which also gives an equation listing for the current version).  
The major difference compared with the Brenton & Whalley study, 
apart from the updated database and an increase in the number of sectors 
and regions studied, is the extension of the analysis from that of a simple 
free trade area to examination of deeper integration, under which Ukraine 
(in common with Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and many other 
neighbours of the EU) would adopt many of the regulatory and technical 
standards of the EU in return for winning virtual free movement for many 
products between Ukraine and the rest of Europe. 
The modelling work carried out has been of necessity (given time and 
data constraints) relatively conservative in nature and this is reflected in 
the results. Although it indicates that trade reforms and deeper integration 
can potentially benefit Ukraine, the work we carry out here suggests that 
the effects of these reforms will have a major impact on the structure of 
                                                      
1 The report by P. Brenton and J. Whalley is entitled Evaluating a Ukraine–EU Free 
Trade Agreement using a Numerical General Equilibrium Trade Model, which was 
prepared for the European Commission as part of the EES Project UK26, “Study on 
the Economic Feasibility, General Economic Impact and Implications of a Free 
Trade Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine”, and submitted by 
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Ukraine’s trade, but will have only a limited impact upon welfare, perhaps 
raising it by up to 10% in the long run (while the impact upon the existing 
EU economies will be negligible – reflecting Ukraine’s relatively small 
GDP). In other words, Ukraine’s poor economic performance is driven by a 
long list of factors, ranging from institutions, competition levels and 
corruption through to acquisition of technology, education, infrastructure 
and investment, which orthodox models do not consider to be greatly 
affected by trade policy changes.  
We consider this to be the ‘conservative view’ of Ukrainian 
integration – that it is beneficial, but still relatively marginal in its effect. We 
also discuss an alternative view of the integration process – that it can 
potentially reach much more deeply into the development of an economy, 
with effects upon institutions, competition levels, investment and so on that 
can extend far beyond the relatively superficial effects investigated in 
traditional general equilibrium approaches. We therefore follow on to 
discuss in more detail the kinds of effects integration might conceivably 
have, and the developments in economic modelling that are slowly 
beginning to take account of such effects. We might call this a more 
‘extensive view’ of Ukrainian integration. 
There is, however, considerable uncertainty about the effects listed in 
the more extensive view. First, the precise ways in which trade policy 
affects an economy such as Ukraine, which is still highly distorted by 
endemic corruption, are not easy to disentangle. Integration may well have 
beneficial effects in terms of opening up markets to foreign competition, 
introducing new technology, allowing people to bypass monopoly 
suppliers or corrupt local financial institutions. Yet, it would be naïve to 
assume that Ukraine can fully benefit unless the Ukrainians themselves 
undertake an ongoing internal programme of promoting competition, 
making institutions more efficient and transparent, investing in 
infrastructure and the like. Indeed, in the absence of such reforms, trade or 
financial liberalisation can often throw up unanticipated problems.2  
                                                      
2 For example, subsidies and distorted pricing meant that, in many cases in the 
early post-Soviet days, many transition countries developed exports with negative 
value added at world prices, such as Poland’s notorious export of hothouse 
flowers. Likewise, liberalisation of external capital flows, while local taxation and 
financial regulation systems were half-developed, led to large-scale capital flight, 
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We cannot overemphasise that deeper integration should properly be 
seen as a package involving domestic policy and institutional reforms, as 
well as trade reforms. Indeed, it is hard to see how mutual recognition 
agreements, for instance, can productively be put in place unless and until 
Ukraine develops the institutions necessary to enforce the harmonised 
standard elements of the acquis. Nevertheless, there are strong reasons to 
believe that the potential long-term gains from an integration package, so 
long as it is understood to require such elements of domestic reform, are 
potentially very strong – probably much greater than the gains from 
piecemeal reform alone. If this is understood, it should provide Ukraine 
with the incentive to follow along a similar path to its more successful 
neighbours to the south and west. 
1.  Types of integration 
We investigate two main types of integration. The first, which was already 
discussed in the 1999 report, is a ‘simple’ free trade area (FTA) between the 
EU and Ukraine. An FTA is seen as more promising than a customs union 
because it does not involve harmonising Ukraine’s external tariffs with 
those imposed by the EU. Unlike the EU accession states, Ukraine still 
trades very heavily with Russia and it would not make sense to impede this 
trade (for further discussion see the analysis and data in chapter 4 of the 
main report). 
According to our (rather simplified) database, in 2004 Russia 
accounted for over 40% of Ukraine’s imports and 18% of its exports, with 
imports from Russia being larger than from the then 15 members of the EU, 
while exports were of comparable size (but declining relatively). This 
degree of Russian dominance partly reflects proximity and size, but to an 
even greater extent the legacy of Soviet integration (reflected in technical 
specifications, existing trade contacts and even the pattern of transport 
infrastructure). We would expect the relative importance of Russia and the 
EU to be reversed if Ukraine engages in a long-term process of deeper 
integration with Europe, but Russian trade will continue to be very 
important for many years (and that with the rest of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) will continue to be significant). For this reason it 
would not be sensible to bring Ukraine’s external tariffs into line with those 
imposed by the EU. In practice, the sectors that will be most affected by 202 | ANNEX 4. ECONOMIC MODELLING 
removal of tariff barriers are meat and dairy products,3 and food 
processing, along with light manufactures and metal manufactures (in the 
case of Ukrainian exports). Much of the projected increase in trade is two-
way and trade between Ukraine and the neighbouring EU accession states 
is expected to gain in particular, with sizeable trade gains coming partly as 
a result of their accession to the EU, and hence preceding any specific trade 
deal with Ukraine. 
Unlike the previous report, we also consider deeper integration 
between Ukraine and the EU.4 In this context, ‘deeper integration’ is taken 
as meaning a combination of harmonisation and mutual recognition in the 
markets for goods and services, along the lines of the agreements with the 
accession states and with Norway, Switzerland and Turkey to reduce or 
eliminate those differences in regulations that are deemed to be barriers to 
trade. In particular, Ukrainian trade with Europe is strongly affected by 
sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS) (agricultural safety and 
disease-prevention regulations, which effectively block trade in meat and 
dairy products at present), technical specifications (most Ukrainian goods 
and services still conform to old Soviet standards), specifications over 
testing and labelling, etc. Border delays can be serious and subject to 
corruption. Tackling these barriers to trade requires a pragmatic approach, 
involving a mixture of harmonised standards and mutual recognition (as 
has been discussed in other chapters of the report).5  
There is a considerable difference in economic terms between a tariff 
barrier and a regulatory barrier. Both may potentially reduce trade and 
protect local firms. But a tariff raises revenue for the country imposing it.6 
                                                      
3 Unfortunately, we cannot specifically and separately model the effects on the 
meat/dairy sector of removing many of the SPS barriers, due to lack of data. 
4 In practice this means deeper integration with the whole of the European 
Economic Area (EEA). 
5 On the issue of trade barriers, readers are especially referred to articles by J.E. 
Anderson and E. van Wincoop, “Trade Costs”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 
42, No. 3, September 2004, along with A.M. Le Jour, R. De Mooij and R. Nahuis, EU 
Enlargement: Implications for Countries and Industries, CPB Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Analysis, The Hague, 2001 and K.E. Maskus and J.S. Wilson (eds), 
Quantifying the Impact of Technical Barriers to Trade, Chs. 1 and 2, Ann Arbor, MI: 
Michigan University Press, 2001.  
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By contrast, resources spent on re-labelling, repackaging and retesting 
products, as well as the time spent waiting at border posts and so forth can 
be considered as a pure waste in economic terms. Consequently, a 
regulatory barrier that reduces trade by x% is generally much more 
expensive to the importing country than a tariff that has the same effect on 
trade volumes. 
Removing regulatory barriers is not a costless process, however. In 
practice, particularly if adoption of the EU acquis were made mandatory, 
there would be considerable expenditure required by Ukrainian authorities 
and firms to redesign products, retrain staff, improve labelling procedures, 
reform laws, etc. Some of these costs would be passed on to Ukrainian 
consumers. Against this, EU product standards might be assumed to 
benefit Ukrainian consumers, and in the longer term, the reliability of 
business in Ukraine and the reputation of Ukrainian firms worldwide 
might benefit substantially. Unfortunately, assessing these effects requires 
industry-level casework rather than a more macroeconomic-level, general 
equilibrium study such as we are able to carry out here. 
We hold that deeper integration between the EU and Ukraine can be 
viewed as a second phase of the integration process, so that it is likely to 
follow on from the formation of a free trade area. As a result, we only look 
at deeper integration in conjunction with the prior installation of an FTA 
(so we could call it ‘FTA+’). 
2.  An orthodox general equilibrium assessment of Ukrainian 
integration 
We start by carrying out a general equilibrium model assessment of the two 
levels of Ukrainian integration with the EU. The model is laid out in detail 
in appendix B and is a development of that used in the Brenton & Whalley 
study in 1999. The model is a multi-country model, which attempts to 
simultaneously simulate the effects of trade policy reforms on trade 
patterns, production and consumption in a number of industries and a 
variety of regions. The word ‘simultaneously’ is what distinguishes a 
general equilibrium model, such as we are using, from simpler, partial 
equilibrium studies that look only at one industry and one country. 
We look at a wider range of regions and sectors than the original 
Brenton & Whalley (1999) study. As shown in Table A4.1, six regions in 
total are considered: 
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Table A4.1 Regions  
No.  New code  Region description 
1 UKR  Ukraine   
2  EU  European Union – 15 member states  
3  CEECs  2004 Eastern European accession states 
4  SEECs  South-eastern European countries + Turkey 
5 RUS  Russia 
6  ROW  Rest of the world 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
As shown in Table A4.2, we use an eight-sector breakdown of the economy, 
in order to separately examine a number of sectors seen as particularly 
sensitive: 
Table A4.2 Sectors 
No.  New code  Sector description 
1  Food crops and animal prod.  Crops and animal prod. 
2 Minerals  Minerals 
3  Food prod.  Food prod. 
4 Light  manufacturing  Light manufacturing 
5  Heavy manufacturing  Heavy manufacturing 
6 Textiles  Textiles 
7 Metals  Metals 
8  Services  Services and activities NES 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
We had originally intended to split food crops and animal products, but 
these turned out to be hard to separate in the Ukrainian national data that 
was available. 
Construction of the database 
Detailed economic data on Ukraine has long been scarce, although the 
situation is slowly improving. Construction of a database has therefore 
been an important aspect of this study.7  
                                                      
7 Thanks are due in particular to Ece Turgay-Brett at the University of 
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Since we are using a multi-country model, it was sensible to use as a 
starting point the GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) database, which 
integrates data on trade, protection, output and consumption by industry 
for a large number of countries/regions and industrial sectors across the 
world. Further, it comes with an easy aggregation package. The main 
drawback, however, is that there is, as yet, no specific ‘Ukraine’ region in 
the GTAP database, because much of the data is not available, so we 
needed to merge the GTAP dataset with information from a variety of other 
sources. 
First, we obtained from our Ukrainian colleagues an input-output 
dataset (on a more detailed aggregation than GTAP, but one that suited our 
purposes except those regarding agriculture), for a corresponding year 
(2001). In addition, we found trade data from two main sources: the 
extremely disaggregated PC-TAS trade database (for a number of years), 
and also some more aggregate data on trade volumes and protection that 
were kindly supplied by Dean De Rosa of ADR Consultants.8  
As the discussion in chapter 4 makes clear, Ukrainian trade has seen 
an extremely rapid expansion since 2001 (in both directions). For this 
reason, we have factored up Ukraine’s imports and exports to bring them 
into line with 2003 levels. The rest of the model essentially still uses our 
2001 database. 
Data on protection 
While tariff rates are published, these are generally at a more disaggregated 
level than those we are using for our model. Obtaining the average tariff for 
trade in a particular broad sector between a pair of regions in a multi-
country model therefore involves a lot of weighting by sub-sector and by 
sub-regions. For this reason, we have used GTAP’s 2001 tariff data (for 
goods from the CIS excluding Russia) for tariffs on Ukrainian exports, 
while Ukraine’s import tariffs have been put together from a combination 




                                                      
8 Dean De Rosa has recently been compiling Ukrainian trade data as part of a 
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Table A4.3(a) Ukrainian tariffs (%) 



















UKR  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EU-15  10.65 1.33  19.56  15.02 5.69 6.43 6.70 0.00 
CEECs  7.20 0.42  18.83  16.52 7.05 9.83 6.45 2.92 
SEECs  11.48 1.72  17.70  12.06 7.39  12.95 5.34 0.00 
RUS  1.88 0.01  6.09  1.71 1.45 1.26 1.29 0.03 
ROW 8.12 0.66  12.86  12.37 3.99  13.66 5.21 0.00 
OCIS 7.69 0.05  12.47  11.89 4.20 8.89 3.30 0.07 
Note: OCIS refers to other CIS, excluding Russia. 
Source: Revised from GTAP (2001). 
Table A4.3(b) Tariffs on Ukraine compared with other CIS members (%) 
   UKR  EU-15 CEECs SEECs  RUS  ROW  OCIS 
G1  Agriculture  – 0.54 2.06 9.48  0.06  13.56 9.02 
G2  Minerals  – 0.00 0.54 0.87  0.00 7.60 0.10 
G3  Food  prod.  – 14.08 18.07 23.73 0.00 32.45 13.01 
G4  Lt  manuf.  – 0.54 6.46 2.07  0.00 7.49 8.66 
G5  Hvy  manuf.  – 0.51 7.88 4.47  0.06 5.90 4.25 
G6  Textiles  – 7.47  13.19 7.27  0.21  11.22  10.83 
G7  Metals  – 1.20 8.33 7.62  0.01 5.41  45.56 
G8   Services  – 0.00 4.83 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.07 
Note: OCIS excludes Russia. 
Source: GTAP (2001). 
 
Modelling the quota on iron and steel exports from Ukraine to the EU 
is also a tricky issue. Our understanding is that the way the quota is 
imposed will almost certainly generate quota rents for the major steel 
companies and their owners. Liberalisation will lead to a large expansion of 
Ukrainian exports, but this is likely to be at the expense of the steel 
companies’ profits. The quota rents (which disappear after liberalisation) 
are assumed to be equivalent to the revenue of a 100% tariff on Ukrainian 
steel exports, but the tariff revenue is spent by the Ukrainian oligarchs in 
Europe (not Ukraine), although it is (perhaps questionably) counted 
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The effects of the integration of product standards associated with the 
EU Single Market are central to understanding the likely effects of deeper 
integration. In common with other recent studies,9 we infer the effects of 
the Single Market by analysing observed trading patterns using a gravity 
framework. This is a well-used method for examining the effects of national 
borders and regional groupings on trade patterns. Again, as a base, we use 
the 2001 GTAP database on trade flows for all of our sectors, based upon a 
39-region breakdown of the world. The model assumes that trade between 
a pair of countries in a particular sector (say, food processing) is likely to be 
greater : 
1)  the larger is the importing country’s market for food products;  
2)  the larger production is in the exporting country; and  
3)  the closer together are the two countries.  
In addition, trade will usually be greater if the two countries belong to the 
same trade bloc and this is the effect in which we are most interested. We 
measure this latter effect by a series of dummy variables,10 for when both 
countries are members of the EU, when both countries are accession states 
(CEEC or SEEC) or when one country is in the EU and the other is an 
accession state, or when one country is an EU member or an accession state 
and the other is totally outside the bloc. 
The tables in appendix A summarise our gravity regressions. In 
Tables A4.4(a)-(b) below we show the projected long-term effects on trade 
volumes among various groups of countries, first when the Central and 
Eastern European and the south-eastern European accession states join the 




                                                      
9 See Le Jour, De Mooij & Nahuis (2001), op. cit. and T. Huw Edwards, Implicit 
Trade Costs and European Single Market Enlargement, Working Paper ERP 05-04, 
Department of Economics, Loughborough University, 2005(b). 
10 These are indicators included in a regression that take the value of 1 in some 
instances and 0 in the others. For example, the dummy variable ‘EUEU’ takes the 
value 1 when both importing and exporting countries are EU members, and 0 
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Table A4.4(a) Long-term effects when all accession states join the EU on their 












EU 156.6  142.9  71.1  187.1  -4.3  28.7  25.7 
Accession states  272.7  179.6  180.5  187.4  -11.4  35.9  121.9 
Other 58.5  42.7  74.4  146.0  97.7  93.5  123.9 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table A4.4(b) Long-term effects when a non-EU country achieves Single Market 

















EU 217.7  276.8  113.4  122.8  22.8  6.1  158.6 
Accession states  403.4  437.6  272.1  447.9  142.7  105.3  478.9 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Interestingly, Table A4.4(a) shows that accession of the CEECs and 
SEECs to the EU would be expected to make them more, rather than less, 
open to trade with third countries such as Ukraine. As Ukraine already 
trades significantly with these regions (being a close neighbour) this 
prospect is likely to promote Ukraine’s trade in both directions with these 
regions. 
Stages of market integration 
We start with simulations based upon our baseline (2001 but with 
Ukrainian trade volumes uplifted). Three rounds of simulations are carried 
out from this baseline: 
Round  1.  CEECs’ accession to the EU; the SEECs and Turkey also are 
assumed to join both the EU customs union and the Single 
Market. 
Round  2.  Following the changes in round 1, the EU (and CEEC and 
SEEC/Turkey regions) forms a free trade area with Ukraine. 
Tariffs between these blocs are eliminated, as is the steel quota 
(which may in fact be removed earlier than this). 
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Round 3.  Following the first two rounds, Ukraine also enters into deeper 
integration in the form of harmonisation/mutual recognition 
agreements with the EU. Owing to the absence of other data, the 
assumed amount by which deep integration reduces the costs of 
trading between the EU and CEEC/SEEC regions and Ukraine 
is derived from our estimated gravity model coefficients.11 
We consider two model variants: short term and long term. The 
former is close to that used in the study by Brenton & Whalley (1999), while 
the latter assumes that there is much more flexibility for both production 
and consumer behaviour to change in response to price changes. Table A4.5 
shows the numerical values assumed for the key elasticities. 
Table A4.5. Numerical values for elasticities 
Assumed elasticities  Short term  Long term 
Transformation in production  2.0  4.0 
Substitution between goods classes (top level)  1.25  1.25 
Substitution between countries in trade (lower level)  2.0  4.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Summary of results 
Accession of the CEECs and SEECs to the EU (or at least in some SEEC 
cases to the customs union and Single Market) is expected to be beneficial 
to Ukraine. This result stems from our gravity model simulations, which 
indicate that once account is taken of differences in country size and 
distances, the CEECs and SEECs were less open to trade with third-party 
countries, such as Ukraine, than were the EU-15 countries. Provisionally, 
this enlargement could, in the long run, double trade between the accession 
countries and Ukraine, with Ukraine’s textile and food processing 
industries benefiting directly and services also prospering as a result of 
rising Ukrainian incomes (see Tables A4.6(a)–(d)). 
 
 
                                                      
11 Another assumption is that the gravity model estimated for 2001 reflects the 
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Table A4.6(a) Results of Single Market accession by CEECs/SEECs – Scenario 1, 
welfare effects (%) 
Effects upon welfare  
  Short term  Long term 
Ukraine 1.91  3.05 
EU-15 0.11  0.17 
CEECs (2004 accession)  2.09  2.60 
SEECs (Balkans + Turkey)  2.08  2.43 
Russia 0.94  1.12 
Rest of the world  0.05  0.08 
Table A4.6(b) Scenario 1, output effects (%) 
Effects upon Ukrainian output 
  Short run  Long run 
Agriculture -0.77  -4.42 
Minerals -3.41  -8.56 
Food processing  1.05  2.73 
Light manuf.  -4.86  -11.15 
Heavy manuf.  -1.33  3.56 
Textiles 4.48  8.34 
Metals -4.46  -17.78 
Services 5.52  8.38 
Table A4.6(c) Scenario 1, changes in exports (%) 
Change in Ukrainian exports by destination 
   Short term  Long term 
EU-15 -0.02  -11.72 
CEECs 2.39  101.64 
SEECs 3.11  82.48 
Russia   -4.41  -13.70 
Rest of World  0.42  -12.50 
Table A4.6(d) Scenario 1, changes in imports (%) 
Change in Ukrainian imports by destination 
  Short term  Long term 
EU-15 -4.77  -11.72 
CEECs 26.13  101.64 
SEECs 16.99  82.48 
Russia   -5.15  -13.70 
Rest of World  -4.65  -12.50 
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Although tariff and quota liberalisation between the EU and Ukraine 
would be expected to lead to significant further increases in trade (on top of 
those from the accession of the CEECs/SEECs), particularly in metals 
exports to the pre-2004 EU countries, overall welfare effects (once quota 
rents are removed) are small or even slightly negative. Food processing is a 
sector that gains significantly from the tariff liberalisation12 (see Tables 
A4.7(a)–(d)). 
Table A4.7(a) Results of a Ukraine/EU/CEECs/SEECs free trade area – Scenario 2, 
welfare effects (%) 
Effects upon welfare 




term  Long term  Short term  Long term 
Ukraine 1.91  2.99  0.00  -0.06 
EU-15 0.11  0.17  0.00  0.01 
CEECs (2004 accession)  2.10  2.68  0.01  0.08 
SEECs (Balkans +Turkey)  2.08  2.42  -0.01  -0.01 
Russia 0.94  1.12  0.00  0.00 
Rest of the world  0.05  0.08  0.00  0.00 
Table A4.7(b) Scenario 2, effects on output by industry (%) 
Effects upon Ukrainian output by industry 
  Compared with base  Compared with CEEC/SEEC 
accession 
  Short term  Long term  Short term  Long term 
Agriculture -2.34  -8.61  -1.58  -4.38 
Minerals -2.17  -7.31  1.29  1.37 
Food processing  13.07  34.03  11.90  30.47 
Light manuf.  6.23  14.63  11.65  29.01 
Heavy  manuf.  2.58 13.93 3.96  10.02 
Textiles  9.92 22.39 5.21  12.97 
Metals 6.38  54.12  11.34  87.45 
Services  6.81 10.33 1.23  1.79 
                                                      
12 The decline in food processing in this scenario may be a reflection of the 
limitation of our model, which does not have intermediate inputs. In practice, 
growing food-processing exports should lead to increasing demand for Ukrainian 
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Table A4.7(c) Scenario 2, changes in exports and imports (%) 
Effects upon Ukrainian exports and imports by destination/source 
  
Compared with base  Compared with 
CEEC/SEEC 
accession 
   Short term  Long term  Short term  Long term 
EU-15 19.75  63.67  19.78  85.39 
CEECs 26.79  147.07  23.83  22.53 
SEECs 25.66  123.48  21.87  22.47 
Russia   -4.24  -10.51  0.18  3.69 
Rest of World  0.65  -0.21  0.22  14.04 
Table A4.7(d) Scenario 2, changes in imports (%) 
Change in Ukrainian imports by destination 
EU-15 0.86  -1.69  5.91  11.35 
CEECs 36.96  133.78  8.59  15.94 
SEECs 26.72  110.79  8.31  15.52 
Russia   -9.65  -22.99  -4.75  -10.76 
Rest of World  -7.50  -18.37  -2.99  -6.71 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Provisionally, our modelling work suggests that deeper integration is 
likely to have similar-sized effects again upon trade volumes compared 
with tariff liberalisation, but this time bringing significant gains to 
Ukrainian welfare (see Tables A4.8(a)–(d)). Particular industries that would 
gain are food processing, metals and light manufacturing, but heavy 
manufacturing and textiles also gain, as do services (benefiting from rising 
incomes in Ukraine). 
Overall, the Brenton–Whalley model structure provides a cautious 
assessment of the likely effects of reforms: it is clear that an FTA agreement 
is likely to be broadly neutral economically, while a deeper integration 
agreement produces significant potential benefits. On the assumptions of 
this model, it is very unlikely that a Ukrainian trade agreement would have 
any great impact upon any industry in the EU-15 member states, while 
there would be some small gains to Ukraine’s near neighbours in Eastern 
Europe.  
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Table A4.8(a) Ukraine’s deeper integration – Scenario 3, welfare effects (%) 
Effects upon welfare  Compared with base  Compared with an FTA 
   Short term  Long term  Short term  Long term 
Ukraine  6.50 9.86 4.50 6.67 
EU-15  0.12 0.19 0.01 0.02 
CEECs (2004 accession)  2.14  2.81  0.04  0.13 
SEECs (Balkans +Turkey)  2.10  2.46  0.02  0.03 
Russia  0.94 1.12 0.00 0.00 
Rest of the world  0.05  0.08  0.00  0.00 
Table A4.8(b) Scenario 3, effects on output by industry (%) 
Effects upon Ukrainian output by industry 
   Compared with base  Compared with an FTA 
   Short term  Long run  Short term  Long term 
Agriculture  -5.91 -22.58 -3.66 -15.29 
Minerals -29.90  -47.55  -28.35  -43.41 
Food processing  22.18  55.23  8.06  15.81 
Light manuf.  12.52  38.29  5.92  20.64 
Heavy manuf.  10.27  28.95  7.50  13.18 
Textiles 20.28  34.24  9.42  9.68 
Metals  3.92 93.13 -2.31 25.31 
Services  7.51 17.07 0.65  6.12 
Table A4.8(c) Scenario 3, changes in exports and imports (%) 
Effects upon Ukrainian exports and imports by destination/source 
   Compared with base  Compared with an FTA 
   Short term  Long term  Short term  Long term 
EU-15 38.63  158.58  15.76  57.99 
CEECs 41.78  239.03  11.82  37.22 
SEECs 34.06  201.40  6.68  34.86 
Russia    -14.46 -24.34 -10.67 -15.46 
Rest of World  -7.37  -11.69  -7.97  -11.50 
Table A4.8(d) Scenario 3, changes in imports (%) 
Change in Ukrainian imports by destination 
EU-15 19.27  50.97  18.26  53.57 
CEECs 55.44  204.67  13.49  30.32 
SEECs 31.25  171.49  3.58  28.79 
Russia   -9.46  -28.35  0.21  -6.97 
Rest of World  -9.28  -29.45  -1.92  -13.57 
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Detailed effects on trade by industry 
The detailed effects (along with the revised gravity model results for EU 
border dummies) are shown in the tables in appendix A. Key results to note 
are discussed below. 
i)   Trade between Ukraine and the EU-15 
The CEEC/SEEC accessions marginally reduce trade between Ukraine and 
the EU-15 in both directions in most sectors.  
The effects of scrapping tariffs (and the steel quota) are dominated by 
a huge percentage increase in Ukrainian metals. Ukraine’s exports of light 
manufactures also benefit significantly. 
Deeper integration has a very big impact on services trade in both 
directions, while agricultural and mineral exports from Ukraine to the EU-
15 also gain significantly. 
ii)   Trade between Ukraine and the CEEC accession states 
Trade in both directions rises sharply when the accession of the CEECs to 
the EU is incorporated. Particularly significant are the rises in metals and 
agricultural products, in both of which the CEECs have a significant initial 
trade surplus with Ukraine. 
Steel liberalisation leads to a huge proportional increase in Ukraine’s 
exports from a low base. Other tariff liberalisation with Ukraine boosts 
Ukrainian exports of agriculture, although the smaller percentage rise of 
trade in the other direction may well be larger in monetary terms, since it is 
from a larger base. The rise in Ukraine’s food product exports is significant. 
The deeper integration of Ukraine leads to sizeable increases in trade 
in both directions in agriculture, food processing, minerals and metals 
trade. 
iii)  Trade between Ukraine and the SEECs 
The SEECs are a fairly minor market for Ukraine’s exports, but themselves 
export around $1.5 billion a year to Ukraine, notably in heavy 
manufacturing, metals and minerals.  
SEEC accession leads to sizeable increases in trade in both directions 
in most industries, except services, which declines. Services trade only rises 
sharply in the final scenario, where Ukraine has deeper integration. 
With tariff reform, again the most notable effect is the large increase 
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3.  Scope for analysis of more ‘extensive’ economic impacts 
As was indicated earlier, there are considerable reasons to believe that an 
integration programme, if seriously carried out and tied in with 
concomitant domestic institutional reforms (and perhaps with appropriate 
infrastructure and technical support from EU member states), could have a 
far greater impact upon the Ukrainian economy than indicated in the 
previous section. This conclusion is essentially the line taken by several 
recent trade integration studies of the 2004 EU accession (notably the work 
by Baldwin, Francois & Portes on European enlargement in 1997 and a 
more recent study by Edwards in 2005).13 
In making this kind of assessment, it is worth starting by listing 
potential reasons why Ukraine’s economy in the 1990s was almost the 
poorest in Europe, with GDP per head perhaps 10% of the EU average. A 
relatively autarkic and distorted trade structure (heavily weighted towards 
trade with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan at the time of independence) is 
only one of a whole list of factors. The list further includes: 
•  poor financial controls, subsidies and soft budgets (being reformed, 
but more slowly than in the EU accession states or even Russia);  
•  highly concentrated industrial production, with little competition 
either at home or from abroad;  
•  rampant corruption, aided by weak institutions and a lack of 
transparency, as well as privatisations and capital outflows for the 
sake of tax evasion;  
•  a dearth of new investment;  
•  poor technical standards and specifications along with a lack of 
quality control;  
•  widespread adoption of old-fashioned technology (e.g. wasteful 
open-hearth steel mills);  
•  poor transport and communications infrastructure; and  
•  a poor image for Ukrainian firms trading abroad.  
                                                      
13 See R.E. Baldwin, J.F. Francois and R. Portes, “EU enlargement: Small costs for 
the West, big gains for the East”, Economic Policy, April 1997, pp. 127-76 (along with 
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Against this should be listed a reasonably skilled population, ample 
coal resources and a large endowment of fertile agricultural land. 
Many of these negative factors interact with one another in a way that 
might be deemed ‘cumulative causation’. For example, corruption may 
deter investment in new firms. Yet investment in new firms may bring in 
newer technology (particularly where they are Western joint ventures or 
subsidiaries). It also increases competition, which, ironically, would help 
reduce corruption. And by yielding tax revenues to the state, it could help 
fund infrastructure improvements, which might again draw in more 
investment. 
If one views Ukraine’s problems as essentially those of cumulative 
causation in this sense, then the potential of the linkages of trade and other 
integration policies with these other factors begin to grow much more 
significant. One could perhaps draw on the more encouraging experiences 
of the recent EU accession states (or indeed of Spain and Portugal 
beforehand) in emphasising this.  
The possible linkages being discussed here and their effects 
increasingly being taken into account in newer generations of general and 
partial equilibrium models. They are also, however, more speculative, 
which needs to be borne in mind.  
Perhaps a good way of considering these effects is that traditional 
general equilibrium models were initially designed to explain the impact of 
marginal trade policies in economies that are large, dynamic, relatively 
uncorrupted and open, and which possess efficient technology, 
management techniques and government ethos. There is thus little reason 
in such circumstances to expect that exposure to increased foreign 
competition would profoundly affect the economy, other than leading to 
some improvement in resource allocation at the margin. This is not the case 
with developing or transition economies, which is why we need to take 
particular account of the factors below. 
Linkages between trade and competition 
Trade is often seen as having a ‘pro-competitive’ effect upon an economy, 
especially where it is small and relatively closed to start with. This effect is 
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Anthony Venables or Richard Baldwin),14 who have developed imperfectly 
competitive models of trade based upon a ‘love of variety’ model of 
consumer choice.15 Liberalising access to trade improves consumer welfare 
through a number of avenues, most notably: 
a)  an increased variety of e available consumer goods. When trade 
barriers are high, people in many smaller and poorer countries will 
only have access to very few varieties of cheese, shoes, types of fruit, 
etc. (This of course does not apply to the rich). Lowering trade 
barriers increases the variety available to consumers; 
b)  reduced monopoly profits. Where a country is relatively small and 
dominated by a handful of local firms, these would be expected to 
charge high prices and provide poor service. Standard models of 
imperfect competition suggest that, as importing firms move into 
sheltered industries and take market share from the local firms, the 
latter will be driven to reduce prices and improve quality and service; 
and 
c)  a clearout of surplus capacity. In many industries, firms need to 
operate on a fairly large scale in order to achieve low costs. When the 
economy is small and sheltered, although there are few local firms, 
these are still too small to gain economies of scale. Trade competition 
may lead to a reduction in the number of these firms, but those that 
remain are likely to be larger. 
Links between trade and input costs 
For similar reasons to those explained above, trade liberalisation can lead 
firms to gain better access to a better choice of input suppliers. This should 
in turn enable them to find better spare parts and support services at a 
lower cost than previously. Special emphasis needs to be put on 
liberalisation of the financial services and telecoms sectors, which should 
greatly facilitate the development of new businesses and improve the 
                                                      
14 Baldwin & Venables’ 1995 article on regional economic integration is probably 
the best summary of this type of analysis – see R.E. Baldwin and A.J. Venables, 
“Regional Economic Integration” in G.M. Grossman and K. Rogoff (eds), Handbook 
of International Economics, Vol. 3, Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 1597-644, 1995. 
15 General equilibrium applications of this type of approach to issues of European 
integration include Baldwin, Francois & Portes (1997), op. cit. and Edwards 
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efficiency of existing ones. All of these changes should feed through to 
greater efficiency and competitiveness in a wide range of industries. 
Capital market effects 
At present, even though Ukraine is a relatively poor country and 
desperately in need of updating its capital stock in many areas (notably in 
its transport and communications infrastructures), it is suffering a huge 
outflow of capital.16 Trade and financial services liberalisation could help 
reduce this by:  
a)  making Ukraine more competitive as a producer, so encouraging 
inward investment;  
b)  reducing the cost or improving the quality of capital goods – many of 
which have to be imported, at least if Ukrainian firms want to equip 
themselves with efficient technology; 
c)  reducing profit margins and increasing efficiency in financial 
services;17 and 
d)  cutting the risk premium on investment in Ukraine.18 
Some very rough simulations indicate that these capital market 
effects might be expected to benefit Ukrainian GDP in the long run by 
around 10%. The welfare gain would be smaller, but still around 5% of 
GDP. (See Box A4.1.) 
                                                      
16 Ukraine is currently running a trade surplus of around 10% of GDP. While 
newsreaders often see a surplus as a good thing, in Ukraine’s case it actually 
corresponds to a large ongoing outflow of financial capital, at a time when local 
industry might well benefit from investment. 
17 Some very provisional results from data envelopment analysis (DEA) studies of 
bank efficiency across a range of post-Soviet economies shows that Ukrainian 
banks have improved their ranking considerably since about 2000, although from a 
very poor initial base. This trend may partly reflect the effects of the general 
economic pick-up following the initial Yushenko reforms. Nevertheless, we 
caution that the crude figures may still be putting considerable gloss on a sector 
where corruption and oligarch domination are still central features. 
18 This was an important feature of the study by Baldwin, Francois and Portes 
(1997, op. cit.) of EU enlargement, where their more optimistic scenario assumed 
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Box A4.1 Some simulations with variable capital stock 
In order to appraise the effects of varying the capital stock, it is necessary to 
make some assumptions about the substitutability between capital and labour 
making up value added in the Ukrainian economy. It is usually assumed that 
technological elasticities of substitution between capital and labour within an 
industry are well below unity; however, the ability to switch between capital 
and labour-intensive industries may raise the overall elasticity of substitution in 
GDP. Against this, our simulations suggest that changes in the composition of 
industrial output in Ukraine are likely to be small. We therefore assume value 
added is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregate of capital and 
labour, with a substitution elasticity in our low elasticity case of 0.5 and in our 
high elasticity case of 0.9. As regards the composition of GDP, the initial 
breakdown available is: 
Table 1. GDP breakdown 
    
   UAH  billions 
 GDP  204,190 
 O/W  taxes 30,720 
 (Less)  Subsidies  -3,456 
 Employees  compensation  86,440 
 Capital  cost  44,616 
 Supranormal  profit  45,869 
 
Supranormal profit has been derived by assuming a 35% monopolistic 
mark-up on costs.  
It is estimated that real marginal production costs consist of employees’ 
compensation plus capital cost, and are split as 66% labour cost and 34% capital 
cost. This is the data used to calibrate an initial CES production function. It is 
assumed that deeper integration of Ukraine into the wider European economy 
will reduce capital costs in three ways:  
•  First, the cost of capital goods will be reduced by cheaper imports. As a 
rough guide to this, the price of utility (in our general equilibrium (GE) 
model runs) is divided by the average production price of goods and 
services. This suggests the capital goods price (compared with average 
output prices for Ukrainian industry) could fall by 2.6% in our low 
elasticity case or 3% in our high elasticity case.  
•  Second, re-branding Ukraine as a more reliable place in which to do 
business will reduce risk premia for investors. We assume, rather 
conservatively, that this reduces the cost of capital (measured as the 
annual rental cost) by 10%.  
•  Finally, we also assume that increased competition in the banking sector 
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Taking these three changes together, capital is assumed to fall in price by 
16.7% in the low elasticity case or 17.1% in the high elasticity case. 
Cheaper capital affects welfare via a complex route. First, the stock of 
capital employed will rise by 14.4% in our low elasticity case or 28.8% in our 
high elasticity case. GDP will rise, by between 4.5% (low elasticity case) and 
8.8% (high elasticity case), compared with the estimates produced by our basic 
GE model with fixed capital. This will raise wages in Ukraine by between 8.9 
and 9.7%.  
As shown above, however, assuming the extra capital is in the form of 
foreign direct investment, there will be an offsetting outflow of interest, profits 
and dividends. Still, a cheaper cost of capital goods means lower costs for 
existing Ukrainian firms, while a lowered risk premium also makes life less 
risky for them (reducing the welfare cost of uncertainty). Yet lower profit 
margins in finance, however, are assumed to mean lower profits for Ukrainian 
banks. 
The net effects of all these factors are that welfare rises by between 4.5% 
(low elasticity case) and 4.8% (high elasticity case), in addition to the trade gains 
identified in our GE model.  
Effects upon corruption and waste 
A growing body of economic literature19 explains corruption, at least 
partly, not just in terms of local institutions and traditions, but in terms of 
‘rent-seeking’. In other words, particularly in a society with relatively 
undeveloped policing and legal institutions, bribery, intimidation, theft and 
the squandering of resources in criminal enterprises will be greater the 
larger are the potential gains from such activities. These gains are closely 
linked to either the rental income from property, such as oilfields or gold 
mines where property rights are insecure or subject to official allocation, or 
to the profits of local or national monopolies.  
•  In the case of Ukraine, a culture has developed where oligarchs, with 
close links to politicians (at least pre-2004) have inherited most of the 
large companies dominating both export and home markets. Entry of 
new competitors is difficult owing to corruption and intimidation and 
the oligarchs’ domination of the financial services sector.  
                                                      
19 See for example, C. Perroni and J. Whalley, “Rents and the Cost and Optimal 
Design of Commodity Taxes”, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 
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•  The steel quota rent is a classic case of a monopolistic income that 
benefits oligarchs. 
•  Increased competition in many goods industries should lower profit 
margins, meaning that the potential gains from deterring or 
obstructing competitors by illegal or semi-legal means are reduced. 
•  Reform of the financial services sector and the entry of foreign banks 
should greatly help the start-up of new businesses, which could 
transform the climate of many industries. 
•  Some theoretical work20 indicates economies subject to corruption can 
experience multiple equilibria (so that small changes in economic 
parameters can, under some circumstances, lead to a sea change from 
being poor and corrupt to being prosperous and less corrupt). 
•  The weakening of oligopolistic powers over resources will relieve the 
constraints on entrepreneurial investment by credit-constrained 
individuals; and the shifting of political power towards the 
entrepreneurial elite will result in economic policy and institutions 
which are more conducive to entrepreneurship and productivity 
progress.21  
Firm selection effects 
Most standard economic models assume all firms are equally efficient. This 
is clearly unrealistic. In practice, there are good and bad firms, and within a 
firm there may be good or bad divisions or plants.  
•  Increased competition from imports is likely to lead to a clear-out of 
the least efficient plants and firms in many industries, raising average 
productivity.22 
•  In general, only the larger and more efficient firms can profitably 
enter export markets.23 Under many circumstances, trade 
                                                      
20 See M. Kelly, Developing Rotten Institutions, Discussion Paper No. 5281, CEPR, 
London, 2005. 
21 See J. Falkinger and V. Grossman, Distribution of Natural Resources, 
Entrepreneurship and Economic Development: Growth Dynamics with Two Elites, 
Working Paper No. 1562, CESifo, Munich, October, 2005. 
22 See the forthcoming paper by T. Huw Edwards, “Who Gains from Restructuring 
the Post-Soviet Transition Economies, and Why?”, International Review of Applied 
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liberalisation, which leads to the faster growth of export industries, 
will particularly benefit these firms, raising average productivity 
across the economy. This effect is sometimes seen as having helped 
lead to the very impressive post-war growth in the productivity of 
Japanese and Korean exporting firms. 
•  The more easily new firms can enter the market, particularly in export 
industries, the bigger these gains will be. The reason is that if plenty 
of new firms are entering the market, the most efficient ones will be 
the likeliest to survive, while the least successful will close. Again, 
financial services liberalisation and institutional reforms could have 
big effects upon this. 
Outsourcing and the inflow of technology 
Much trade these days, especially the rapidly growing trade in East and 
South East Asia, is driven by outsourcing by Western firms. Effectively this 
involves establishing an ongoing business relationship (often involving a 
takeover or a joint venture) that enables the Western multinational to invest 
in bringing in its more advanced technology, product brands and business 
techniques to the local firm. Although outsourcing is often stimulated by 
cheaper local labour costs, low wages alone do not drive this sort of 
investment. The major reason is that outsourcing relationships can be very 
risky, since the Western company is investing in a new country with a new 
legal and administrative environment, a different business culture and an 
often unreliable infrastructure and local suppliers.  
•  Greater trade openness (which allows the Western firm to use its 
customary foreign suppliers), along with finance, utilities and 
infrastructure reforms (which enable its local partner to carry out 
business more efficiently), are essential in driving outsourcing. 
•  Bringing Ukraine’s business regulations and quality standards into 
line with the rest of Europe should greatly enhance its attractiveness. 
•  Investments in transport infrastructure are also likely to prove 
essential. 
                                                                                                                                       
23 See A.B. Bernard, S. Redding and P.K. Schott, Comparative Advantage and 
Heterogeneous Firms, Paper presented at the Conference on Globalisation and Firm 
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Networking effects 
Because overseas firms face a risk when they enter a new market, they will 
tend to place a great premium upon markets that are, to some degree, 
familiar. Their decisions may reflect historical patterns of trade or local 
ethnic ties (for example, China’s economic boom is largely being driven by 
businesses developed by the Chinese diaspora across South East Asia, who 
in turn developed links with the West far ahead of firms in the People’s 
Republic). But once pioneering firms have entered a market and shown 
themselves to be successful, others will more easily follow. The key thing, 
therefore, is to establish and nurture the initial, pioneering ties.24 Whether 
Ukraine can attract new investors across a range of industries (other than, 
perhaps, in agriculture or metals manufacture) is a difficult issue – 
probably the best initial prospects would be in food processing, provided 
Ukraine could overcome the formidable problems of removing the SPS 
barriers on trade with Western Europe.  
When firm-to-firm economic relationships and trust are important – 
as in many aspects of industry – the formation of reliable ties can be seen as 
a form of capital formation, requiring the ‘investment’ of experimentation 
with new partners. In a well-functioning economy, firms are able to 
develop wider networks of ties, whereas in poorly functioning economies, 
where institutions and trust are weak, close insider relationships among 
small groups of people or firms may dominate. This latter case is relevant 
to Ukraine, because the Soviet break-up meant the destruction of many 
previous economic ties. Under some circumstances (which seem to have 
dominated in Poland, Hungary and the other EU accession states), after an 
initial disruption the process of re-establishing wide-ranging economic 
relationships, both at home and with the West, seems to have gone on 
apace, as some theorists have indicated that it should.25 In the CIS states, 
however, something quite different has happened – the post-Soviet chaos 
seems to have led to the domination of some of the former Soviet 
economies (those further from the EU, notably Russia, Ukraine and Central 
Asia) by small, corrupt networks of insiders – the oligarchs – who can 
                                                      
24 See for example, T. Huw Edwards, “Import Search and the Path-Dependency of 
Trade”, Mimeo, Loughborough University, 2005(a). 
25 See for example, P. Frijters, D.J. Bezemer and U. Dulleck, Contacts, Social Capital 
and Market Institutions – A Theory of Development, Working Paper, University of 
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obstruct reform and block the entry of new players. The theory for 
understanding and modelling this process, or of how and under what 
circumstances institutional and trade reforms can help switch an economy 
from a corrupt one with poorly-developed networks dominated by insiders 
to a thriving one with widespread economic ties is still in its infancy. 
‘Re-branding’ Ukraine 
At present, ‘made in Ukraine’ is probably a sign of substantial negative 
value, for both potential customers and potential business partners abroad. 
By contrast, ‘made in the EU’ is usually a strong positive sign. It may well 
be that the best hope Ukrainian producers have of initially breaking into 
many Western markets is under the brands of existing Western firms, who 
outsource their production to Ukraine. Yet even attracting the outsourcers 
may not be easy, since they too will be deterred by Ukraine’s reputation. 
•  The ultimate prize for Ukraine would be for local Ukrainian firms to 
be treated with a high degree of trust by foreign consumers and 
business partners. This potential benefit is probably the biggest, yet 
the most intangible one of deeper integration of Ukraine. The 
intermediate prize would be for in-the-know Western outsourcing 
firms to be prepared to lend their brand names to goods produced in 
Ukraine. Even getting to this stage would require considerable 
improvements to Ukraine’s business image. This goal requires reform 
across a whole range of institutional areas, as well as in trade and 
competition policy, regulation and the product rules associated with 
deeper integration.  
•  For Ukraine to reach the stage of achieving mutual recognition with 
the EU across a wide range of goods and services would probably be 
the most significant step in re-branding Ukraine as part of ‘virtual 
Europe’. 
•  From the EU’s perspective, the benefits from re-branding Ukraine are 
mainly political. There has to be some caution, in the sense that the 
EU cannot be seen to bestow the brand of ‘virtual Europe’ upon 
countries that fall far short of EU legal and business standards – for 
fear of tarnishing the image of European businesses in general.  
4.  Deeper integration of Ukraine and institutional reforms 
As summarised earlier in chapter 4, ‘top-down’ empirical estimates of the 
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by Daniel Piazolo)26 indicate that an improvement of one-third in 
institutional quality would have a static effect of perhaps 10% on Ukrainian 
GDP, with ongoing effects linked to capital formation (including network 
and social capital formation) leading to eventual gains of 20 to 30%. It may 
even (looking now at studies based upon an ‘endogenous growth’ 
formulation) have an ongoing increase in the growth rate, that would 
cumulate over the years beyond this. 
These estimates are clearly much larger than the orthodox general 
estimates of the effects of trade policy reforms (even when the reforms 
involve deeper integration), as was summarised above. There is a strong 
overlap, however, between the wider-ranging economic effects of 
integration, as outlined in the subsequent bullish assessment (and which 
are only now being incorporated into general equilibrium-type models) 
and those picked up empirically by studies such as Piazolo’s. For example, 
capital accumulation effects could add 5 to 10 percentage points to 
Ukraine’s national income (as indicated above), while if increased 
competition reduced the scope and incentives for corruption, the gains 
could be similar in magnitude. 
Yet there are further effects that are perhaps not being captured. 
Some are related to institutional reforms in areas that do not relate so 
directly to trade.27 Some may be more closely driven by capital 
infrastructure investment,28 while some may reflect political openness. 
Again, some of the key aspects of economic development – we have 
already mentioned networks and social capital in the context of trade – are 
still very difficult to model.  
 
                                                      
26 See D. Piazolo, The integration process between Eastern and Western Europe, Kieler 
Studien No. 310, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1999. 
27 Although, as deeper integration is increasingly seen as incorporating reform in 
services sectors, its effects upon regulation will be wide-ranging, particularly if 
integration is interpreted as requiring not merely the institution of regulations, but 
the creation and maintenance of the institutions required to police them. 
28 Such investment should, nevertheless, be seen as an essential element of deeper 
integration since a sound capital infrastructure – roads, railways, airports, hotels, 
etc. – is essential to maximise the benefits of economic openness, even if such 
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The survey in chapter 4 shows that international agreements can 
‘anchor’ institutional reforms, such that by linking reforms closely to trade 
or political agreements their credibility can be enhanced. Perhaps above all, 
businesses can operate in a climate where the economic and institutional 
direction in which policy is headed is clear. This aspect may play an 
important part in the development of wider economic networks, as 
previously noted. 
Nowhere has the impact of this kind of institutional-trade-political 
linkage been more evident than in the cases of successive waves of EU 
accession states, from Ireland through to Spain and Portugal to Poland and 
Hungary. A deeper integration package with Ukraine cannot go quite as 
far. This conclusion may make it somewhat harder to instil the credibility 
element in Ukrainian reforms, although, as our modelling indicates, the 
potential gains from deeper integration are not negligible and our 
discussion of the more extensive effects indicates that they could be large 
for Ukraine.  
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ANNEX 4. APPENDIX A 
TABLES 
Table A4(a). Effects of reforms on trade between the EU-15 and Ukraine 
   Effects of each stage in turn    










 Base  value     
Agriculture   139  -1.44  49.64  103.37 
Minerals 28  -3.57  7.41  142.73 
Food processing  395  0.76  98.49  18.11 
Light manuf.  540  -9.07  65.38  18.14 
Heavy manuf.  1,894  -3.43  22.42  9.08 
Textiles 431  0.00  25.06  2.97 
Metals 98  -4.08  1714.89  76.09 
Services 1,031  8.34  1.79  194.25 
Overall 4,556  -0.70  64.83  56.88 
 
Effect on EU-15 exports to Ukraine 
Agriculture    517 -9.67 36.62 48.66 
Minerals 753  -13.94  2.93  -2.72 
Food processing  107  -7.48  64.65  6.71 
Light manuf.  101  -18.81  25.61  -5.41 
Heavy manuf.  1,594  -18.57  7.40  -6.89 
Textiles  323  -3.41 4.49 8.74 
Metals  1,173  -17.90 20.77 18.45 
Services  1,279 1.09 0.08  140.31 
Overall  5,847  -11.72 11.35 35.58 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 230 | ANNEX 4. APPENDIX A – TABLES 
Table A4(b). Effects of reforms on trade between the CEECs and Ukraine 
   Effects of each stage in turn    
 











  Base value       
Agriculture   49  38.78  48.53  184.42 
Minerals 30  40.00  7.14  242.22 
Food processing  158  9.49  97.11  27.80 
Light manuf.  220  -31.82  65.33  -11.75 
Heavy manuf.  618  62.14  22.26  83.45 
Textiles 134  40.30  25.00  45.07 
Metals 35  111.43  1,460.81  238.29 
Services 137  -55.47  1.64  21.37 
Overall 1,381  27.30  94.08  74.68 
 
Effect on CEECs’ exports to Ukraine 
Agriculture   260  131.92  21.89  282.12 
Minerals 235  85.96  -0.46  109.04 
Food processing  78  83.33  68.53  112.24 
Light  manuf.  71  57.75 41.07 83.70 
Heavy  manuf.  775  62.84 13.79 87.33 
Textiles  54  53.70 24.10 74.60 
Metals 425  198.12  12.39  307.40 
Services  50  -58.00 4.76 8.82 
Overall 1,948  101.64  15.94  162.79 
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Table A4(c). Effects of reforms on trade between the SEECs and Ukraine 
   Effects of each stage in turn    















  Base value       
Agriculture   24  66.67  50.00  233.33 
Minerals 9  55.56  7.14  262.96 
Food processing  22  59.09  97.14  86.76 
Light manuf.  98  1.02  63.64  29.08 
Heavy manuf.  352  40.06  21.91  57.77 
Textiles 67  28.36  25.58  33.11 
Metals 21  19.05  1,500.00  93.15 
Services 50  -58.00  4.76  8.82 
Overall 643  26.44  76.75  70.52 
 
Effect on SEECs’ exports to Ukraine 
Agriculture   114  103.51  40.95  232.34 
Minerals 205  73.17  7.61  91.76 
Food processing  45  108.89  61.70  141.87 
Light manuf.  17  117.65  16.22  153.08 
Heavy manuf.  602  55.81  13.43  78.95 
Textiles 30  33.33  37.50  52.73 
Metals 412  143.93  9.75  235.71 
Services 76  -50.00  0.00  17.11 
Overall 1,501  82.48  15.52  135.02 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table A4(d). Revised gravity model results for EU border dummies  
    Food    Meat/  Minerals Processing Light  Heavy    Textiles  Metals  Services 
    crops  dairy      manuf. manuf.      
Ln Importer Demand  0.616349  0.728503  0.821643  0.969623  0.987661  0.863769  0.837337  0.887152  0.80653 
Ln Exporter Output  0.539988  0.609558  0.69277  0.603089  1.085446  1.08863  1.001178  0.875404  0.779284 
Dummies: ACCACC -1.40039 -0.22928 -1.64254 -0.4556  0.581296 0.339263 0.237486 -0.29987 0.22903 
   EUACC  -1.02726 -0.08863 -1.14785  -0.45472  0.504223  0.393738  0.805418 -0.23926 0.309239 
   EUEU  -0.0849  0.798732  -0.611  0.600022  0.460205  0.645917  1.034391 0.010159 0.598301 
   EUOTH  -1.24074  -0.5277  -1.36912 -0.20087  0.254973  0.586825 0.084205 -0.96722  0.393391 
   ACCOTH  -1.70107  -0.88329  -1.92505  -1.10089  -0.42647 -0.07326 -0.72162 -0.10795 0.20874 
Ln Distance  -0.74427  -0.54377  -0.93815  -0.74615  -0.73098  -0.7764  -0.80084  -0.52587  -0.2336 
Constant     -1.55601  -6.54877  -3.28787  -6.91939  -12.0975  -10.9053  -8.09363  -6.21969  -13.0317 
                   
R-squared     0.427408 0.377883 0.470544  0.518433  0.725546 0.794017 0.669382 0.656759 0.794545 
Adj R-Squared  0.423959  0.37369  0.466822  0.515769  0.724045 0.792897 0.667561 0.654855 0.793429 
Notes: 
t-stats significant at 99% level 
t-stats significant at 95% level 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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ANNEX 4. APPENDIX B 
TECHNICAL MODEL DESCRIPTION 
The model is a multi-country, general equilibrium model, adapted from 
that used earlier by Brenton & Whalley (1999). Their paper describes the 
model in less technical terms, while this note is more technical in nature.  
The modelling procedure is effectively as follows: 
As with any general equilibrium model, we start by assuming a 
model structure, which lays out the way in which we model production, 
consumption and trade.  
•  Based on that structure, we then need to assume a series of 
elasticities, relying upon the literature for guidance. 
•  We then assume that our base data represents an equilibrium state of 
the world economy, in accordance with the model structure that we 
have assumed. Working on this assumption, we are able to calibrate a 
series of share and other structural parameters that help determine 
the equilibrium of the model. 
•  We then lay out the equations of the model. These contain a number 
of variables – which alter simultaneously as we change our 
assumptions about tariffs and other policy instruments – in order to 
calculate the new equilibrium. 
•  Then we insert our altered policy assumptions and calculate the new 
equilibrium, deriving the effects on trade, production and consumer 
welfare. 
All our data is calibrated upon an initial data set. This set is a series of 
input-output and trade tables, where the world is broken down into six 
regions, and production and consumption are split up among eight broad 
classes of commodities. 
In the equation listing as follows, our regions are indexed as either ‘r’ 
or ‘rr’, while commodities are indexed as either ‘g’ or ‘gg’, so that, for 
example, CNSr,g,rr denotes consumption in country r of commodity g 
produced in country rr. CNSr,g,tot denotes consumption in country r of an 
aggregate basket of commodity g from all countries. 234 | ANNEX 4. APPENDIX B – TECHNICAL MODEL 
1.  Variables used in the model 
The following is a listing of the variables in the model. These variables are 
the economic series that we assume will alter in order to satisfy the 
equilibrium conditions laid down by the model, once certain assumptions 
on tariffs and so forth are changed. 
PRNr,g production 
CNSr,g consumption 
UTPr  price of utility 
INCr income 
PRPr,g producer  price 
PRCr,g,r consumer  price 
CP1r,g,r  CES price aggregate 
REVr  tariff and tax revenue 
2. Model  equations 
2.1  Production functions with derived supply functions 
We start by modelling the production side of the economy. We are still 
using the production structure of the Brenton–Whalley model, which was 
developed in order to simulate a Ukrainian economy on which very little 
information was available. Consequently, production is not modelled in 
detail. Rather, the economy is assumed to operate on a ‘production 
possibility frontier’, so that it can only produce more of one good by 
producing less of another. The rate at which one good is substituted for 
another is determined by the elasticity of transformation, σt. For simplicity, 
however, the equations below are actually written in terms of a 
‘transformation parameter’, ρt, which is directly related to the elasticity of 
transformation by the formula ρt=(σt-1)/ σt. Note that this formulation has 
no intermediate inputs and does not distinguish between factors of 
production (such as labour or capital).  
2.2  Production possibility frontier (PPF) 
This equation determines the trade-off between production of each good g 
in country r. PP1r,g is a share parameter, based on the base year structure of 




g r g r R PRN PP PPF
ρ ρ / 1
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2.3  Supply function (all goods except good 8) 
We now want to know how the production of each good varies as producer 
prices are altered. This has been calculated by determining the ratio of 
production of good g to that of good 8 (services) in each country. This ratio 
will vary with prices according to the elasticity of transformation: 
) 1 /( 1
, 8 , 8 , , 8 , , )) 1 /( ) 1 ((
tr
g r g r g r g r g r g r PRP PP PRP PP PRN PRN
ρ − = .           (2) 
2.4  Modelling the consumer side 
Income function with derived demand functions 
Country r’s total income is revenue from selling goods, plus tax and tariff 
revenue and aid received from abroad: 
∑ + + =
g
r r g r g r r AID REV PRP PRN INC , , .                           (3) 
Aggregate price for bundles of each type of consumer goods 
Consumers are assumed to maximise utility subject to a budget constraint 
(given by INCr, as derived in the equation above). Utility is modelled as a 
nested CES (constant elasticity of substitution) function, so that consumers 
choose on a top level among different classes of goods (such as between 
services and food products) and simultaneously on a lower level among 
different countries of origin for each type of good (for example between EU 
or Russian food products). 
We start by calculating the ‘average price’ for the bundle of good g, 
chosen from across the range of different countries:  
tot g r
rr
rr g r rr g r g r CNS PRC CNS CP , , , , , , , / ) ( 1 ∑ = .                         (4) 
Consequently, we derive an ‘average price’ for services, food products, 
light manufactures, etc. 
Top level demand for each consumer goods category 
Having calculated the average price for each goods category, the consumer 
is then able to choose how to split expenditure among goods (e.g. between 
services and food products). This is calculated from how the consumer 
initially splits up expenditure (BENCNSr,g,tot is total consumption in 
country r in the base case of goods class g from any source), along with the 
changes in consumer prices, by way of the top-level elasticity of 
substitution in consumption, σs and related substitution parameter ρs=(σs-
1)/ σs: 236 | ANNEX 4. APPENDIX B – TECHNICAL MODEL 
) 1 /( 1
8 , 8 , , ,
, 8 , , , , 8 , , ,
) 1 1 /( ) 1 1 (
) / (
sr
g r g r g r g r
tot g r tot g r tot g r tot g r
BENCP CP BENCP CP
BENCNS BENCNS CNS CNS
ρ − ×
× =
.             (5) 
Marginal cost of utility in each country 
The model uses as its overall price index the marginal cost of consumer 
utility. This takes the form of a CES price function, where UP0 is a 
parameter calculated from the baseline data, in order to express overall 
prices as an index: 




gg r r r CP UP UP UTP
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ / ) 1 ( )) 1 /( (
,
)) 1 /( 1 (
, ) 1 1 ( ) 0 / 1 (
− − − ∑ × = .        (6) 
Demand for goods from different national sources 
We now move to the lower level of the consumer’s utility function, which 
determines how the consumer allocates expenditure on good g (say, food 
products) among different regions of origin. Share2 is a share parameter, 
reflecting the way consumers chose in the base case to split up 
consumption among different countries of origin. These shares will change 
to reflect changes in relative prices (inclusive of taxes and tariffs), subject to 
the constant elasticity of substitution at the lower level, σs2 and the related 
substitution parameter ρs2=(σs2-1)/ σs2: 
) , 2 1 /( 1
, , ,
) , 2 1 /( 1
, , , , , , ) / 1 ( 2
g r s
rr g r g r
g r s
rr g r tot g r rr g r PRC CP SHARE CNS CNS
ρ ρ − − × × = .  (7) 
Balanced (household) budget 
The consumer’s budget constraint is that income equals expenditure. For 
simplicity, we do not allow for varying savings in this model: 
∑∑ =
gr r
rr g r rr g r PRC CNS INCr , , , , .                                    (8) 
Market clearing 
For each goods class, g, total consumption across all countries equals total 
production across all countries: 
∑ =
rr
g r rr g r PRN CNS , , , .                                             (9) 
Zero profits 
Again for simplicity, the model assumes all markets are perfectly 
competitive (although different countries produce differentiated products, THE PROSPECT OF DEEP FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE| 237 
and there are taxes, tariffs and other trade costs). The price to consumers 
equals the production price plus tariffs plus consumption taxes: 
) 1 )( 1 ( , , , , , , g r rr g r g rr rr g r TAX TAR PRP PRC + + = .                    (10) 
2.5  Government balanced budget 
Each country’s government gains revenue from consumption taxes and 
tariffs. These are redistributed in a lump-sum form to consumers, to spend 
upon goods according to their own choice (there is no direct government 
spending in the model). 
∑∑ + + =
g
rr g r g rr
rr
rr g r g r g rr g rr rr g r g rr r CNS PRP TAR TAX TAX PRP TARt PRP REV , , , , , , , , , , , ) ( . (11) 
PRPr,g1 is fixed at 1 to act as the denominator for the model 
PRP.FX(“ROW”,”G1”) = 1.                                    (12) 
Modelling of changing border costs 
As well as tariffs, we assume that traded goods face a border cost, ICBr,g,rr, 
when they cross from region r to region rr. These costs are assumed to 
reflect the effects of regulatory barriers to trade, and are assumed to be in 
the form of a fixed proportional cost on the value of traded goods (an 
‘iceberg cost’). These costs reflect different technical specifications and 
product compatibility, labelling, testing and costs of border and customs 
checks. We estimate these costs by looking at how trade patterns among 
various regions differ from an idealised pattern, using a gravity model.  
We assume that deeper integration lowers the cost of trading between 
Ukraine and the various EU regions, by reducing or removing regulatory 
barriers. The easiest way to model this within the Brenton–Whalley model 
structure is to adjust the lower-level share parameters. Effectively, if 
regulatory costs on Ukrainian exports to the EU of good g are reduced, 
then we assume that EU consumers are now able to obtain more utility 
from each unit of good g imported from Ukraine. This is reflected in a rise 
in the share parameter for Ukrainian exports to the UK: 
g r s
rr g r rr g r rr g r ICB x UP SHARE
, 2
, , , , , , ) 1 ( 2 2
ρ − = ,                (13) 
where UP2 is the share parameter in the base case and ICB is the assumed 
border cost between the two countries.  
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